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ABSTRACT




My dissertation is a collection of three essays relating to three important aspects of
financial markets - assets, firms, and households. While the first two chapters focus on
financial linkage between asset markets (emerging country CDS and bonds), and firms
(US financial system), the last chapter explores how households form beliefs about the
stock markets and macroeconomy in general.
In the first chapter I show that the emerging market CDS-bond basis systematically
declines when US interest rates fall. This is intriguing because in a frictionless market,
the CDS-bond basis, defined as CDS spread minus bond spread should be zero. The
basis deviations are temporary and occur in both pre and post the financial crisis of
2008-09, although the effect is arguably stronger post crisis. The relationship is driven
by a rise in investor demand to sell CDS when US rates are low and the investor
motive is most consistent with reaching for yield. Aggregate outstanding sovereign
CDS positions held by investors show net CDS sold increases when the rates fall. I
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also find the largest mutual funds in the emerging debt market are net sellers of CDS
during 2006-2016 and show similar sensitivity to interest rates.
The second chapter is joint work with Sumanta Basu, George Michailidis, and
Amiyatosh Purnanandam. We introduce and estimate a model that leverages a system-
wide approach to identify systemically important financial institutions. Our Lasso
penalized Vector Auto-regressive (LVAR) model explicitly allows for the possibility
of connectivity amongst all institutions under consideration: this is in sharp contrast
with extant measures of systemic risk that, either explicitly or implicitly, estimate such
connections using pair-wise relationships between institutions. Using simulations we
show that our approach can provide considerable improvement over extant measures.
We estimate our model for large financial institutions in the U.S. and show its usefulness
in detecting systemically stressful periods and institutions.
The third chapter is joint work with Camelia M. Kuhnen and Stefan Nagel. We
show that individuals’ macroeconomic expectations are influenced by their socioeco-
nomic status (SES). Individuals with higher income or higher education levels are more
optimistic about future macroeconomic developments, including business conditions,
the national unemployment rate, and stock market returns. In the time series, the
spread in beliefs between high-SES and low-SES individuals diminishes significantly
during recessions. We document that SES-related differences in macroeconomic expec-
tations are in part driven by different recent changes in people’s personal finances, the
type of news they attend to, and the economic conditions in their county of residence.
Moreover, we find that SES-driven expectations can help explain why, during non-
recession periods, individuals with higher socioeconomic status have more exposure to
the stock market and are more inclined to purchase homes, durable goods, or cars.
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CHAPTER I
Effect of US Monetary Policy on Emerging
Sovereign CDS-Bond Market
1.1 Introduction
The CDS-bond basis is the difference between the cost of insurance on a risky bond
and the bond’s yield spread over a risk-free rate. In a frictionless market without arbi-
trage opportunities the basis should be exactly zero. But in practice it is at most only
approximately zero due to technical contract differences, and sometimes it deviates
quite far from zero. During the 2008-09 crisis, the basis became extremely negative
(lowest at roughly -700 bps for high-yield and -200 bps for investment-grade US cor-
porate bonds). The literature suggests the cause of the unusual deviations was the
rapid decline in liquidity in the bond market during the crisis driven by a combination
of unprecedented rise in risk aversion, deleveraging by investors, shortage of capital at
dealers and rising funding costs. The gap in the CDS-bond basis persisted for a few
months before going back to normal as market conditions improved and the partici-
pants regained the ability to contribute capital to the bond market (Duffie (2010)).
While large persistent deviations attracted much attention, there are also time-
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varying discrepancies in the CDS-bond relationship that have not been looked at, pos-
sibly because of their temporary nature and smaller magnitude. These deviations are
intriguing because they reveal a systematic pattern - I find that the basis systematically
varies with US interest rate fluctuations. I explore if reaching for yield - investors’
propensity to buy riskier assets in order to obtain higher returns - can explain this.
The CDS-bond basis is particularly useful here because it can distinguish the demand
shocks arising due to yield chasing investors from the shocks to the fundamental cred-
itworthiness of the underlying entity. Under the assumption that fundamental factors
related to the credit risk are priced in the same way in the bond or CDS, the discrep-
ancies in the basis, which is the difference between the CDS and bond spreads, capture
the effect of factors orthogonal to the credit risk component. This paper studies the
effect of a particularly important global factor, namely the US monetary policy, on
deviations of the sovereign emerging market (EM) basis.
The reason to focus on EM is that policy makers in EM have been concerned about
US monetary policy in connection with excess global liquidity since 2008-09 crisis.
Many argue that loose monetary policy, including unconventional ones like quantitative
easing (QE), has had considerable spillover effects in EM economies through volatility
in capital flow, exchange rate fluctuations, rapid credit growth or inflation etc.1 But
the impact of US monetary policy on foreign financial assets is relatively less studied,
with the exception of few recent examples such as Chen et al. (2012), Fratzscher et al.
(2016), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Bowman et al. (2015). While there is some overall
agreement in these studies that expansionary policies depressed credit spreads in EM,
there is little clarity on whether such effect is only seen post crisis, or what are the
channels of transmission.2 This paper provides insight into these issues by studying
1See for example Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Mishra et al. (2014), Rai and Suchanek (2014)
2Both Fratzscher et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2012) suggest post crisis QE raised equity prices and
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the distortions in the basis which is better suited than just prices to identify the
effect of investor demand from fundamental factors related to creditworthiness of the
underlying. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is also the first to show spillover
effects of US interest rates to deviations from a no-arbitrage relationship in a foreign
financial market.
The main hypothesis in this paper is that low interest rates in the US create incen-
tives for investors to reach for yield in EM debt market, which is riskier than traditional
safe instruments like the treasuries. To gain exposure to the underlying credit risk of
the sovereign, the investors, possibly those with short investment horizons or more
volatile need of capital, prefer to sell CDS over buying the underlying bond because
CDS contracts have liquidity advantages over bonds with the same return profile. This
creates a selling pressure in CDS markets which, in presence of constrained dealers,
depresses the CDS premia and thereby, the basis.
The two key ingredients in this hypothesis are - a) why do certain investors choose
CDS over bonds, and b) how does a demand pressure lead the CDS premia to become
temporarily delinked from the underlying bond spread?
First, CDS market performs a liquidity transformation by repackaging the bond’s
default risk into a more liquid security which transfers risk efficiently between holders
(Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015)). CDS markets are considered more liquid because
they have lower trading costs such as lower margin requirements (Garleanu and Peder-
depressed credit spreads in EM. They both study only the unconventional period whereas Gilchrist
et al. (2014) and Bowman et al. (2015) compare the impact of conventional (pre-crisis) as well as
unconventional (post-crisis) policy measures on the international bond market. But, their findings are
contrasting - while Gilchrist et al. (2014) finds monetary easing leads to narrowing of EM sovereign
bond yield spreads only during the conventional period, Bowman et al. (2015) suggests the effects
are similar in both periods. Fratzscher et al. (2016) discusses global portfolio rebalancing driving
the effects and Gilchrist et al. (2014) suggests reaching for yield as a likely mechanism. These two
mechanisms are not exclusive. However, reaching for yield is a more specific demand channel that is
associated with greater risk-taking and is more likely when interest rates are low.
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sen (2011)) or ease of transaction due to greater standardization (Oehmke and Zawad-
owski (2017)).3 The lower cost attracts investors who have short-term trading horizon
and are susceptible to liquidity shocks to trade in the CDS market. Oehmke and Za-
wadowski (2015) shows theoretically that relatively optimistic long-term buy-and-hold
type investors buy the bond whereas optimistic short-term investors sell the CDS, and
both types of pessimistic investors buy CDS. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) finds
empirical evidence that speculative trading is more concentrated in CDS markets due
of its liquidity advantage. Second, CDSs are over-the-counter, sophisticated derivatives
with fewer and specialized participants like big banks, hedge funds and other institu-
tional investors like mutual funds. A small specialized market decreases the ability of
the dealer to hedge all uncovered positions on one hand, but also lends them bargaining
power against other investors (Duffie et al. (2005)). Thus, excess demand to sell CDS
by investors can lead these dealers to lower the quoted premium to make up for the
cost of being unhedged.
There are two testable implications for the hypothesis. First, it predicts a positive
relationship between the US interest rates and the EM CDS-bond basis. I find this to
be true for both the level and slope of the US yield curve during 2004-2014. Second, it
predicts a negative relationship between the net CDS sold and the US interest rates.
This also holds up in the data, both for aggregate CDS positions and for the largest
mutual funds that invest in emerging market debt. What can unifiedly explain these
observed relationships? I suggest investor demand driven by reaching for yield motives
presents the most coherent narrative.
In the first part of the empirical analysis, time series regressions at weekly frequency
3The CDS contracts based on ISDA guidelines have more standardized contractual terms than
the bonds which are split into different issues with different coupon, maturity, embedded options
etc. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) shows that more fragmented a firm’s bond issues are, the more
attractive its CDS market is for trading credit risk.
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show that the basis increases by 48-76 bps on average when the level of US yield curve
increases by 100 bps. The effect is significant only in the conventional (pre crisis) period
- not surprising given that short rate was essentially stuck at zero in the unconventional
(post crisis) period. For the US yield curve slope, a 100 bps increase is associated
with about 35-45 bps increase in the EM CDS-bond basis during both pre and post
period.4 The response in the basis is temporary - the effect reverts in less than 4 weeks.
The adjusted R-squared of these regressions are high - varying between 0.72 to 0.28
depending on whether the specification includes lagged regressors or not. Also, the
effect of the US term structure on basis is robust across time which is confirmed by
estimating the same regression over ≈ 2-year rolling windows from 2004-2014.5
Next, in an event-study approach, I show that the basis falls on days of Federal Open
Markets Committee (FOMC) announcements of expansionary policy. This strongly
suggests that the effect of interest rates on the basis is causal in nature. I follow Han-
son and Stein (2015) and use changes in 2-year nominal treasury rate around FOMC
announcements as a proxy for monetary policy news about expected medium path of
interest rates. I find a 100 bps change in the US Treasury is associated with 143 bps
change in basis, measured over the same 2-day window during the post crisis period.
There are two possible concerns before we can interpret the estimated coefficient as
causal effect of monetary policy. First, Could an omitted factor be partly driving the
comovement between basis and the treasury rate changes on the FOMC days? If this
reverse causality argument were true, the estimated effect should not be distinct for
FOMC and non-FOMC days. This is rejected in the data - the response of basis to
4There is little theoretical guidance whether the short rate or long rate is relevant for reaching for
yield. Without a priori assumptions, I have included both the short and long rates in my time series
regression and find both of them to be significant implying that the whole term structure of interest
is relevant for deviations in basis.
5The positive relationship is robust to alternative specifications such as fixed effects model or daily
or semi-weekly frequency specifications.
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100 bps US rate change is nearly twice for FOMC days than the non-FOMC days
during the unconventional period and the effect is both economically and statistically
significant. Second, does the change in treasury on announcement days reveal macroe-
conomic news or Fed’s monetary policy stance? Since the effect on the FOMC days
is significantly different from non-FOMC days when macro news is more prevalent,
FOMC announcements arguably reveal news about policy beyond just the economic
content. Lastly it is unrealistic to assume that the Fed contemporaneously responds to
the basis changes - FOMC meetings call for days of preparation and, unless it is a crisis
situation, ensuring credit market’s smooth functioning is arguably not one of Fed’s core
mandates. An analysis focused on just the QE announcements shows similar patterns
- an expansionary QE announcement on average lowers basis by ≈ 14 bps (statistically
significant) by the day after the announcement.
A concern here is whether the positive relationship between the CDS-bond basis
and US interest rates is driven by the illiquidity of the underlying bonds. Is it possible,
in absence of any demand shocks to the CDS spreads, when the risk-free rate rises the
illiquid bond yield does not adjust causing the yield spread to fall, thereby causing the
basis to increase? To address this, I measure the effect of FOMC announcements over
increasing horizon (1,2,..,5 days after announcement) assuming that longer horizon will
allow the yields to adjust accordingly. The reactions of the CDS over these horizons in
the unconventional period show a 100 bps decrease in the treasury rate is associated
with almost one-to-one decrease in CDS premia even after 5 days. On the other hand,
there is some adjustment in the yield right after announcement, but after 5 days, the
change in the yield spreads negligible. Thus, the slow reaction of the bonds possibly
leads to some degree of mismeasurement of the basis right after announcement, but it
is not enough to explain the overall positive reaction of the basis to US interest rate
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found in the data.6
The discussion until now establishes that the basis declines when US rates fall.
Next, using a sample of weekly aggregate sovereign CDS positions from the Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) from 2008-2016, I show that the net CDS sold
by investors increases when the slope of the US yield curve declines.7 During the entire
sample period, with the exception of a few months in end 2008, the dealers are net
buyers of sovereign CDS. This supports the view that the net sellers are yield seeking
investors because selling CDS is most consistent with speculative risk-taking motive.
Furthermore, literature on over-the-counter derivative market describes that dealers are
not able to hedge their positions right away due to search cost in finding a counterparty
(Garleanu et al. (2009), Duffie et al. (2005)) and a derivative order flow that increases
risk exposure of the dealers, will lead to a larger price impact (Shachar (2012)). This
means a temporary increase in CDS selling by yield-oriented investors (non-dealers)
further increases the dealers’ risk, prompting them to reduce the quoted price to deter
potential sellers, thereby intensifying the impact on basis.
To give an example of who the investors and dealers might be in the EM CDS
market, I gather from CRSP, the list of US mutual funds that invest in emerging
market debt (EMD) during 2006-2016. I collect the CDS holdings data for the largest
among these funds from their quarterly investment filings (N-Q and N-CSR forms) to
6Another concern is that the CDS somehow overreact to the changes in interest rates compared to
the bonds. It is, however, hard to justify why the CDS overreacts positively to interest rate rise around
announcements. Also, if there is an overreaction, what should be the appropriate horizon for the CDS
markets to correct? Results show that the CDS response over 5-days around the announcement is still
comparable in magnitude to its response over 2-days. So it is unclear if overreaction can explain the
observed pattern. Faster reaction in CDS is also more plausible in light of recent evidence by Adrian
et al. (2017) who show that dealers facing more regulations post crisis have reduced liquidity in the
bond markets.
7Although the public data does not provide the positions for only the emerging countries, the
major part of this aggregate CDS data is likely to be comprised of EM as the CDS market of advanced
countries is small.
7
the Securities and Exchange Commission of US (SEC). The final sample has 17 funds,
chosen such that they primarily invest in EMD during the sample period and have
at least 50 million USD as net assets at the beginning of 2006.8 I find these funds
are net sellers of CDS, similar to what Jiang and Zhu (2016) reports for the largest
corporate bond funds. The dealers in these CDS contracts constitute of a handful of
big banks such as, but not limited to, Citi Group, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Credit
Suisse, Goldman Sachs etc. There is much heterogeneity in CDS usage over time and
across the funds; there are some large funds who do not use CDS at all while some are
net sellers of CDS with the net notional CDS sold exceeding 50% of total net assets
on occasions. Lastly, time series regression of changes in net CDS sold as a % of net
assets by these funds on change in US yield curve slope gives a negative and significant
coefficient. This is consistent with the idea that institutional investors such as mutual
funds reach for yield in EM CDS market. However, one need to interpret the result
cautiously because the mutual funds only give a partial picture of the entire class of
CDS investors; but at least in this limited sample, the sign of the coefficient goes in
the predicted direction.
The deviations in the basis in response to the changes in US interest rates discussed
in this paper are most consistent with reaching for yield by investors. The reasons why
I suggest yield seeking is the most likely channel are the following. a) The most likely
motive behind CDS selling is speculative risk-taking. In the low interest rate regime,
CDS is a suitable instrument to take on credit risk and jack up returns because it
represents a tail risk that is evaluated over a horizon exceeding an average managers
term (Rajan (2006)). b) In absence of theoretical models of reaching for yield the
empirical literature has looked for a positive relationship between the spreads of risky
8The smallest fund at the beginning of this sample has 65 million USD worth of net assets. Most
of these funds grow to many times their size over the next decade.
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debt and US interest rate (e.g. Kamin and Von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen and Mody
(1998), Arora and Cerisola (2001)) which is what I find for CDS spreads in the FOMC
event study. c) The positive relationship between spreads and rates is not specific to
just risky EM sovereign debt; it also holds for the high-yield US corporate basis and
not the AAA-rated investment-grade basis.9 Using the basis data for US corporate
debt constructed in Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013), regressions of weekly changes in
high-yield corporate basis on changes of US interest rates gives similar results as the
EM basis. Lastly, the effect on basis is stronger in the post period (at least in the
FOMC analysis) when the reaching for yield concern has received the most attention.
1.2 Related Literature
Relative importance of fundamental factors versus global factors in determining the
EM credit spreads has been an important empirical question.10 However, in explaining
determinants of credit spreads, it is unclear what the global variables pick up when
included in regressions with other correlated country specific factors. For example, if
spreads increase as global interest rates rise, it is difficult to parse out whether decline
in creditworthiness of the borrower, or global phenomena unrelated to the creditwor-
thiness causes the spreads to rise. In this respect, the high frequency deviations in
the basis studied in this paper focuses on the effect of non-fundamental factors, which,
incidentally, are also much fast moving compared to the main determinants of credit
risk such as GDP growth or debt level.
Recent studies on comovement across EM CDS assert a significant role of global
9I thank the authors, Jenne Bai and Pierre Collin-Dufresne for kindly providing me with this
weekly time series of high yield and investment grade corporate basis from 2005-2014.
10See for exampleEichengreen and Mody (1998), Arora and Cerisola (2001), McGuire and Schrijvers
(2003), Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013), Longstaff et al. (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2016)).
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investors whose demand shocks translate into liquidity shocks for commonly held as-
sets;11 Longstaff et al. (2011) finds high level of comovement in EM CDS; Karolyi and
McLaren (2016) reports the sharp capital outflow from many EM markets in response
to Fed’s surprise announcement of phasing out their asset purchase program. I comple-
ment the findings in Longstaff et al. (2011) by documenting that EM CDS comove more
than the bonds and global risk premiums such as VIX are more correlated with the
first principal component(PC) in the CDS market than the first PC in the bond mar-
kets. I interpret the different degree of comovement as a sign that marginal investors
in bonds and CDS markets are constrained in different ways and consequently respond
to global conditions differently. This makes the case for an investor-driven wedge in
the CDS-bond pricing (i.e. push factor as opposed to pull factor) more persuasive. A
shortcoming in this approach is, just by studying comovement, one can not distinguish
whether the investors’ funding shocks or risk-taking motives drive the demand. The
main analysis in the paper outlined in the introduction above, however, makes the
distinction - the positive relationship between the basis and US rates is driven by how
the investors’ search for yield responds to changes in the rates and not by how the
investors’ ability to contribute capital responds to the same.
Theoretical treatment of reaching for yield is still nascent. It is unclear which
11In markets with frictions, Barberis et al. (2005) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009a) de-
scribe how demand of a common investor can give rise to comovement among fundamentally
unrelated assets. Barberis et al. (2005) discusses various ways correlated demand can generate
comovement. In style/category view, investors allocate assets to broad classes of securities eg
bonds/stocks/corporate/government debt etc based on past performance or fundamental news and as
investors move funds in and out of a category, assets, even those with fundamentally different cash
flows, comove. In habitat view, investors prefer a to invest in a subset of assets that are easier to in-
vest in e.g. have lower transaction costs, lower capital requirement etc. In information diffusion view,
some assets react to news faster than others and this gives rise to a common factor across assets with
similar rates of information assimilation. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009a) show in a theoretical
setting how margin constraints and dealer funding constraints can translate into demand shocks that
generate comovements among assets. All these different mechanisms are likely to be relevant to bond
and CDS markets.
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investors reach for yield and when, to what extent this relates to productive risk taking
versus excessive risk, and what motives or frictions could lead to such behavior. To the
best of my knowledge, the only theoretical models of reaching for yield are discussed in
Acharya and Naqvi (2016) and Hanson and Stein (2015). The key frictions are different
in the two papers; the former uses asymmetric information between the principal and
manager to incentivise reaching for yield and the latter uses non-standard preference
for investors to do so. However, post 2008-09, there has been a renewed interest in
reaching for yield among policy makers both in US and abroad (Haltom et al. (2013)).
The concern is whether prolonged low interest rates can encourage excessive exposure,
coordinated risk-taking, complacency about the extent of risk undertaken, all of which
have the potential to create a systemic impact when the tail-risk unwinds in unfavorable
states of the world (Yellen et al. (2011)).
In absence of theoretical guidance, literature has therefore relied on empirical evi-
dence of reaching for yield. But based on the circumstances or type of institution, the
modes of reaching for yield could be both subtle and varied. Becker and Ivashina (2015)
finds that insurance companies attempt to enhance portfolio returns by investing in the
riskiest corporate bonds within a risk rating. Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017) finds
that, in low interest rate environment, money market funds either exit the market or
change their product offerings by investing in riskier asset classes. Choi and Kronlund
(2016) finds when the level and slope of the yield curve are low, the mutual funds not
only actively shift their assets to riskier bonds but also experience higher inflows from
their investors. Stein (2013) warns of non-price ways in which reaching for yield may
show up - investors ‘agree to fewer covenants, accept more implicit subordination, and
so forth, and high yield issuance responds accordingly’. This paper contributes to the
empirical literature on reaching for yield by documenting how the CDS selling increases
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and consequently the basis falls when US interest rates are lowered.
When it comes to risky bond spreads, sovereign or corporate alike, the popular
narrative has been reaching for yield predicts a positive relationship between US rates
and credit spreads. But there is disagreement in empirical evidence on this; while
Fontana and Scheicher (2016) reports a negative relationship, Arora and Cerisola
(2001) and Gilchrist et al. (2014) find a positive relationship. For bond spreads at
issuance Kamin and Von Kleist (1999) finds no impact and Eichengreen and Mody
(1998) finds mixed evidence. In this respect, my findings support a positive relationship
between US interest rates and EM spreads.
This paper is related to a recent branch of literature that discusses dislocations
driven by demand and inability of arbitrageurs to close it. Borio et al. (2016) shows
how growing demand for dollar hedge from investors combined with limits to arbitrage
by dealers, owing to lower balance sheet capacity or stricter risk requirements, have
driven the violations of covered interest parity in currency markets since 2007. Klingler
and Sundaresan (2016) show demand for swaps by underfunded pension funds coupled
with balance sheet constraints of swap dealers can drive the swap spreads negative.
Possibly this is also why it is not surprising that I find the overall time series behavior
of the EM basis is not unique. Not only that it closely resembles the US corporate basis
reported in Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013) - slightly positive during the early sample
period but turns quite negative during the crisis and remains below zero thereafter -
but also the cross-currency basis in the post crisis period reported in Du et al. (2016).
My paper is similar to Klingler and Sundaresan (2016) in other ways as well; in that
paper underfunded pension funds prefer interest rate swaps over buying Treasuries
because the swap requires modest investment compared to Treasury, thus, freeing up
scarce funds that can be invested in high return yielding stocks. Their mechanism is
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similar in spirit to the choice of CDS over bonds when reaching for yield in this paper.
This paper also contributes to the growing empirical literature on CDS usage by
institutional investors. Recent literature finds mutual funds are net sellers of corporate
CDS and CDS usage is more prevalent among bond mutual funds which are invested in
relatively illiquid bonds, have high portfolio turnover and/or volatility, or have under
performed in the past. Findings in Guettler and Adam (2010) and Jiang and Zhu
(2016) show corporate bond funds are net sellers of CDS from 2004-2011 and their
most frequent strategy is to sell single-name CDS to gain credit risk exposure. Partly
contradictorily, Aragon et al. (2016) report that net buy-protection of corporate bond
mutual funds increases over the pre-crisis period (2004Q1-2007Q2) but falls steadily
from 2007Q3 to 2009 amidst concern of counterparty risk. They speculate that mutual
funds become sellers later partly because high risk premium in the post period is
attractive(yield-chasing) and partly to fill the void left by original sellers (dealers)
whose market making ability is impaired due to capital constraints in post period.
The findings in this paper is similar - several largest EMD mutual funds are net sellers
of sovereign CDS and their CDS selling behavior is consistent with reaching for yield.
1.3 Background on the CDS-bond basis
What is a CDS?
CDS is an insurance contract written on the notional amount of a bond (corporate
or sovereign) for a fixed period. If a credit event occurs, such as default on the bond,
missed coupon payment or restructuring etc, the insurer has to pay the insured the
difference between the notional (face value) and the market value of the bond. In turn,
the insurance buyer has to make fixed periodic payments (premiums as a percentage of
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the notional amount) to the seller until the maturity of the contract or the credit event,
whichever occurs first. The gross dollar denominated CDS market has grown since 2004
from about 8 Trillion USD to about 30 trillion USD in 2011 and have decreased since
then to about 10 trillion USD in 2017. The current net size of the market is 1 trillion
USD.12 It is a largely an over-the-counter dealer based market where institutional
investors such as hedge funds, banks, mutual funds etc can participate. The CDS
contracts are created by International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc (ISDA)
and have become more standardized over time.13
Theoretical relationship between bond spreads and CDS spreads
In a frictionless market (e.g. no dealer margin or transaction costs), a CDS contract
can be priced by no-arbitrage. Following Duffie (1999), consider a par floating rate
risky bond that pays coupons Rt+S until maturity and a par floating rate risk-free bond
that pays Rt at the same coupon frequency and has the same maturity. A portfolio
that consists of shorting the risky bond and investing in the risk-free bond, pays a
spread of S until maturity or default, whichever occurs first, and receives 100 − Y (τ)
at default, where τ is the time of default, 100 is the par value of the riskfree bond
and Y (τ) is the price of the risky bond at default. The payoff of this portfolio is the
same as that of a CDS written on the risky bond; the buyer pays a fixed premium
(also called credit spread) S until the contract expires or the credit event, and receives
the difference of the par value and market value of the risky bond at the event. Thus,
theoretically the CDS spread is equal to the bond spread and, therefore, the basis,
which is the difference between the two, is zero.14 At origination of the CDS contract,
12Source: ISDA http://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/swaps/notional-outstanding
13For a detailed discussion of the CDS markets see Jarrow (2011)
14Another way to construct the theoretical basis using fixed coupon bonds is discussed in Jarrow
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there is no exchange of cash between the seller and buyer of the CDS. The annuity
premium is determined such that the value of the CDS contract at origination is zero
i.e the expected value of the premiums to be paid equals the expected payoff to be
received in case of default. After origination, the CDS market value can differ from
zero, based on changes in the riskiness of the underlying or changes in market rates.
Duffie (1999) notes that determining the premium is a more critical pricing problem
for the market makers, while valuation post origination is more critical for investors
facing mark-to-market calls.
Basis deviations in practice
In practice, the no-arbitrage relationship is only approximate. Some technical rea-
sons for the deviations discussed in the literature are a) non par fixed coupon bonds are
used in reality instead of par floating rate bonds, b) maturity and timing of the coupon
payment on the bond and CDS may not be coincident, c) Interest rate accrual for CDS
coupons and bond coupons not accounted for in base model. But these technicalities
are unlikely to cause severe discrepancies in the pricing of CDS and bond. In presence
of frictions, however, the deviations in basis from its theoretical level could be both
large and systematic. To trade on a negative (positive) basis, the arbitrageur needs to
purchase the bond through a repo (short sell the bond through a reverse repo) and buy
(2016). Consider a fixed coupon risky bond with a face value of 1 that pays coupon cB and has
maturity τ . Consider a fixed coupon risk-free treasury bond with face value 1, coupon cT and the
same frequency of coupon payment and maturity as the risky bond. Shorting the risky bond and
investing in the risk-free bond generates the following cash flow: pay cB − cT every period until
default or maturity, and receive B(χ, τ)−D(χ, τ) at default period χ, where B(χ, τ) and D(χ, τ) are
the price of the risky and risk-free bond at default. Note that this cash flow is same as that accrued
to a CDS buyer who pays premium c until default or maturity, whichever is earlier, and receives
B(χ, τ)−D(χ, τ) at default. Thus, by no-arbitrage, the CDS premium, c is given by cB − cT . Thus,
theoretically, the basis, defined as the difference between the CDS spread and the bond spread is zero
i.e. basis = c − (cB − cT ) = 0. However, in reality the CDS buyer recieves 1 −D(χ, τ) at default so
the relationship is approximate.
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(sell) CDS contract on the notional amount of the bond. The bid-ask spread for risky
illiquid bonds at the beginning and termination of the repo could be large. Moreover,
the scarcity of the underlying bond can pose further short selling problems. Other
examples of transaction costs faced by investors are margin requirements and mark-
to-market calls. In addition to transaction costs, market makers inability to hedge
their positions perfectly can also affect the fundamental basis. Counterparty risk of
the seller is also not accounted for in the theoretical relationship; concern about CDS
seller’s ability to pay in case of default can move CDS spreads away from the bond
spreads. Stricter capital requirements may also cause violation of the no-arbitrage
relationship.
Studies have shown that higher market volatility and tighter funding during the
financial crisis led to rapid deleveraging in the bond markets and consequently drove
the basis significantly negative for an extended period. In fact, the basis has remained
below zero since the crisis until today and this is attributed to reduced ability to
arbitrage in presence of stricter balance sheet regulations on dealers. In this paper, I
discuss systematic deviations in basis in response to US monetary policy in both pre
and post crisis period.
1.4 Data Description
This section describes how the basis is constructed from data and discusses alter-
native methods of computing the basis does not alter the main result.
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1.4.1 Bond and CDS data
Daily yield-to-maturity (ytm) for bonds and CDS spreads are obtained from Bloomberg
for 23 emerging countries for the period 1-Jan-2004 to 14-Nov-2014.15 For each coun-
try the bonds are chosen based on the following filters : outstanding amount between
2004-2014, maturity type ’Bullet’ (i.e senior straight bonds with no embedded op-
tions), coupon type ‘Fixed’, currency denomination ‘USD’, market type ‘Global and
Euro-Dollar’, and sector/industry type ‘Sovereign’. For each country I collect CDS
spreads for all available maturities, namely, 1,2,3,4,5,7, and 10 years. The yield spread
and CDS premia are denoted in annualized percentage.
The list of the countries and data availability for remaining maturity 3-5 years is
summarized in Table 1.1. The last column in Table 1.1 lists the average S&P rating
for these countries. Most ratings are in the speculative category (BBB). All empirical
analysis in this paper exclude Venezuela and Ukraine as the average volatility of these
two countries is ≈ 280 bps which is much higher than ≈ 54 bps for the rest of the
sample. The exclusion only affects the level of the basis during the crisis but does not
affect the main regression results.
Construction of the basis
To obtain a daily yield series for any country in my sample, at each date, I take
the ytm of the bond whose remaining maturity is closest to 5 years and no less than 3
years. The methodology of stringing together on-the-run bonds is a common practice
that is followed by Bloomberg to create benchmark yield series for particular maturity.
Following the literature, I use overnight indexed swap rate (OIS) as the reference
15Both ytm and CDS spreads are mid quotes (average of bid and ask) of the last price of the day.
The list of EMs are based on IMF/World bank list of emerging countries. Many countries are dropped
from final list due to unavailability of CDS or enough US dollar denominated bond data.
17
risk-free rate. The OIS rate is the geometric average the overnight effective federal
funds rate over the term of the contract and is largely considered default risk free
because there is no exchange of principal at the beginning of the contract. Treasury
yields are not an ideal proxy for risk-free reference rate as they can be artificially low
due to ‘flight-to-quality’.I linearly interpolate the OIS curve to match the remaining
maturity of the yield series at each date. Country specific yield spreads are computed
as ytm(3-5years) minus OIS(3-5 years). Similarly, the maturity-matched CDS spread
is obtained by linearly interpolating the CDS spreads. The basis is defined as the
difference between maturity-matched CDS spread and yield spread. Figure 1.1 plots
the average EM spreads and basis at a weekly frequency. The weekly data is constructed
using end-of-day Friday quotes. In all subsequent empirical analysis I use the basis at
3 to 5 years remaining maturity.
Alternative ways to construct the basis
Many studies use the EMBIG yield spreads for emerging countries constructed by
JP Morgan but these spreads are constructed using bonds with maturities varying from
2 to 30 years. Although EMBIG yield spread is a continuous time series, my average
yield spread is a cleaner measure of basis at different maturities. However, my average
EM yield spread closely resembles the JP Morgan EMBIG series during the sample
period 2004-2014.16
Fontana (2011) interpolates ytm of bonds to have exact remaining maturity of 5
years and constructs the basis as difference between 5 year CDS and the interpolated
bond spreads. The choice between this method and mine comes down to choice of
interpolating the ytm or the CDS. Interpolating the yield assumes a linear yield curve
16 See Figure 1.17 in Supplementary Results for comparison of EMBIG and my yield spread.
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and involves interpolating two bonds which are likely to have different principal and
coupons. On the other hand interpolation across similar liquidity assets is arguably
better. If one assumes that all the bonds around a certain maturity bucket have similar
liquidity while the CDS at different maturities are substantially different in terms of
their liquidity, then interpolating the CDS might be more prone to bias. Combining
the relevant issues, it is hard to argue which method will be more appropriate for
my analysis. For robustness, I use the basis constructed following Fontana (2011)
methodology as well but this does not affect my main result.17
Another alternative choice for yield spreads is to use the z-spread, defined as the
parallel shift over the zero-coupon treasury yield curve. But Nashikkar et al. (2011) and
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013) argue that z-spreads become less comparable to the
market CDS spreads since the bonds trade away from par. They follow par-equivalent
CDS (PECDS) methodology, originally developed by JP Morgan, to extract default
intensities from (non-par) prices of bonds and then calculating a fair CDS premium
consistent with the bond implied default probabilities. The basis is then computed
as the difference between actual CDS minus the bond-implied PECDS. To construct
basis this way is heavily model dependent. It is also not obvious if this method is
more appropriate in the current problem. In fact, my main result also holds up in
the corporate basis data constructed by authors in Bai and Dufresne(2013) using this
methodology. The results are presented in Section 1.8.
1.4.2 Global variables relevant for basis deviations
Literature has investigated the role of global variables in explaining the CDS-bond basis
deviations, either in the context of corporate (Fontana (2011)) or sovereign (Fontana
17 See Figure 1.18 and Table 1.15 in Supplementary Results for comparison between basis created
by these methods.
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and Scheicher (2016)) debt. In this paper the focus is on US monetary policy. So the
key variables of interest are the level and the slope of the US yield curve given by the
following:
- Short rate (level): 3 month OIS
- Term premia (slope): 10 year Treasury - 3 month OIS
Controls used in the empirical section are other risk factors identified in this literature.
Risk premium: 3 month Libor-OIS spread indicates short term banking credit/liquidity
risk. The Libor is an uncollaterised funding cost at which banks lend to each other.
OIS is an overnight swap rate that allows borrowing at a fixed rate (federal funds rate
in US) and is considered risk-free as there is no exchange of principal. Libor-OIS rate
indicates the risk premium associated with counterparty risk in uncollaterised funding.
Volatility premium: CBOE Volatility Index VIX is the expected risk neutral
variance of US S&P500 index and is believed to capture the aggregate uncertainty
in the economy. Another alternative is to decompose VIX into a) forecast based on
realized volatility and b) volatility risk premium. Using them as controls instead of
VIX does not change the main result in the paper. Therefore, for parsimony I use VIX
in the main body of the paper.
Liquidity risk premium: 3 month OIS-Treasury spread is considered a measure
of short term liquidity premium because both OIS and treasury rates are risk free
but treasuries are the safest collateral. In times of market stress, the ois-tbill spread
indicates a liquidity premium related to flight-to-safety.
Dealer health: Average of 5 year CDS of largest US banks is indicative of the
health of the dealers and is used to control for the tightness of the dealer’s capital
constraints that can affect their ability to provide liquidity or incur risk in the CDS-
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bond markets.18
Country specific control: Country-specific controls are less meaningful for the
basis since there is little to suggest if country fundamentals impact CDS and bond
spreads differently. Moreover, the fundamental determinants of spreads such as debt-
to-GDP or GDP growth are reported monthly or quarterly and, therefore, not helpful
to explain basis variation at a daily/weekly frequency. However, studies have reported
that the CDS markets are more correlated with equity than bonds. Therefore, I include
the average EM stock return created by MSCI as an additional control.
Data on these global variables are obtained at daily frequency from the federal re-
serve website and Bloomberg. Figure 1.2 shows the weekly levels of the global variables
and the basis averaged across the countries during the whole sample.
1.4.3 Subsample periods
In all subsequent empirical analysis, I divide the sample into two monetary regimes:
a) pre 11/25/2008 - a conventional policy period (1/1/2004 to 11/24/2008), and b)
post 11/25/2008 - an unconventional monetary policy period (11/25/2008-11/14/2014)
following Gilchrist et al. (2014) who identify 11/25/2008 as the beginning of non-
standard monetary policy in the US. The federal funds rate has been close to zero
since the beginning of the unconventional period. The first quantitative easing related
announcement was made on 11/25/2008. During the unconventional period, the Fed
implemented the non-standard monetary policy by a) purchasing large scale mortgage
backed securities (MBS) and treasuries with an aim to improve the functioning of
financial markets and stimulate the economy by reducing the longer-term interest rate,
18 The banks included here are Amex, bofA, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley and
Wells Fargo.
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and by b) forward guidance to communicate the future path of federal funds rate. It
is evident in Figure 1.2 that the two periods are distinctly different for many of these
macroeconomic variables. For example, VIX index and bank health measured by the
5 year CDS of major banks/dealers have both increased in level and become more
volatile in the post period. The short rate given by OIS3month started falling towards
the end of 2008 and has remained close to zero since.
1.5 Comovement in EM debt market
This section examines the comovement in the EM bond and CDS markets separately
to test if degree of comovement in the two markets is different. Varying degree of
comovement in the CDS and bond markets support the argument that the temporary
wedge in CDS-bond basis is driven by different marginal investors in the two markets.
This section serves as a motivation for the main hypothesis - since CDS markets have
lower transaction cost than bond markets, they attract different types of investors,
which in turn drives a systematic wedge in the CDS-bond pricing. The aim of studying
the comovements is not to distinguish whether the investors differ in their risk-taking
behavior or the funding constraints they face, but to assert that investor-related factors
as opposed to fundamental factors (i.e. push factors as opposed to pull factors) play
the dominant role in the basis deviations.
Why comovement arises in EM debt market?
High level of comovement has been reported in many financial markets in the con-
text of rising global liquidity post crisis (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015)). The-
oretical models such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009a) describe how investor’s
22
funding liquidity shocks can translate to asset market liquidity and give rise to com-
monality across securities. In a world with frictions, Barberis et al. (2005) describes
different ways in which comovement can arise via correlated demand shock even when
the assets are not fundamentally related. Investors may choose to allocate funds at an
asset class level instead of picking individual ones. This sort of style investing has be-
come increasingly common in EM CDS markets with the trading of CDX.EM indices.
The average notional size of the sovereign CDS index is ∼ 100 billion USD during
2008-2016. Alternatively, the information diffusion view suggests that some assets are
easier to trade or held by investors with faster access to news. Thus, assets which
assimilate information at the same rate comove more.
Comovement in CDS versus bond markets
I start by showing that EM bond yield spreads and CDS spreads comove a lot (Figure
1.3). Commonality is often empirically detected by using principal component analysis
(PCA) in which the standardized variables are decomposed into orthogonal factors of
decreasing explanatory power. The degree of comovement is given by the percentage
variance explained by the first principal component (PC) of weekly changes in spreads
(bonds or CDS) and it is a summary statistic that increases when the spreads move
together more. Since many countries have missing data, I use the pairwise correlation
matrix to estimate the PCs. The first PC is obtained as linear combination of the
standardised variables (changes in yield or CDS spread) with positive weights and
essentially represents a level factor of the spread changes.
Table 1.2 reports two metrics of average commonality among weekly changes in
bond yield spread and CDS spread for two subsample periods - conventional (1/1/2004
to 11/24/2008) and post (11/25/2008 to 11/14/2014). The first metric is a simple av-
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erage of absolute pairwise correlation among the sovereign CDS or yield spread changes
and is found to be higher for CDS than bonds in both periods. The second metric is the
explained percent variation of first PC and is also higher in CDS than in bonds in both
periods.19 The first PC explains 76(63)% variation in CDS spreads whereas the first
PC of bond spreads explain about 53(41)% variation in the conventional (unconven-
tional) period. The magnitude is similar to what others have found in the literature;
Longstaff et al. (2011) reports the first PC explains 64% variation of monthly CDS
spreads during 2000-2010. Fontana and Scheicher (2016) reports CDS markets are
more interconnected than bonds for European Union sovereign debt during 2007-2012
period. Another interesting pattern is that comovement declines from pre to post pe-
riod. Increase interconnectedness before the crisis has been also reported in the case
of the US stock markets in Billio et al. (2012a).
Time series dynamics of comovement
Figure 1.4 graphs the time series of the percentage variation explained by the first
PC of spreads changes using ≈ 2 years rolling windows. Results for both 2-day changes
and weekly changes in spreads are reported for robustness. The 2-day changes are
constructed using every alternate days ( i.e. non overlapping observations) and weekly
changes are constructed from Friday to Friday. For each rolling window, only countries
with more than 50% observations are used, thereby reducing the number of available
countries to vary between 11 to 15 across the windows.
The time series pattern shows commonality across CDS spreads has been increasing
over the last decade whereas it is declining for yield spreads. One has to careful before
interpreting rising commonality as increased interdependence as it could also be driven
19 In calculating measures of comovement, countries with more than 50% missing observations are
removed, leaving only 15 countries’ to be included in Table 1.2
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by increasing volatility of the underlying factor (Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). At least,
the diverging pattern of comovement in the two markets is enough to support the view
that there are different forces at play in the two markets.
I report the correlation between the first PC calculated from weekly changes in
bond and CDS spreads and weekly changes in global variables such as VIX index and
5-year CDS on major banks on a rolling basis in Figure 1.5. Correlation in each window
is based on approximately 2 years long sample (113 observations). Almost everywhere,
the correlation between the first PC of CDS and these two global variables is higher
than that between first PC of bond spreads.Average correlation of the PC of CDS
changes with VIX is ∼ 0.75 during the crisis and ∼ 0.6 afterwards. Other studies have
also reported high correlation of credit spreads with VIX.
The above patterns of comovement in CDS versus bonds support the view that
systematic deviations in basis are driven by marginal investors in each market who
respond differentially as global market conditions change. Thus, this section motivates
examining the time series variation of the basis in response to global risk factors in the
following section.
1.6 Empirical results: EM basis and US interest rates
Reaching for yield predicts a positive relationship between the US interest rate and
EM basis. In this section I provide empirical evidence that support this hypothesis.
I use a time series regression to test whether the changes in US yield curve level and
slope can significantly explain the changes in basis, after controlling for global market
conditions. Next, to argue that the effect of the US rates on basis is causal in nature,
I use an event study approach with the FOMC meetings and study how the basis
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responds to monetary policy announcements. Below I discuss the analysis and the
results in detail.
1.6.1 Time series analysis
For a remaining maturity τ , basis is computed as
basis(τ) = c(τ)− (ytm(τ)−OIS(τ))
where c(τ) (OIS(τ) ) is the CDS (OIS) interpolated to match the remaining maturity
of the yield, which varies between 3 to 5 years. The time series specification regresses
changes in basis on the two key variables of interest, namely changes in the level and
slope of the US yield curve, while controlling for other global variables. The choice
of the control variables are motivated by a number of earlier studies that explore the
effect of global market conditions on EM spreads. Although arguably there is no a
priori reason why such macroeconomic conditions will affect the basis, I entertain the
possibility that they can differentially impact the CDS and bond markets, at least
temporarily. So I include these variables, even though detailed interpretation of those
coefficients is not the focus of this study.
Baseline regression
The baseline regression in average weekly changes with no lags is given below.
∆basist(τ) = α + β1∆OIS3montht + β2∆(UST10yt −OIS3montht) (1.1)
+β3∆(LIBOR3montht −OIS3montht)
+β4∆(OIS3montht − UST3montht)





Σcountry i(basisi,t − basisi,t−1)
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 1.3 report the results for the conventional and uncon-
ventional period respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report the results for the specifica-
tion augmented with 4 lags of the regressors to capture reversal effect, if any. Inclusion
of lags beyond 4 periods neither improves the adjusted R squared of the regressions
nor change the sum of the lagged coefficients much. Newey-West standard errors with
2 lags are reported for each regression.20
The search for yield hypothesis is when US interest rates fall there is a greater
appetite for higher-yielding risky assets like EM debt instruments. Thus, the key
variables of interest are the level and slope of the US yield curve, measured here by
OIS3month and UST10y minus OIS3month respectively. There is little theoretical
guidance whether the short rate (level) or long rate (slope) is relevant for reaching for
yield. Existing empirical studies have used both; for example, Eichengreen and Mody
(1998) uses 10 year US treasury rate while Kamin and Von Kleist (1999) suggests 3
month and 1 year treasury rates better capture the monetary policy stance as longer
rates may be affected by inflation expectations. Gilchrist et al. (2014) uses 2 year
treasury to capture the ‘path surprise’ in US monetary policy, and Arora and Cerisola
(2001) uses the federal funds rate as a direct measure of monetary policy in their
analysis. Without a priori assumptions, I explicitly include both the short and long
rates in my time series regression and test for their significance.
For both pre and post period, the contemporaneous coefficient on the slope is
positive and significant and suggests ≈ 36-46 bps increase in basis when slope increases
20Alternative specifications such as using a country fixed effects model with standard errors clustered
by countries slightly affects the magnitudes of the coefficients but not the signs or significance of the
coefficients. The qualitative results don’t change if daily or semi-weekly data is used instead of weekly
data. Using 3 month US treasury as level and 10 year US Treasury minus 3 month US treasury as
slope does not affect the main coefficients.
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by 100 bps. The contemporaneous effect of the short rate is significant only in the pre
period and the magnitude varies between ≈ 35-75 bps for every 100 bps change in
the level depending on the regression specification. The effect of the short rate is
insignificant in the post period and is not surprising given little variation in the short
rate post crisis. Overall, the positive coefficient is consistent with reaching for yield by
global investors. When rates fall, investors increase their risk exposure in an attempt to
earn higher returns. But since investing in risky assets like EM debt is easier through
CDS, the demand pressure to sell CDS shows up as a downward movement of the basis.
The coefficient on the first lag of the slope is negative and indicates a reversal in
the following week but not enough to offset the initial positive effect. This partial
reversal could be attributable to the illiquid nature of the bond market which may
cause it to react slowly to changes in macroeconomic conditions. For example, when
the interest rate rises, if the bond yield does not change, the bond spreads declines
because of the movement of the risk free rate. This then leads to a mismeasurement of
the basis contemporaneously and hence the positive contemporaneous coefficient. But
the negative lagged coefficients in the regressions imply that this effect, if there, corrects
in the following week as the yields adjust. So even accounting for the slow reaction of
bonds, the sum of the coefficients at t and t-1 show that the basis change is positive
when interest rates rise which is consistent with the reaching for yield hypothesis. The
sum of all lagged coefficients indicate the change in basis is temporary and reverses
within 3-4 weeks. This is possible if arbitrageurs step in to close the widening gap in
basis.
The coefficient on the other state variables in Table 1.3 are meaningful and in line
with previous works on corporate basis (Fontana (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne
(2013)). 3 month Libor-OIS spread, VIX and 5y CDS for top banks are considered
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proxies for funding risk in this literature and is expected to have a negative relationship
with basis. That is, when short term inter bank credit/liquidity/volatility risk is high,
the basis widens as illiquidity in the bond markets becomes more severe. A rise in Libor-
OIS spread, VIX (indicator global risk aversion), or CDS spreads of top banks (health
of dealers), implies tighter credit conditions which in turn contributes to deteriorating
liquidity in bonds compared to CDS. I find the lagged sum of coefficients on these
variables to be negative as expected (with the exception of bank CDS in the pre period).
However, the contemporaneous coefficient on VIX and top bank CDS is positive and
significant. This is possibly related to the faster reaction in the CDS markets compared
to the bond markets. This is also consistent with the findings reported earlier using
PCA; the first PC in the CDS market is more correlated with VIX than the first PC
in the bond market. The coefficient on the short-term liquidity premium given by
OIS3m-UST3m is mostly insignificant. I also include the average EM stock returns
from MSCI as a control. The lagged sum of coefficients is insignificant in pre period
but negative in post period. Stock returns are negatively correlated with credit spreads.
But equity is more correlated to CDS market than bonds (Longstaff et al. (2011)) which
could be possible given faster assimilation of information in both markets compared to
bond market. This can explain why the contemporaneous effect of returns on basis is
negative.
Rolling Regressions
In order to examine if the positive effect of the interest rates (level and slope) on
the basis is robust across time, I run the regressions as before for rolling windows with
113 weeks (slightly over 2 years) of data. Panels in Figure 1.6 plot the estimated beta
coefficients on each regressor for the specification excluding lags (Eq (1.1)) against
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the last day of each window. The dotted line gives the 95% confidence band for the
estimates where Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are used. The results are
similar to Table 1.3. The slope coefficient is positive and significant throughout the
sample except for a short while during the early part of the crisis. The level coefficient
is positive and significant until the latter part of the sample which is expected given
the short rates were essentially stuck at zero post crisis. The signs of the funding cost
proxies like Libor-OIS, VIX and bank CDS 5y are robust across time but the signifi-
cance varies. Notable among these periods is VIX becoming significant in explaining
the basis deviations during the crisis when VIX levels were at a historical high.
Figure 1.7 plots the sum of all the coefficients (contemporaneous and 4 lags) for
each regressor along with the 90% confidence interval. The bands are computed using
the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients in the regression
with 4 lags. The sum of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients is mostly insignificant
which implies the reversal of the effects.
1.6.2 Basis Reaction around FOMC meetings
To capture the effect of monetary policy on the EM sovereign CDS-bond basis, I
follow Hanson and Stein (2015) and Gilchrist et al. (2014) and use changes in 2-year
nominal treasury rate around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announce-
ments as a proxy for monetary policy news about expected medium path of interest
rates. FOMC announcements communicate news about both the level of the target
federal funds rate and the expected path of the federal funds rate over the next quar-
ters. But post crisis, the latter became the primary content as the target lingered close
to zero.21
21For further discussion of the target surprise vs path surprise in US monetary policy, see Gurkaynak
et al. (2005), Hanson and Stein (2015), Gertler and Karadi (2015), and Gilchrist et al. (2014)
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Effect of FOMC announcement on the CDS-bond basis
The FOMC announcements are usually made 8 times a year. The calendar is pre
announced on the Federal Reserve website. During the conventional period (1/1/2004
to 11/24/2008) there were 41 announcements and during the unconventional period
(11/25/2008 to 11/14/2014) there are 50 announcements. In both periods there were
two inter meeting dates.22 I computed 2-day changes in the CDS or yield spreads for
each country first and then averaged the changes over the number of available countries.
I run the following baseline regression specification to estimate the effect of FOMC
announcements on the basis. The sample size is 40 in the conventional period and 50
in the unconventional period.
∆t−1,t+1basis = α1 + β1∆t−1,t+1UST2y + ηt+1 (1.2)
where ∆t−1,t+1X denotes a 2 day change in variable X from t-1 to t+1 bracketing the
FOMC announcement at t. If we could interpret the coefficient β1 as the effect of change
in monetary policy stance on the EM CDS-bond basis, then a positive coefficient will
be consistent with investors reaching for yield, that is, when interest rates are lowered,
yield oriented investors create a selling pressure in CDS market, thereby lowering the
basis. I estimate Eq (1.2) using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.
The result is reported in Panel A of Table 1.4.
Possibility of reverse causality makes the above interpretation of β1 problematic.
22Inter meeting dates in the conventional period were 22-Jan-2008 and 8-Oct-2008 and in the un-
conventional period were 25-nov-2008 and 1-Dec-2008.
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To address this concern, I run the following regression.
∆t−1,t+1basis = α2 + β2∆t−1,t+1UST2y + δFOMCt
+γFOMCt ×∆t−1,t+1UST2y + εt+1 (1.3)
where FOMC equals 1 for FOMC announcement days and 0 otherwise. This specifica-
tion uses 2-day changes ( t-1 to t+1) in basis for each day (t) in the sample, and includes
the interaction between the changes in UST2y and the FOMC announcement dummy
in the regressions. I estimate Eq (1.3) using OLS with Newey-West standard errors
with 10 lags (equivalent of 2 lags used in the weekly setting). Results are reported in
Panel B of Table 1.4.
β1 is estimated to be 0.249 and 1.425 in the conventional and unconventional period
respectively but it is only statistically significant at 1% in the unconventional period
(Panel A in Table 1.4). The magnitude implies 100 basis point increase in UST2y
over two days around the FOMC announcement, raises basis by 143 basis points in the
unconventional period. There are two possible concerns with this interpretation.
First, reverse causality implies Fed might be responding to some macro information
that is contained in the movement of the basis. For example, the Fed may lower rates
in response to diverging basis which is an indication of malfunctioning credit markets.
Although this is more likely to be true only in emergency situations like the crisis in
2008, in general, it is unreasonable to assume that the regular FOMC announcements
responds to movements in high frequency changes in basis. If the reverse causality
is due to some unobserved variable driving the correlation between US rates and the
basis, the reaction of basis on FOMC and non-FOMC days should not be different i.e,
the interaction term should not matter. In the unconventional period, the interaction
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coefficient is 0.724. This is economically large and implies effect of 100 bps increase in
interest rate on basis on FOMC day is nearly 143 bps , twice as much on the non-FOMC
day which is about 70 bps.
Second, does the interest rate change during these announcements represent Fed’s
private macro news rather than monetary policy stance? Hanson and Stein (2015)
argue that on non-FOMC days, the changes in UST2y are representative of macro
news than monetary stance of the Fed. If on FOMC announcements only macro news
is revealed, then the coefficient γ should not be significant. The economically significant
estimate of the interaction term suggests FOMC days have information about policy
stance beyond the macro news which is prevalent on other days.
The evidence in Table 1.4 shows the sensitivity of EM sovereign basis in response
to the path surprise in US monetary stance conveyed at FOMC announcements and
proxied in the literature by changes in UST2y rate. The effect is present in both
conventional and unconventional period although it is stronger post crisis.23
Horizon dependence
The next question is how horizon dependent are these estimates. This is relevant
given the concern of potential illiquidity in EM sovereign bonds. I estimate the follow-
ing regression for h- day change in basis where h=1,2,..,5.
∆t−1,t+hbasis = α + β∆t−1,t+1UST2y + η1,t+1 (1.4)
Figure 1.8 plots the estimated β against the horizon h - an impulse response of
23Table 1.16 and 1.17 in the Supplementary Results reports the response of 2-day change in CDS and
yield spreads to 2-day change in UST2y. The elasticity of CDS spread to 2 year treasury is 0.183(1.049)
on FOMC days during the conventional(unconventional) period. In comparison, the elasticity of YS
spread to 2 year treasury is -0.08(-0.45) on FOMC days during the conventional(unconventional)
period.
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basis over h days to -100 bps change in 2-year Treasury over 2 days around the FOMC
announcement. The slight reversal of the basis is seen in both the conventional and
unconventional period, although the initial impact is both greater and significant in
the unconventional period.24 This adjustment in the basis is likely due to the illiquid
nature of the underlying bond market. This is further illustrated in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5 presents the OLS estimates of 2-day (h=1) and 6-day (h=5) change in
the components of the basis, namely CDS and YS (yield spread), in response to 2-day
change in UST2y on FOMC days. Robust standard errors are reported in each case.
The first row in both panels shows that the direction of the CDS changes and the
YS changes are opposite. In fact, the estimates for 2-day YS changes are insignificant
in both conventional and unconventional periods. But when the change is measured
over 6 days bracketing the announcement, the coefficient on YS change changes from
-0.8 to 0.357 in the conventional period. The corresponding change is -0.45 to -0.08
in unconventional period. This could be because the bond yields take more time to
react to the FOMC news. As a bit of supporting evidence, in the last column, I report
the estimated response in EM bond yield from Gilchrist et al. (2014). I compare this
with the response of the bond yields given in the column (4). Even though sample
size, number of EMs and the measure of monetary surprise in Gilchrist et al. (2014)
are different from my current analysis, the qualitative pattern of estimates are broadly
similar.25
The response in the yield spread (YS), when measured over a longer span, follows
that of the CDS, which lends support to the illiquidity story. However, it is important
to note that the economic magnitude of the change in basis, 5 days after the announce-
24Figure 1.19 shows the impulse response of the basis and its components over the horizon without
the confidence bands.
25Gilchrist et al. (2014) estimates are for speculative grade portfolio of EM bonds. Conventional
period: 2/6/1992-11/24/2008. Unconventional period: 11/25/2008-4/30/2014
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ment, is still large, particularly in the post crisis period which means that the slow
reaction in yields is not enough to explain the movement of the basis following FOMC
announcements. In fact, the change in the basis is driven by movement of the CDS;
in the unconventional period, the CDS falls by ≈ 107 bps after 5 days in response to
-100 bps change in UST2y while the movement in the yield spread is negligible.
Robustness to other proxies of US monetary policy
For robustness checks, in Table 1.6 I report the results of a specification similar to
Eq (1.2) except that it uses different variables as proxy for the monetary policy. A few
patterns emerge from this analysis which strengthen the results presented already. a)
Overall, the sign of the coefficients are positive which is consistent with reaching for
yield (except for 3 cases - OIS3m, UST3m, UST10y-UST2y in conventional period).
b) The economic magnitude of the coefficients in the unconventional period is larger
than the conventional period. This could be because dealers/arbitrageurs are more
constrained in the post period, thereby, intensifying the impact of CDS selling. c)
The coefficient on the slope of the US yield curve proxied by UST10y-OIS3m varies
between 0.205 to 0.527 on FOMC days compared to 0.376 to 0.455 in the multivariate
specification in Table 1.3. But the coefficient on the level of the US yield curve proxied
by OIS3m is not comparable to the estimate in Table 1.3, possibly because target
surprise on FOMC days is insufficient to capture the future path of monetary policy.
On a similar note, UST2y changes explain more variation in the changes in basis than
shorter term rates like UST3m or OIS3m. This lends support to using UST2y rates to
capture the path surprise of monetary policy.
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1.6.3 Effect of quantitative easing related announcements on basis
“ Thus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced
the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other assets with
similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration. For example, some investors
who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term,
high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well.”
—Ben Bernanke Speech, 27 Aug, 2010
With the funds rate at zero lower bound during the unconventional policy regime,
the FOMC conducted monetary policy by altering the size of the Fed balance sheet.
Studies such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) have shown that the
easing policies of the Fed affected asset prices in US. Here we extend the empirical
analysis to examine how the QE related announcements impacted the EM CDS-bond
basis.
Description of the QE announcement data
Table 1.7 gives a brief description of the QE related announcement. The dates until
3 Nov, 2010 are based on dates used in Fratzscher et al. (2016). I add important Fed
announcements dates after 3 Nov, 2010 based on official Fed reports and media articles.
I also select a subset of these QE dates for a cleaner indicator of changes in expected
long term rates in US. Following the literature, I exclude a) 1 Dec,2008 and 10 Aug,
2010 because other major news that could impact the market were also announced on
these dates b) 2009 phase out dates because they were found to be largely irrelevant for
market. In the post 2010 period, I exclude the dates if the Fed announcement stated
that they will continue to follow their current policy without any new changes. In the
end 12 announcements are selected out of 19 in total (Excluded dates are highlighted
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in Table 1.7).
Basis change on QE announcement days
For the event-study, I define two categorical variables, event1t and event2t. Both
take value -1 if the QE announcement type is an expansion, 1 if phase out, and 0
otherwise. Expansion (phase out) is defined based on negative (positive) changes in
UST2y around the selected announcements listed in Table 1.7. As shown below, event1t
is based on 1-day change and event2t is based on 2-day change in UST2y.
1) ∆t−1,tbasis = α1 + β1 ∗ event1t + εt (1.5)
event1t = −1 if ∆t−1,tUST2y <0 on QE announcementt
= 1 if ∆t−1,tUST2y >0 on QE announcementt
= 0, otherwise
2) ∆t−1,t+1basis = α2 + β2 ∗ event2t + ηt (1.6)
event2t = −1 if ∆t−1,t+1UST2y <0 on QE announcementt
= 1 if ∆t−1,t+1UST2y >0 on QE announcementt
= 0, otherwise
Classifying expansion (phase out) using actual changes in UST2y is meaningful
because market expectations prior to the announcements may have been different. For
example, although the Fed announced possibility of greater expansionary measures on
1/28/2009, the UST2y rate increased, i.e. the market reaction (reflected in 1-day or 2-
day change in UST2y) was not the same as the intended type of announcement. Table
1.8 presents the actual changes in UST2y and the slope on selected announcement
dates.
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Eq (1.5) and (1.6) are estimated for post crisis period with daily data. Estimates
of β1 and β2 with Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags are reported in Table 1.9.
Column (1) in Table 1.9 suggests that, on average, the basis fell by 14 bps on the day
of an expansion announcement. Column (2) suggests the basis fell by 12.7 bps till
day after an expansion announcement where expansion is identified by negative 2-day
change in UST2y.
As seen in previous subsections, the change in basis reverses slightly in the day
following the announcements, possibly due to adjustments in the illiquid bond markets.
To show a similar pattern following the QE announcements, regression below estimates
basis change over 1 to 6 days after the QE event defined as in Eq (1.6).
∆t−1,t+hbasis = α + β ∗ eventt + ηt where h=1,2,3,4,5,6 (1.7)
eventt = −1 if ∆t−1,t+1UST2y <0 on QE announcementt
= 1 if ∆t−1,t+1UST2y >0 on QE announcementt
= 0, otherwise
where ∆t−1,t+hbasis is the change in basis h-days after the announcement. Figure 1.9
plots the average basis change over the next days following QE announcement with 95%
confidence interval. Change until 3 days after announcement horizon are significant at
5%.
The change in basis is driven by the response of CDS on QE announcement days,
even after accounting for the slow adjustment in the yield spreads. Columns (1) - (5) in
Table 1.10 report the average change in basis, CDS spreads, yield spread, yield and OIS
respectively on the day of the announcement and on the day after the announcement. I
find CDS spreads fall by ≈ 10 bps on expansion announcements and by 7 bps more on
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the following day while the yield spread increases by ≈ 4 bps on announcement. Over
the next day, the yield spread starts to follow the CDS movement but still the overall
change is ≈ -3 bps (=3.9-6.8) which is small compared to -17 bps (=-10-7) change in
CDS. This implies, even though that the yields are slow to change, the average change
in basis is driven by change in CDS on announcement days.
Lower treasury rates cause the CDS spreads to fall on account of yield oriented
investors selling more CDS. The resultant demand pressure leads to decline in the
basis. I provide evidence in support of this claim from the aggregate CDS positions
data in the following sections.
1.7 Evidence on CDS positions
This section studies the sovereign CDS buying/selling trend in the aggregate sovereign
CDS market and for the largest mutual funds who invest in EM debt and shows that
investors sell CDS in a manner consistent with reaching for yield.
1.7.1 Aggregate sovereign CDS sold and US yield curve
Aggregate data
I collate publicly available data on CDS positions reported in Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) website from Oct 2008 to July 2016. DTCC reports
gross notional amount of CDS in USD equivalent for reference categories by type of
buyer and seller of protection every week. The buyer and seller types are categorized
as ”Dealers” and ”Non-dealers”. For sovereign EMs, the most granular category of
reference entity that is available publicly is ”Sovereign/State Bodies”. This is possibly
an imperfect measure of only EM CDS. However, the volume of CDS for advanced
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countries is expected to be smaller. Also, patterns in outstanding amount of CDS
referencing smaller European countries such as Greece or Italy (if included in the
DTCC data), arguably look much like EM in the post crisis era. DTCC defines dealer
as any user that is, or is an affiliate of a user who is, in the business of making markets
or dealing in credit derivative products; and non-dealer/customers as any user that is
not a dealer and that uses the system to confirm eligible credit derivative transactions,
primarily with dealers. These include institutions such as traditional asset management
firms, hedge funds, insurance companies, etc. For each investor type (dealer or non-
dealer), I calculate the net notional amount of CDS sold as the difference between the
gross amount sold minus the gross amount bought by the particular investor type.
Patterns in sovereign CDS market
Figure 1.10 compares the gross notional amount of sovereign CDS with all types of
CDS. Gross notional amount of sovereign CDS averages about 2.4 trillion USD over the
sample period from end-2008 to mid-2016. This is less than one-tenth of the average
gross amount for all CDSs combined. Total notional amount of all type of CDS has
fallen from over 30 trillion in end-2008 to nearly $10 trillion in mid-2016 while sovereign
CDS market has been expanding from end-2008 to mid 2012 and then has been steadily
falling. Figure 1.20 in Supplementary Results shows single-name CDS forms more than
90% of the sovereign CDS market unlike corporate, where market for CDS indices is
almost as large as single-name market .
Figure 1.11 shows that the dealers’ gross sovereign CDS position is much larger
than non-dealers’ position - average weekly notional amount of sovereign CDS position
of dealers is $2.1 trillion USD compared to $0.3 trillion USD for non-dealers. Figure
1.21 in the Supplementary Results shows buying and selling activities of non-dealers
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have steadily increased and therefore, have decreased for dealers since 2013. Figure
1.12 shows that non-dealers are net sellers of sovereign CDS since 2010 and the average
net amount sold during this period is ∼ 25 billion USD. This means the dealers are
net buyers of sovereign CDS since 2010. Siriwardane (2016) also reports a similar
decreasing trend of trading CDS in dealers in the US corporate CDS market.
Relationship between CDS net selling and slope of US yield curve
In Figure 1.13 I restrict the sample from Oct 2008 to Nov 2014 to keep it comparable
with the sample of basis data used before. Top panel shows a strong negative correlation
between net selling of sovereign CDS by the non-dealers and the US yield curve slope.
Since there is a downward trend in OIS3m since the beginning of the sample, I remove
the linear trend in OIS3m and plot net sovereign CDS sold by non-dealers and the
detrended OIS3m in the bottom panel. The correlation between net selling of sovereign
CDS and slope is -0.53 in my sample period of Oct 2008-Nov 2014. The correlation
between net selling and detrended OIS 3m is -0.15 ( without detrending, the correlation
is -0.52). Both correlations are significant at 1% level. The time series behavior of net
CDS sold and US yield curve level and slope support my hypothesis of reaching for yield
via CDS selling - when the interest rates are low, investors are encouraged to sell more
CDS in order to take risk in debt market. In fact, in unreported results, I verify that
this strong negative relationship holds for all aggregated CDS types reported DTCC.
This suggest investor behavior like reaching for yield is not specific to just the sovereign
CDS markets.
Table 1.11 shows the result of regressing the weekly sovereign CDS changes on the
exogenous global variables. The significant negative coefficient on the slope term indi-
cates reduced selling when slope increases. The magnitude is significant economically
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too - a 100 bps decline in the slope of the US yield curve implies investors (net)sell 3
billion USD of notional amount of CDS in a week and 4.5 billion USD notional amount
over two weeks.26 Comparison of contemporaneous coefficients between the regression
result for changes in basis (Column (4)) and net CDS sold (Column (2)) shows oppo-
site signs on all exogenous variables except the liquidity premium (OIS3m-LIBOR3m).
This pattern is consistent with reaching for yield.
1.7.2 Largest mutual funds in EM CDS market
Recent literature on derivative usage among institutional investors finds mutual
funds are one of the biggest players in the CDS markets. Guettler and Adam (2010)
find that among largest 100 US corporate bond funds, not only the use of CDS increased
from 20% to 60% between 2004 to 2008, but the size of the positions also increased
manifold. This section provides evidence that largest mutual funds that invest in EM
debt market take risk and lever-up via CDS. This makes sense as mutual funds are
supposed to be liquid and CDS markets are more liquid than the bonds. Aragon et al.
(2016) find, when faced with an outflow, bond funds sell fewer bonds if they are CDS
users i.e, CDS usage helps them partly substitute selling the bonds with buying CDS
to maintain a target risk level. However, using CDS requires some infrastructure, so
the largest mutual funds (which usually belong to a fund family) are more likely to be
users of CDS (Guettler and Adam (2010)).
Net flows to US mutual funds
Using monthly net assets and returns data for all US mutual funds that invest in
emerging market debt (Lipper Class=EMD) from the Chicago booth CRSP Database
26In unreported results using rolling windows, I find the net selling falls by 2 to 4 billion USD when
slope increases.
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for Jan 2006 to March 2016, I calculate the monthly net flow at fund level.27 There
are total 132 funds who have been classified as EMD at least once during the sample
period. Figure 1.14 shows the concentration among these mutual funds by comparing
the ratio of aggregate net flow to aggregate net assets of all these mutual funds with
that of largest 17 funds. The plots are quite comparable in level and time series. It
shows that I can focus on these selected funds in the following analysis without loss of
generality.28
The 17 largest funds are chosen such that a) they have the highest net assets in
2006m1, b) they invest primarily in EMD during the sample period (occasionally some
of these funds are classified by Lipper as ‘HY’ (High Yield), ‘EML’ (Emerging Market
Local), ‘CRX’ (Currency), or ‘INI’ (International Income) based on how they invest,
but the most common classification is ’EMD’), c) They have full data during 2006-2016,
and d) they have at least 50 million USD of net assets in Jan 2006.
The vertical dotted line in Figure 1.14 denotes the ‘taper tantrum’ - the reversal
in EM flows following Fed governor Ben Bernanke’s announcement of phasing out US
asset purchases. The EMD mutual funds experienced about 4.5 billion USD outflow,
about 56% of which was from the top 17 funds. Koepke (2015) documents withdrawal
of about 73 billion USD from emerging markets equity and bonds by global investors
in 2013, about half of which in May aloneThe sharp fall in emerging market sector on
expectations the Fed tapering its bond purchases in May 2013 is seen as unwinding of
reaching for yield in the emerging markets (Haltom et al. (2013)).
27CRSP reports returns and net assets at share class level. I calculate net flow for each share class
within a fund as follows: NetF lowt = NetAssetst −NetAssetst−1 ∗ (1 + returnt). Then I aggregate
the net flows and net assets for all share classes within a fund.
28In Figure 1.22 in the Supplementary Results, I compare 24-month rolling standard deviation of
aggregate net flows/net assets of all funds to that of the 17 largest EMD mutual funds. The standard
deviation of the top funds are comparable to that of the total.
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Evidence from the largest mutual funds’ filings
Table 1.12 lists the 17 largest EMD mutual funds mentioned above and documents
their net assets at the beginning and end of the sample in decreasing order of initial
size. Many funds have grown massively over the decade, sometimes by more than 10
times (one exception is Pimco Emerging markets bond fund which is smaller in terms
of net assets in 2016 than in 2006). The last 4 columns of Table 1.12 show the average
CDS selling behavior of these funds during 2006-2016. The data on CDS positions of
these mutual funds are obtained from quarterly filings of investment portfolio by these
funds at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) via N-Q and N-CSR forms.
Both these types of forms are filed semi-annually but during different quarters in the
year. This gives me a quarterly data for each fund from 2006 to 2016. I manually
collect this data on all outstanding CDS bought/sold as of the reporting date in the
filings. I only use the sovereign CDS (not corporate CDS) used by the funds in this
sample which is representative of the CDS usage by EMD funds because sovereign CDS
constitutes the bulk of their CDS investment portfolio. Next, for each fund in each
quarter, I aggregate all outstanding positions on different reference countries to obtain
the net notional amount of CDS sold.
The two largest funds in Jan 2006, namely GMO and PIMCO Emerging markets
bond fund, are by far the largest sellers of sovereign CDS contracts, having sold, on
average during a quarter, a notional amount of ∼ 1.3 billion(GMO) or ∼ 0.8 billion
(PIMCO) USD. The net CDS sold by these two funds, on average, amount to nearly
40-50% of their respective total assets. This is large compared to the other funds in
the sample who only occasionally sell as much e.g. JP Morgan and Payden in pre-crisis
period or Federated during 2014-2016. Even among the top funds, there is a lot of
variation in the CDS usage, both in cross section and time series. 6 out of these 17
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major funds, namely Fidelity, SEI Institutional International, Fidelity Advisor, DWS,
Mainstay and Legg Mason, do not report any CDS usage in the quarterly filings between
2006-2016. Among the rest who do, the usage varies a lot over time. Figure 1.15 shows
the net CDS sold as a % of net assets for these funds over time.
Reaching for yield via CDS predicts a negative relationship between net CDS sold
and the US interest rates. Table 1.13 reports the results of regression of quarterly
changes in net CDS sold (as a % of net assets) on changes in the level and slope of the US
yield curve, controlling for the same global variables used in earlier sections. Since I only
have the SEC filings from 2006, the conventional period here covers a shorter duration
than the previous analysis. To keep the unconventional period duration the same as
before, I only include filings reported on or before 14 Nov 2014.29 The coefficient on
the slope is negative and significant. In terms of magnitude, there is a decline of ≈
1.5 percentage points in net selling by these major funds when US yield curve slope
increases by 100 bps in the unconventional period. However, the slope coefficient is
positive but insignificant in the conventional period. The level of the yield curve,
measured by OIS 3 month is not significant in any of the period. This could be partly
due to the low power of test in the post period when 3 month OIS was close to zero.
Another possibility is that reaching for yield became a more pressing concern for mutual
funds in the post crisis period.
Overall, I show that largest mutual funds that primarily invest in emerging market
debt are net sellers of CDS although the magnitude of their CDS usage could vary
extensively over time as well as in cross section. However, one must be cautious because
this analysis does not give a complete picture of the CDS usage. a) It excludes the
smaller mutual funds or those classified differently than EMD but invest in sovereign
29The regression results in the unconventional period does not change even if I include all filings
until March 2016.
45
CDS market. b) The data is reported quarterly as a snapshot in time, so any change in
behavior in the intermittent period is not captured. In spite of these shortcomings, the
CDS selling behavior of the largest EMD funds is similar that of the corporate bond
funds in US in that they represent more than 50% of the market and are net sellers of
CDS. Studies have found that corporate bond funds use CDS for gaining more return.
Here, in addition, I show there exists an explicit negative relationship between the CDS
sold as a % of the net assets and the US yield curve slope. Combined, these findings
point at speculative trading in EM debt via CDS.30
1.8 Further Discussions
Comparison with corporate basis
The overall time series behavior of the EM basis is not unique. It closely resembles
the US corporate basis reported in Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013) - the basis is slightly
positive during the early sample period but turns quite negative during the crisis and
remains below zero thereafter. Systematic violation in the no-arbitrage conditions
indicates constrained intermediaries; for example, large deviations in the corporate
CDS-bond basis during crisis driven due to costly financial intermediation are discussed
in Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) and Fontana (2011), or persistent deviations in covered
interest rate parity in the largest asset markets in the post crisis period are reported
Du et al. (2016). The EM basis here deviate from fundamental no-arbitrage value in
two aspects - a) temporary changes due to selling pressure, which I claim is consistent
30The motives of investing in CDS and bonds could be many. For speculation about worsening
credit worthiness of a sovereign, the investors could buy a ’naked’ CDS or sell a bond. In case of
hedging the credit risk or to make profits from a negative basis, one could buy both the bond and
the CDS. Selling the CDS combined with short selling a bond is an unlikely strategy as short selling
a bond is difficult. Thus, CDS selling is mostly indicative of speculative risk taking.
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with reaching for yield, and b) average level of basis is persistently below zero post
crisis, possibly due to tighter risk management of intermediaries post crisis. Figure
1.16 plots weekly levels of the CDS-bond basis for high-yield (HY), investment-grade
(IG) and EM. HY and EM have a BBB rating while IG is AAA-rated. The basis data
for US corporate debt is provided by the authors in Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013).
Reaching for yield in US corporate debt?
If reaching for yield refers to the investors’ propensity to take more risk, my hy-
pothesis that the basis is positively related to US interest rates should also hold for
other riskier investments like high-yield corporate debt. In time series regressions of
weekly changes of US high-yield corporate basis on changes of US yield curve slope
while controlling for other market conditions, I find 100 bps increase in the slope is
associated with ≈ 50 bps change in basis which is comparable to what I found for
EM basis ( ≈ 42 bps). The coefficient is negative for investment-grade basis which is
usually AAA-rated and not expected to be subject to the appetite for risk.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper I present evidence of transmission of US monetary policy to EM debt
market that is most consistent with reaching for yield. To do so I use deviations in the
CDS-bond basis which is a novel way to overcome the concern that the main result is
driven by changes in country fundamentals. I find that the EM basis declines when US
interest rates fall and the magnitude is economically and statistically significant. The
basis response to US interest rate is not easily explained by illiquidity of the underlying
bond markets or overreaction in CDS markets or time varying investor/dealer capital
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constraints. The time series pattern of the EM basis is also not unique; it is comparable
to similar no-arbitrage relationships in other asset markets where limited arbitrage
conditions hold.
I argue that search for yield by global investors in risky EM debt market explains
the observed behavior in a very consistent way. To support my hypothesis, I first show
that aggregate sovereign CDS selling negatively varies with US interest rates, and then
complement the analysis by giving examples of a few specific mutual funds who do the
same. One word of caution is that I only examine a limited sample of EMD funds,
who may not represent other key CDS investors like hedge funds. But in light of the
existing literature that investigates motives and means of CDS usage by institutional
investors, the evidence here strongly suggests yield chasing.
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Figure 1.1: Weekly level in annual percentage of average EM yield spread, CDS spread
and basis for remaining maturity 3-5 years.
49
Figure 1.2: Weekly levels of average basis for remaining maturity 3-5 years and global
variables.
(a) Level and slope of US yield curve
(b) Risk premium and liquidity premium
(c) VIX and bank health
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Figure 1.3: Comovement in weekly levels of yield spreads and CDS spreads for 21 EM.
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Figure 1.4: Percentage variation explained by the first principal component of 2-day or
weekly changes in bond and CDS spreads on a rolling basis. Each window uses one-fifth
of the total sample observations, T. For 2-day change data, T=1368 observations and
window=273 observations. For weekly change data, T=567 observations, window=113
observations
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Figure 1.5: Correlation between the first principal component of weekly changes in
bond and CDS spreads and weekly changes in global variables such as VIX and 5-year
CDS on major banks on a rolling basis. Correlation in each window is based on 113
observations.
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Figure 1.6: Rolling regression results for the baseline specification in Eq(1.1). Each
panel plots the estimated coefficients on specific exogenous variables on a rolling basis.
Each regression is estimated with about 2 year (113 weeks) of data. 95% confidence
bands, calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are shown.
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Figure 1.7: Rolling regression results for the augmented specification (baseline Eq(1.1)
+ 4 lags) are shown below. Each panel plots the sum of the estimated coefficients
(t, t-1,.., t-4) on specific exogenous variables on a rolling basis. Each regression is
estimated with about 2 year (113 weeks) of data. 90% confidence bands, calculated
using Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are shown.
55
Figure 1.8: Impulse response of the basis (in bps) over 1,2,..,5 days to -100 bps change in
UST2y over 2 days around the after FOMC announcements. Plot shows OLS estimate
of β in Eq (1.4) against the horizon h. 95% confidence bands constructed with robust
standard errors are shown.
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Figure 1.9: Change in the basis (in bps) over 1,2,..,5 days following a QE expansion
where QE expansion is defined by negative 2-day change in UST2y on QE announce-
ment. Plot shows the coefficient β in Eq (1.7). Newey-West standard errors with 10
lags are used to calculate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 1.10: Comparison of weekly levels of gross notional sovereign CDS with all types
of CDS.
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Figure 1.11: Gross notional amount of sovereign CDS bought and sold by investor type.
The top figure reports gross amount bought and sold by the non-dealers and bottom
figure shows the same for dealers.
59
Figure 1.12: Net notional sovereign CDS sold by non-dealers.
60
Figure 1.13: Time series variation of of US yield curve level (OIS3m) and slope (US10y-
Ois3m) and net selling of sovereign CDS by non-dealers. Since there is a downward
trend in OIS3m since the beginning of the sample, the series has been detrended using
a linear trend. No trend correction is made for the slope.
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Figure 1.14: Compare monthly time series of aggregate net flow/ net assets between
all mutual funds who invest in EM debt and 17 largest (as of Jan 2006) EMD mutual
funds with complete data from 2006-2016
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Figure 1.15: The panels below show quarterly time series of net CDS sold as a % of
net assets for major emerging market debt mutual funds listed in Table 1.12. 6 out
of 17 funds that do not have any CDS outstanding during the reporting period from
2006-2016 are excluded from panels below.
(a) GMO (b) PIMCO
(c) PIMCO LOCAL (d) TRowe
(e) Alliance (f) Federated
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(g) MFS (h) Payden
(i) Goldman Sachs (j) TCW
(k) JP Morgan
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Figure 1.16: Comparison of weekly levels of average EM basis with US high yield (HY)
and investment grade (IG) corporate basis is from Bai and Dufresne (2013).
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for the daily sovereign yield spreads and CDS spreads
in annualized percentage for remaining maturity 3 to 5 years for 23 EM. Sample period
is 1/1/2004-11/14/2014.
Yield Spread(3-5y) CDS spread(3-5y) S&P
Country N Mean(%) Std. dev.(%) N Mean(%) Std. dev.(%) Rating
Brazil 2,736 1.7 1.16 2,735 1.84 1.32 BBB- to B+
Chile 1,341 0.6 0.55 1,315 0.55 0.61 A+ to A-
China 1,607 0.45 0.53 1,602 0.44 0.47 BBB+ to BBB
Colombia 2,699 1.81 1.04 2,696 1.68 1.09 BBB- to BB
Croatia 506 3.67 0.87 483 3.1 0.89 BBB- to BB+
Hungary 924 3.29 1.27 887 2.95 1.12 BBB to BB
Indonesia 1,432 2.28 0.91 1,201 1.76 0.77 BB+ to B
Israel 1,609 0.92 0.42 1,365 1.1 0.58 A+ to A-
Malaysia 1,005 0.4 0.23 1,002 0.29 0.17 BBB to BBB-
Mexico 2,695 1.13 0.74 2,694 1.08 0.71 BBB+ to BB
Panama 2,056 1.68 1.01 2,051 1.38 0.79 BBB to BB
Peru 1,731 1.53 0.89 1,727 1.45 0.89 BBB- to BB-
Philippines 2,668 1.91 1.1 2,451 2.1 1.29 BBB- to BB-
Poland 1,836 1.45 0.84 1,770 1.18 0.75 A- to BBB-
Qatar 1,858 1.1 0.59 1,357 0.84 0.43 AA to BBB
Russia 1,266 1.95 0.51 1,251 1.69 0.43 BBB to CC
South Korea 1,805 1.25 0.88 1,546 0.99 0.87 A+ to A-
South Africa 2,107 1.77 1.32 2,073 1.33 0.9 BBB+ to BB+
Thailand 72 0.52 0.07 72 0.29 0.05 AAA to BBB-
Turkey 2,733 2.41 1.14 2,714 2.2 0.95 BB- to B-
Ukraine 2,119 7.37 6.28 2,074 7.86 7.53 BB- to B-
Venezuela 2,048 8.72 5.09 2,046 8.95 5.97 BB- to B-
Vietnam 502 4.05 0.87 314 2.96 0.57 BB to BB-
Table 1.3: Regression of weekly change in basis on change in exogenous variables. Col-
umn (1) and (3) show results of baseline Eq(1.1) for conventional and unconventional
period respectively. Column(2) and (4) show the results for baseline specification aug-
mented with 4 lags of the exogenous variables. Newey-West standard errors with 2
lags are used. T-stats are presented in parenthesis.
∆Basist
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
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No Lag 4 Lags No Lag 4 Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆OIS 3m t 0.758∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ -0.871 -0.789









∆UST10y −OIS3m t 0.376∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗









∆LIBOR3m−OIS3m t -0.398∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.951∗∗∗









∆OIS3m− UST3m t -0.144 -0.052 -0.520 -0.061










∆V IX t 0.020∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.003 -0.004









∆Bank CDS 5Y t 0.173∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗









MSCI Return t -1.038∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗ -1.383∗∗∗ -1.112∗∗∗









N 253 245 306 294
adj. R2 0.451 0.723 0.280 0.482
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Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.4: Panel A shows regression result for 2-day change in basis on 2-day change
in UST2y on FOMC days only. There are 41 and 50 FOMC announcements in the
conventional and unconventional period respectively. Robust standard errors are used.
Panel B shows the regression result for 2-day change in basis on 2-day change in UST2y
for all days and dummy for the FOMC announcements (FOMC =1 on annoucnement
days, 0 otherwise) . Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags are used. T-stats are
shown in parenthesis in both panels.
Panel A
∆ basis (2-day)
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆ UST2y (2-day) 0.249 1.425∗∗∗
(1.02) (3.08)
N 40 50
adj. R2 0.023 0.431
Although conventional period has 41 announcement days, UST2y data is missing
for one announcement date (1/22/2004).
Panel B
∆ basis (2-day)
Conventional Period Unconventional Period




∆ UST2y x FOMC -0.111 0.724
(-0.47) (1.53)
N 1215 1479
adj. R2 0.143 0.203
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.2: Compare comovement in weekly changes in yield spreads and CDS spreads in
conventional and unconventional period using two metrics - a) average absolute pairwise
correlation, and b) percentage variation explained by the first principal component.
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
YS changes CDS changes YS changes CDS changes
Avg Correlation(%) 48.7 72.8 41.3 66.2
% Variation Explained 52.8 76.4 41.0 63.2
Analysis excludes countries with more than 50% missing observations
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
Table 1.5: Regression results of change in basis and its components, namely CDS spread
and yield spread (YS), measured over 2-day and 6-day around FOMC announcements
on 2-day change in UST2y. There are 41 and 50 FOMC announcements in the con-
ventional and unconventional period respectively. Robust standard errors are used.
T-stats are reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Conventional Period
∆ Basis(2-day) ∆ CDS(2-day) ∆ YS(2-day) ∆ Yield(2-day) ∆ Yield in GYZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ UST2y(2-day) 0.249 0.183 -0.080 0.690∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(1.02) (0.53) (-0.58) (3.16)
∆ Basis(6-day) ∆ CDS(6-day) ∆ YS(6-day) ∆ Yield(6-day) ∆ Yield in GYZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ UST2y(2-day) 0.140 0.557 0.357 1.048∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗
(0.70) (1.33) (1.15) (2.56)
Panel B : Unconventional Period
∆ Basis(2-day) ∆ CDS(2-day) ∆ YS(2-day) ∆ Yield(2-day) ∆ Yield in GYZ
∆ UST2y(2-day) 1.425∗∗∗ 1.049∗ -0.450 1.055∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗
(3.08) (1.89) (-1.59) (5.46)
∆ Basis(6-day) ∆ CDS(6-day) ∆ YS(6-day) ∆ Yield(6-day) ∆ Yield in GYZ
∆ UST2y(2-day) 1.060 1.066 -0.084 1.612∗∗∗ 1.358
(1.52) (1.29) (-0.25) (5.20)
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column header ∆ Yield in GYZ reports the OLS estimate of 2 day change in speculative grade bond
yield on intraday change in UST2y in Gilchrist, Yue and Zakrajsek (2014). See text for details
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Table 1.6: Regression results of 2-day change in basis on 2-day change in different
proxies of US monetary policy around FOMC announcements. There are 41 and 50
FOMC announcements in the conventional and unconventional period respectively.
Robust standard errors are used and T-stats are reported in parenthesis.
∆basis (2-day)
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆ UST2y (2-day) 0.249 1.425***
(1.02) (3.08)
adj. R2 0.023 0.431
∆ OIS 3m (2-day) -0.142 0.611
(-0.53) (0.95)
adj. R2 -0.007 -0.006
∆ UST3m (2-day) -0.0961 2.445***
(-0.76) (2.95)
adj. R2 0.001 0.197
∆ UST10y-OIS3m (2-day) 0.205 0.527**
(0.75) (2.41)
adj. R2 0.036 0.312
∆ UST10y-UST3m (2-day) 0.138 0.448**
(0.91) (2.08)
adj. R2 0.036 0.233
∆ UST2y-UST3m (2-day) 0.180 1.305**
(1.43) (2.30)
adj. R2 0.061 0.277
∆ UST10y-UST2y (2-day) -0.0823 0.433
(-0.17) (1.63)
adj. R2 -0.024 0.126
N 40 50
Although conventional period has 41 announcement days, UST2y data is missing
for one announcement date (1/22/2004).
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Quantitative easing related announcements from the monetary policy re-
leases published by Fed. Highlighted rows indicate dates excluded to get a more selec-
tive indicator of QE events.
Date News Type Source Description
25-Nov-08 QE1 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Initiate a program to purchase the direct obligations up to
$100 billion in GSE debt and $500 billion in MBS. Creation
of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).
1-Dec-08 QE1 Expansion Bernanke
Speech
Possible purchase of long-term treasuries.
16-Dec-08 QE1 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Fed funds rate reduced to 0-0.25 range; evaluating the po-
tential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securi-
ties
28-Jan-09 QE1 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Stands ready to expand the quantity of such purchases and
the duration of the purchase program as conditions war-
rant; also is prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury se-
curities
18-Mar-09 QE1 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Increase the size of the Federal Reserves balance sheet
further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of
agency mortgage-backed securities; purchase up to $300






Gradually slow the pace of Treasury purchase and antici-






Gradually slow the pace of agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties purchases and anticipates execution by the end of the





Amount of agency debt purchased will be $175 billion in-
stead of previously announced $200 billion. Gradually slow
the pace of its purchases of both agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities and anticipates execution by
the end of the first quarter of 2010.
10-Aug-10 QE2 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Reinvest principal payments from agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securi-
ties; continue to roll over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
Treasury securities as they mature
27-Aug-10 QE2 Expansion Bernanke
Speech
If necessary, expand the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
longer-term securities.
Continued on next page...
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... table 1.7 continued
Date News Type Source Description
15-Oct-10 QE2 Expansion Bernanke
Speech
FOMC is prepared to provide additional accommodation if
needed to support the economic recovery
3-Nov-10 QE2 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury se-
curities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of





Maturity Extention; purchase, by the end of June 2012,
$400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturi-
ties of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of







Extend maturity extension program until end of 2012
13-Sep-12 QE3 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional
agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion
per month
12-Dec-12 QE3 Expansion FOMC
Statement
Continue to purchase additional agency mortgage-backed
securities at a pace of $40 billion per month; in addition,














Prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to
maintain appropriate policy accommodation as the outlook







Beginning in January, add agency mortgage-backed secu-
rities at a pace of $35 billion per month rather than $40
billion per month, and longer-term Treasury securities at a
pace of $40 billion per month rather than $45 billion per
month.
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Table 1.8: Actual 1-day and 2-day change in UST2y and slope (UST10y-OIS3m) on
selected QE announcements. Last column summarizes the overall change in US interest














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
25-Nov-08 Expansion(QE1) -16 -22 -17 -28 Decrease
16-Dec-08 Expansion -10 -2 0 -20 Decrease
28-Jan-09 Expansion 2 8 12 27 Increase
18-Mar-09 Expansion -23 -18 -50 -41 Decrease
27-Aug-10 Expansion(QE2) 5 -1 15 3 Increase
15-Oct-10 Expansion -1 0 7 0
3-Nov-10 Expansion 0 -1 4 -10
21-Sep-11 Expansion(Operation Twist) 3 2 -9 -25 Decrease
20-Jun-12 Expansion 2 2 0 -2
13-Sep-12 Expansion (QE3) -1 2 -3 10
12-Dec-12 Expansion 1 3 6 8 Increase
22-May-13 Phase Out (Taper Tantrum) 0 0 9 7 Increase
Table 1.9: Average change in basis on selected QE announcement days (unconventional
period). The QE indicator is -1(1) if the change in UST2y is negative (positive), and
is 0 on all other days. Column (1) reports β1 in Eq (1.5) and column (2) reports β2 in




QE Selected(∆ UST2y(1-day)) 0.140∗
(1.95)
QE Selected(∆ UST2y(2-day)) 0.127∗∗
(1.98)
N 1504 1503
adj. R2 0.033 0.017
Unconventional period - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Average change in basis and its components on the day of the QE announce-
ment and on the day after the announcements during the unconventional period. QE
selected indicator is 1(-1) if the announcement was expansion (phase out) type and is
0 for all other days. Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags are used and T-stats are
reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Change from t-1 to t
∆Basist ∆CDSt ∆Y St ∆Y ldt ∆OISt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QE Selected(∆ UST2y(1-day)) 0.140∗ 0.101∗ -0.039∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(1.95) (1.66) (-1.98) (2.08) (3.16)
N 1504 1504 1504 1504 1504
adj. R2 0.033 0.022 0.002 0.014 0.026
Panel B: Change from t to t+1
∆Basist+1 ∆CDSt+1 ∆Y St+1 ∆Y ldt+1 ∆OISt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QE Selected(∆ UST2y(1-day)) 0.004 0.071∗∗∗ 0.068 0.060 -0.009
(0.12) (3.00) (1.43) (1.62) (-0.37)
N 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503
adj. R2 -0.001 0.011 0.008 0.013 -0.000
Unconventional Period: 25 Nov 2008 - 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Regression result of changes in net CDS sold by non-dealers on changes
in US interest rates while controlling for other global variables changes (unconven-
tional Period). For comparison, Column (4) and (5) shows the result of regressing
basis changes on the same regressors. Note column (4) here is same as column (3) in
Table 1.3. Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are used. T-stats are reported in
parenthesis.
∆NetSellt ∆NetSellt ∆NetSellt ∆Basist ∆Basist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆OIS3m t 3.060 15.185∗∗ 16.887∗ -0.871 -0.109
(0.42) (2.06) (1.94) (-0.85) (-0.13)
t-1 -18.004 0.966
(-1.22) (1.09)
∆UST10y −OIS3m t -1.487 -2.987∗∗ -3.080∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(-1.25) (-2.16) (-2.27) (6.40) (7.64)
t -1 -1.379 -0.243∗∗∗
(-1.36) (-4.52)
∆LIBOR3m−OIS3m t 4.231∗∗ 6.888 -0.640∗∗∗ -0.632∗
(2.30) (1.44) (-3.53) (-1.79)
t-1 -1.012 0.135
(-0.14) (0.24)
∆OIS3m− UST3m t -6.205 -6.322 -0.520 -0.745∗
(-1.37) (-1.22) (-1.39) (-1.93)
t-1 1.118 -0.670∗∗
(0.19) (-2.46)
∆V IX t -0.025 -0.023 0.003 -0.003
(-0.52) (-0.48) (1.01) (-1.09)
t-1 -0.080∗ -0.007∗∗
(-1.67) (-2.23)
∆Bank CDS 5Y t -1.576∗∗ -1.637∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(-2.06) (-1.85) (2.88) (2.81)
t-1 1.766∗∗ -0.190∗∗
(2.31) (-2.39)




N 309 305 302 306 302
adj. R2 0.003 0.022 0.048 0.280 0.361
Unconventional period: 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Average size and CDS position of largest mutual funds that invest in EM debt between Jan 2006 to Mar
2016. Data for monthly net flows and total net assets (TNA) is obtained from CRSP and data for quarterly CDS
positions are obtained from filings by the mutual funds at SEC. Data is aggregated for all institutional share classes




Net CDS Sold (Mil $)
Quarterly Average
Net CDS Sold/TNA (%)









GMO 2004084 2760 4062 1329 841 47 40
PIMCO Emerging Markets Bond 2017767 2600 1503 653 1002 23 24
Fidelity 2003386 1824 4054 0 0 0 0
PIMCO Developing Local Markets 2007584 1673 3999 7 122 0 2
SEI Institutional International 2008618 961 1464 0 0 0 0
T Rowe 2008371 519 4671 10 21 1 1
Alliance 2000821 385 6121 25 3 6 1
Fidelity Advisor 2003423 212 3301 0 0 0 0
DWS 2002324 212 119 0 0 0 0
Mainstay 2006037 189 182 0 0 0 0
Federated 2003314 188 86 -4 7 -3 7
MFS 2005905 183 3961 -1 33 -0 1
Payden 2007427 135 998 16 0 12 0
Goldman Sachs 2004297 100 1024 1 -29 0 -2
Legg Mason 2005652 92 118 0 0 0 0
TCW 2009270 71 2658 0 -42 0 -1
JPMorgan 2005407 66 905 37 -3 14 -2
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Table 1.13: Regression of quarterly changes in net selling (as a % of TNA) by largest
EMD mutual funds on quarterly changes in global variables. 11 of the largest mutual
funds that use CDS (see Table 1.12) are included in the sample below. Fund fixed effects
with clustered standard errors are used in the regression and T-stats are reported in
parenthesis.
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆NetSell/TNA ∆NetSell/TNA ∆NetSell/TNA ∆NetSell/TNA
∆OIS 3m -0.147 -0.069 0.596 2.907
(-0.18) (-0.12) (0.16) (0.67)
∆UST10y −OIS3m 1.347 1.984 -1.428∗ -1.434
(0.81) (1.04) (-2.12) (-1.66)
∆LIBOR3m−OIS3m -5.084 -0.855
(-1.20) (-0.45)
∆OIS3m− UST3m 2.077 -6.594
(0.84) (-0.92)
∆V IX 0.183 0.010
(0.95) (0.25)
∆Bank CDS 5Y -0.232 -0.262
(-0.16) (-0.46)
N 107 107 251 250
adj. R2 0.003 0.051 0.019 0.037
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Compare regression of weekly change in basis on weekly changes in global
variables for US corporate debt and EM sovereign debt. The weekly data for US high
yield (HY) and investment grade (IG) corporate basis is from Bai and Collin-Dufresne
(2013) and the sample period is 2005w28-2014w45. Column (3) and (6) below gives
the regression results of weekly EM basis shown earlier in columns (1) and (3) in Table
1.3. Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are used and T-stats are reported in the
parenthesis.
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆HY Basist ∆IG Basist ∆EM Basist ∆HY Basist ∆IG Basist ∆EM Basist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆OIS 3m 0.994∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 1.019 1.181∗∗∗ -0.871
(2.40) (1.86) (2.90) (0.68) (3.64) (-0.85)
∆UST10y −OIS3m 0.583 -0.046 0.376∗∗∗ 0.485∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(1.40) (-0.42) (3.93) (1.89) (-3.21) (6.98)
∆LIBOR3m−OIS3m -0.525∗ -0.025 -0.398∗∗∗ -0.973∗ -0.217 -0.640∗∗∗
(-1.68) (-0.20) (-5.04) (-1.77) (-1.33) (-3.53)
∆OIS3m− UST3m 0.166 0.147 -0.144 0.077 0.158 -0.520
(1.02) (1.39) (-1.32) (0.09) (0.55) (-1.39)
S&P500 Ret 4.969 0.027 1.461 -0.347
(1.56) (0.03) (0.72) (-0.67)
∆V IX 0.009 -0.006 0.020∗∗ 0.014 -0.001 0.003
(0.51) (-1.08) (2.05) (1.19) (-0.16) (1.01)
∆Bank CDS 5Y 0.071 0.009 0.173∗∗ 0.118 0.066 0.147∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.19) (2.38) (0.95) (1.16) (2.88)
MSCI Rett -1.038∗∗∗ -1.383∗∗∗
(-2.72) (-2.85)
N 162 175 253 315 315 306
adj. R2 0.287 0.163 0.451 0.045 0.191 0.280
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014




Figure 1.17: Compare average daily yield spread constructed in this paper with average
JP Morgan EMBIG yield spread. Rates are in annualized percentage.
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Figure 1.18: Compare weekly levels of average yield spread, CDS spread and basis
constructed in this paper with alternative methodology in Fontana (2011).
(a) Compare Yield spread
(b) Compare CDS spread
(c) Compare Basis
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Table 1.15: Compare regression results of changes in basis on changes in global vari-
ables between two methods - a) Basis(3-5y) is constructed by interpolating CDS spreads
to match remaining maturity of bonds (my approach) b) Basis(5y) is constructed by
following Fontana(2011) approach. For details see alternative basis construction meth-
ods in data section. Newey-West standard errors are used. T-stats are reported in
parenthesis.
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆Basis(5y)t ∆Basis(3− 5y)t ∆Basis(5y)t ∆Basis(3− 5y)t
∆OIS3mt 0.609
∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ -0.931 -0.871
(3.46) (2.90) (-0.88) (-0.85)
∆UST10y −OIS3mt 0.375∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(6.32) (3.93) (6.86) (6.40)
∆LIBOR3m−OIS3mt -0.388∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.523∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗
(-4.04) (-5.04) (-2.25) (-3.53)
∆OIS3m− UST3mt -0.096 -0.144 -0.448 -0.520
(-1.14) (-1.32) (-1.23) (-1.39)
MSCIrett -0.946
∗∗∗ -1.038∗∗∗ -1.488∗∗∗ -1.383∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-2.72) (-2.94) (-2.85)
∆V IXt 0.014
∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.003 0.003
(2.26) (2.05) (0.82) (1.01)
∆Bank CDS 5yt 0.152
∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(2.82) (2.38) (2.95) (2.88)
N 253 253 306 306
adj. R2 0.474 0.451 0.303 0.280
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.10.2 FOMC
To measure the effect of 2-day change in UST2y on credit spreads around FOMC
announcements, I run the two following regressions for X=CDS or bond spreads. The
results are shown below in Table 1.16 and 1.17.
∆t−1,t+1X = α1 + β1∆t−1,t+1UST2y + ε1,t+1
∆t−1,t+1X = α2 + β2∆t−1,t+1UST2y + δFOMCt + γFOMCt ×∆t−1,t+1UST2y + εt+1
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Table 1.16: Panel A shows regression result for 2-day change in CDS spread on 2-day
change in UST2y on FOMC days only. There are 41 and 50 FOMC announcements in
the conventional and unconventional period respectively. Robust standard errors are
used. Panel B shows the regression result for 2-day change in CDS spread on 2-day
change in UST2y for all days and dummy for the FOMC announcements (FOMC =1
on annoucnement days, 0 otherwise) . Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags are
used. T-stats are shown in parenthesis in both panels.
Panel A
∆ CDS (2-day)
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆ UST2y (2-day) 0.183 1.049∗
(0.53) (1.89)
N 40 50
adj. R2 -0.017 0.145
Although conventional period has 41 announcement days, UST2y data is missing
for one announcement date (1/22/2004).
Panel B
∆ CDS (2-day)
Conventional Period Unconventional Period




∆ UST2y x FOMC 0.445 1.353∗∗
(1.25) (2.56)
N 1215 1479
adj. R2 0.031 0.049
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
FOMC =1 on announcement days, 0 otherwise
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Table 1.17: Panel A shows regression result for 2-day change in yield spread on 2-day
change in UST2y on FOMC days only. There are 41 and 50 FOMC announcements in
the conventional and unconventional period respectively. Robust standard errors are
used. Panel B shows the regression result for 2-day change in yield spread on 2-day
change in UST2y for all days and dummy for the FOMC announcements (FOMC =1
on annoucnement days, 0 otherwise) . Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags are
used. T-stats are shown in parenthesis in both panels.
Panel A
Conventional Period Unconventional Period
∆ UST2y -0.080 -0.450
(-0.58) (-1.59)
N 40 50
adj. R2 -0.018 0.048
Although conventional period has 41 announcement days, UST2y data is missing
for one announcement date (1/22/2004).
Panel B
Conventional Period Unconventional Period




∆ UST2y x FOMC 0.538∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗
(3.58) (2.45)
N 1215 1479
adj. R2 0.270 0.298
Conventional - 1 Jan 2004 to 24 Nov 2008; Unconventional - 25 Nov 2008 to 14 Nov 2014
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
FOMC =1 on announcement days, 0 otherwise
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Figure 1.19: Change in basis and its components 1,2,..,5 days after FOMC announce-
ments in response to -100 bps 2-day change in UST2y.
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1.10.3 DTCC
Figure 1.20: Comparison of the gross size of the market for single-name CDS and CDS
indices. The top figure shows the the size of only the sovereign CDS and the bottom
figure shows the same for all CDS combined.
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Figure 1.21: Percentage of total gross notional sovereign CDS bought and sold by
investor type. The top figure compares % sold by dealers and non-dealers and bottom
figure compares the % bought by them.
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1.10.4 Mutual Funds in EM CDS market
Figure 1.22: Compare rolling standard deviation (over 24 months) of aggregate net
flow/ net assets of all mutual funds who invest in EM debt and 17 largest (as of
2006m1) EMD mutual funds from 2006m1 to 2016m3.
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CHAPTER II
A System-wide Approach to Measure Connectivity
in the Financial Sector
2.1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in understanding and measuring systemic risk,
largely driven by the events of the 2007-09 financial crisis. A number of such measures
have been proposed, including conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) (Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2011)), CoRisk (Chan-Lau et al. (2009)), systemic expected shortfall (SES)
(Acharya et al. (2012)) and, SRISK (Brownlees and Engle (2015)), to name a few. An-
other strand of literature proposes network connectivity of large financial institutions
as a way to identify systemically important institutions based on the centrality of their
role in an appropriately constructed network, e.g., network of the corresponding firms’
stock returns (see Billio et al. (2012b)).
There is broad agreement that systemic risk threatens the stability of the entire
financial system and hence any associated risk measures should provide a systemwide
perspective. However, there is relatively little theoretical guidance on how to measure
systemic risk; therefore, understanding the econometric properties of the proposed
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measures of this risk becomes even more important.1
Since systemic risk represents a property of the entire financial system, interconnect-
edness of the participants represents a key element. For example, highly interconnected
institutions that are likely to fail pose a higher risk to the system due to the presence
of multiple channels of transmission and contagion. Hence, at their core all proposed
measures of systemic risk aim to reflect connectivity. For example, SES and CoVaR
assess the association between a given financial institution’s condition with that of the
rest of the financial system and more broadly the economy. The larger the magnitude
of these associations, the higher is the systemic risk of a given institution. Network
based approaches directly aim to measure connectivity between financial institutions
and subsequently derive summary network measures as proxies for systemic risk. How-
ever, extant measures of systemic risk often fall short of a true system-wide measure
of connectivity. Our paper highlights this limitation of the current literature, and then
proposes a solution.
We primarily focus on a network based approach akin to that adopted in Billio
et al. (2012b) to illustrate our key point. Billio et al. (2012b) estimates a bivariate
Granger causal association on the stock returns of large financial firms of the economy
where firm A is said to be connected to firm B if A Granger-causes B, i.e., return
of firm A at time t has additional predictive power in forecasting return of firm B at
t+1, over and above the lagged returns of firm B. While this is a useful starting point,
such pairwise approach of learning network structures misses out on the system-wide
1Earlier theoretical work has mainly focused on banking and currency crises. These models provide
extremely valuable insights into the microeconomic foundations of crisis, but they do not take us all
the way to a measure of systemic risk that can be implemented in practice, e.g., see Allen and Gale
(1998) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for some early contributions. Papers by Battiston et al.
(2012), Acemoglu et al. (2015) and others have made considerable progress in the literature in recent
years. These papers provide valuable insights into the shape of network structure, the mechanism of
the shock propagation, and the resulting implications for the fragility of the system.
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connections. Specifically, a pairwise measure of statistical association between any two
firms A and B gives the direct strength of connectivity between A and B, as well as
indirect effects through all the other nodes in the network. As a result, a network
based on such marginal effects of A on B does not pin down institutions that are key
in propagating the risk in the system. We illustrate this issue in Figure 2.1. The figure
plots the true network structure for a three firm system. In this hypothetical system,
there are 3 causal effects in the model: B → C, B → A, C → B. However, due to
indirect effect through B, there is additional (spurious) pairwise Granger causal effect
C → A. Measures such as SES and CoVaR partially mitigate this issue by considering
statistical relationships between an institution and the system as a whole. However,
even with these measures a similar concern arises since these models estimate the
covariance of an institution with the rest of the system without conditioning it on all
other participants. While our focus is on pairwise Granger causal network, we explore
this issue for other measures further in Section 2.4 of the paper.
The key issue in the above example is that the pairwise metric does not take into
consideration the effects of the third institution on the pair under consideration. Con-
ceptually, the misspecification problem of the pairwise Granger causal effect is anal-
ogous to the well understood omitted variable bias in standard regression models.
Statistically, the model parameters end up being inconsistently estimated, which in
turn may lead to large economic costs; for example, a number of institutions that are
not highly interconnected may end up being wrongly classified as interconnected under
such an approach. Hence policy designs, such as linking a bank’s capital requirement
based on their interconnectedness in the network, are likely to be problematic with
such a structure. Similarly, such an approach may not be meaningful in identifying
systemically important firms of the financial system.
91
One approach to correctly identify the interconnectedness structure of the system
is to fit a VAR model that takes into consideration all interactions amongst the
system’s components. This can be done, for example, by estimating the VAR model
with all firms simultaneously, instead of a pair-wise approach. However, the number of
parameters to be estimated even for the simplest lag-1 VAR model in this approach is
quadratic in the number of institutions under consideration. For example, to estimate
a full VAR(1) model for 100 financial institutions, we need over 10,000 time periods
for estimation. In most practical applications, this seems infeasible. We suggest a
statistical approach based on recent developments in higher dimensional statistics that
overcomes this challenge.
We employ a regularized VAR model, using LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and
Selection Operator) techniques, that only focuses on estimating the strongest inter-
connections, while forcing weaker relationships to zero. The key statistical advantage
of this approach is that we need significantly lower number of time points to estimate
this model as compared to the classical estimation of the VAR model as long as the
underlying network is approximately sparse. We provide an in-depth discussion of
our statistical approach in Section 2.3 with additional technical details in the Sup-
plementary Discussion. The method provides statistically consistent estimates of the
network’s interconnectedness, which constitutes the first step towards gaining insights
about interconnectedness patterns during periods of financial calmness and juxtapose
them to those during financial distress. As Glasserman and Young (2015) argue, the
role of growing interconnectedness of the financial system is one of its least understood
aspects.
Among the extant approaches to measure systemic risk, perhaps the closest to a
system-wide approach is the one developed in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014). In this work,
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the authors fit vector autoregressive (VAR) models simultaneously for all firms and use
variance decomposition of the forecast error of the fitted model to define the network
topology and extract connectivity measures. Since Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) estimate
a full VAR model, a limitation of their approach is that their model can be estimated
only for a limited number of firms (e.g., 15 firms in their study) since the estimation of
a full VAR model requires extremely large amount of data. Our model, on the other
hand, can be useful for a more realistic setting involving all important banks of the
economy.
After discussing the statistical underpinnings of our model, we conduct some sim-
ulation exercises to highlight the advantages of our measure over the existing ones.
In our first simulation exercise, we simulate data on lead-lag relationship between fi-
nancial institutions based on lag-1 VAR model. On the simulated data, we estimate
connections based on both our model (which we refer to as Network Granger Causal
model) and the bi-variate VAR model. Our model does considerably better in detect-
ing the true network structure. We also compute CoVaR and MES measures on this
simulated data and show the improvement our model achieves.
The use of a first-order VAR model of stock returns may not be an innocuous
assumption. In efficient markets, past stock returns of other financial institutions
should not have any predictive power for explaining the return of any other institutions.
Market inefficiency, slow diffusion of information and frictions such as short-selling
restrictions can be a potential reasons for non-trivial dependence between the returns of
different institutions over time. However, our paper does not rely on this specific form of
interdependence across the institutions’ returns. Using the idea of partial correlations,
a system-wide approach can be taken to capture contemporaneous connectivity as
well. Building on this idea, we next simulate a model that only has contemporaneous
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correlations across institutions’ returns and contrast our approach with other models
such as CoVaR and MES. Again, our model performs better in capturing the true
connections. Given the very infrequent occurrence of actual systemic events that can
be used to evaluate the relative performance of different models, our simulation exercise
is especially important in establishing the usefulness of our approach.
In the final part of the paper, we estimate our model using the stock return data of
three important sectors of the financial services industry, namely banks, broker-dealers
and insurance companies. The financial institutions in these sectors are intricately
related through both direct business relationships such as lending and borrowing, and
through indirect relationship such as “spillover effects” through correlated trading or
exposure to common assets.2 Theoretical works such as Allen and Gale (2000), Babus
(2013), Acemoglu et al. (2015) discuss direct linkage formation among firms through
lending. On the other hand, some recent papers focus on connectedness via trading ac-
tivities of firms. Colla and Mele (2010) discusses information network among investors
while Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009b) shows how funding of traders with capital
constraints and risk limits are affected by destabilizing nature of margin-based trading
. In this paper, we are agnostic about the reasons behind connections in the first place.
Rather, our focus is on the measurement of the resulting interconnectedness.
Using our LASSO penalized lag-1 VAR model, we estimate the network structure
over time, on a rolling basis, from year 1992 to 2012. We show that different measures
of connectedness based on the number of firms connected to each other (degree) and
the shortest path length from one firm to another in the network (closeness), exhibit
sharp peaks just before important systemic events such as the dot-com related market
crash in 2000 and the Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008.3 Thus our network is useful in
2Billio et al. (2012b) discusses increased financial linkages across these types of institutions.
3There are several possible measures of centrality in networks such as degree, closeness, betweenness
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providing information on the buildup of systemic risk in the financial system. Needless
to say, with limited number of systemic events in the economy, we are unable to carry
out any formal statistical test for the predictive power of our network. However, it
is clear that our results line up well with identifiable periods of systemic risk in the
economy.
Our network estimates allow us to detect institutions that are relatively more im-
portant in the network at any given point in time. Higher the degree of a firm, larger
is the number of its immediate neighbors. Higher closeness, on the other hand, indi-
cates how easily the firms can be accessed by other firms in the network. We find that
AIG becomes one of the most important nodes in our network before and during the
recent financial crisis. This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence that high-
lights the central role of AIG in the economy during the 2007-2009 period. We provide
the ranking of institutions at different points in time during our sample period, and
these rankings can be useful inputs to policy decisions on the detection of systemically
important institutions. Based on our estimates we find that banks that were closely
linked to AIG experienced larger negative returns in the immediate aftermath of the
failure of Lehman, providing confidence in our estimation method.
Our network estimate picks up strong relationships, which are likely to be more
meaningful for policy decisions. We contrast our estimated network with that in Billio
et al. (2012b) which is significantly more dense. Said differently, in their pairwise
network, institutions on average are connected to several others since the estimation
does not parse out indirect relationships between institutions. Thus the pairwise
Granger causal approach ends up with too many connections between institutions as
and eignevector. Without a clear theoretical guidance, it is unclear which measure is most suited for
systemic risk applications. Hence we present our results for two most widely used measures used often
in studies of network model.
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opposed to our network Granger causal approach.
In summary, our paper contributes to the literature by estimating the network struc-
ture in a statistically principled way, specifically a measure of network that is consistent
and mitigates, to a large extent, the omitted variable bias inherent in pairwise meth-
ods. Since any error in the misclassification of systemically important institution can
be very costly for the economy, our paper provides a considerable improvement in de-
signing and implementing efficient macro-prudential regulations. Our approach can be
useful in a number of different settings where researchers are likely to be interested in
both direct and indirect linkages between several firms in a network. For example, our
methodology can be useful in detecting supplier-customer stock return relationships for
a large number of firms. Similarly, our method can be helpful in estimating the effect of
common owners or board members on firm policies. Our paper provides self-contained
guidance on estimating a true Network Granger Causal model for applied researchers
in different areas of finance and economics.
Section 2.2 expands on the biases created by pairwise approach and highlight the
limitations of extant measures of systemic risk. Section 2.3 proposes our Lasso penal-
ized VAR measure. In Section 2.4, we show the usefulness of our measure, compared
to existing measures, on simulated data sets. Section 2.5 presents the estimation result
with actual data for 75 largest financial institutions of the U.S. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Pair-wise versus system-wide approaches
We elaborate on the problem statement and potential biases created by extant
measures in this section. Throughout this paper, we use Ai: and A:j to denote the i
th
row and jth column of a matrix A, respectively. We also use the standard notations
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for norms of a p-dimensional vector ‖v‖∞ = maxj=1,...,p |vj|, ‖v‖1 =
∑p
j=1 |vj|. For a







Consider a network of 15 institutions with 5 hubs, each with one central firm. In
each hub, the middle firm is central and propagates shocks to other firms. Firms on the
periphery, on the other hand, do not propagate any shocks to other firms (see Figure
2.2). Such a dynamics can be modeled by assuming a data generating process in which
the middle firm’s return in period t affects the returns of both firms on the periphery
in period t+ 1. We capture this idea by simulating data as per the dynamics below:
Rt+12 = 0.6 ∗Rt2 + εt+12
Rt+1j = 0.6 ∗Rtj + 0.4 ∗Rt2 + εt+1j , j = 1, 3
εtj
i.i.d.∼ N(0, 1)
We simulate this model with 500 independent draws. Based on the simulated data,
we fit a pair-wise VAR model in line with Billio et al. (2012b). For each pair of firms,
we estimate the lead-lag relationship between their returns using an OLS model. It is
worth emphasizing that in this approach each estimation exercise ignores the effect of
all other firm’ returns on the returns of the pair under consideration.
The true network as well as the estimated pairwise Granger causal network are
depicted in Figure 2.2. The estimated network structure detects significant relation-
ships between the adjacent peripheral firms in each hub in addition to the relationship
between the central firm and the rest. Thus, the estimated network structure provides
an incorrect picture of the true network. The reason is simple. The pairwise model
ignores the fact that returns of both peripheral-firms are driven solely by the central
firm. Ignoring the effect of the central firm’s returns while estimating correlations be-
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tween the returns of firms on the periphery, leads to false positives connections. In
other words, the pairwise model ignores the conditional independence in returns of
firms on the edges, conditional on the central firm’s returns.
After estimating the network structure, researchers often use statistics such as the
degree of a node (i.e., number of important connections a particular node has) as a
measure of the importance of the node in the network. In the above example, the pair-
wise model estimates a degree of 2 for both the adjacent nodes, as compared to its true
degree of 1. Thus, the use of this network structure can lead to misleading inferences.
An immediate solution to this problem is to estimate the VAR model simultaneously
with all firms in the system. However, such an approach is not feasible with standard
techniques due to data limitations. For example, if we have 100 large institutions in the
system, then a VAR(1) model needs to estimate 10,000 (100×100) parameters! This is
often impossible due to relatively fewer samples and regime changes in the underlying
system. Our proposed method overcomes this problem of dimensionality and allows us
to estimate the model structure in a very wide range of situations.
While it is relatively straightforward to see the difference between a pair-wise and
a system-wide approach in the case of VAR model discussed above, even other models
such as MES and CoVaR face this challenge. For example, consider CoVaR. It measures
the value-at-risk of the entire financial system conditional on the value-at-risk of a
given institution. For firm i value-at-risk at a confidence level q represents the extent
of losses that will not be exceeded with a probability greater than q. CoVaR measures
the probability that the entire system is in distress (i.e., the return of the entire system
is below some threshold) conditional of bank i hitting it VaR limit. A related measure,
∆CoV aR measures the difference in CoVaR when the firm i is in its median state
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compared to the same firm being in a distressful state. More formally:
P
(





Rsystem ≤ CoV aRsystem|R
i=V aRiq
q | Ri = V aRiq
)
= q
∆CoV aRsystem|iq = CoV aR
system|Ri=V aRiq




As can be seen from the above discussion, CoVaR only conditions on the distress
of one financial institution at a time. Thus it misses out the effect of all other firm’s
returns on the system, and just like pairwise VaR it attributes all the indirect linkages
as a direct linkage between firm i and the system. For example, assume that JP
Morgan Chase is the most vital bank in the system in the sense that its distress leads
to distress of the entire system as well as a specific bank, Citi Bank. Even if Citi
Bank, in our example, is systemically unimportant, CoVaR is likely to pick it up as an
important systemic bank. The underlying issue is the same: CoVaR of Citi Bank does
not consider the indirect effect of JP Morgan Chase.
MES, defined as the expected return of firm i when the system is at its lower tail,
provides some improvement by conditioning on the system as a whole. However, it still
computes a pairwise measure. Formally, MES is defined as follows (we take negative
of the expected return so that the measure increases in systemic risk:
MES = −E(Ri|Rsystem <= Rsystemq )
If firm j is the central node that affects both firm i and the system as a whole, then we
will find a significant relationship between firm i′s returns and the system as a whole
in a model that excludes firm j from it.
99
Ideally, we want to compute the CoVAR and MES measures of an institution after
conditioning on the effect of all other firms in the system. For example, the notions of
CoVaR and MES can be generalized in a system-wide fashion by including the omitted
firms in the conditioning set as follows:
P
(
Rsystem ≤ CoV aRsystem|Riq | Ri = V aRiq, Rj = V aR
j
50%, R
k = V aRk50%, . . .
)
= q
However, estimation of such measures will face similar statistical challenges due to
over-parameterization, which will require additional econometric considerations. For
expositional simplicity, we first discuss our modified VAR model and later return to a
discussion of these other measures of systemic risk.
2.3 Model and Method Description
To overcome the limitations presented above, we adopt an approach that has both
sound statistical and economic properties. At a very broad level, our statistical ap-
proach forces weak relationships among institutions in the network to zero, allowing us
to take a true system-wide approach in estimating the model with limited data. In eco-
nomic terms, this approach is both sensible and useful for policy designs. As we discuss
in detail later in the paper, numerous studies have shown that financial institutions
form trading or counter-party relationships with only a handful of other institutions.
Hence, the assumption of sparsity that underlies our estimation is reasonable in our
context. Second, when regulator have limited resources, it is advantageous to focus on
stronger connections in the network. Our model allows us to do this.
We estimate the network connectivity among p institutions based on a p-dimensional
VAR(1) model of stock returns (after suitable transformation to reduce nonstationar-
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ity). The transition matrix of this model reflects strengths of lead-lag relationships
between returns of two institutions, conditional on the returns of all the other ones
in the sample. To ensure consistent estimation of our model with limited sample size
(n  p), we assume sparsity of the true underlying financial network, and motivate
this assumption by pointing to empirical evidence in section 2.3.1. The posited sparsity
assumption implies that a large number of elements in the transition matrix are zero,
and hence fewer parameters need to be estimated from the available data.
As we describe in section 2.3.2, such a sparse VAR model can be consistently esti-
mated using a penalized (Lasso) regression framework with small sample size. However,
using the sparse Lasso VAR estimates directly to assess network connectivity faces two
issues - (i) this estimate does not come with associated uncertainty measures (e.g. con-
fidence intervals), and (ii) sparsity of the network relies on a non-obvious choice of a
tuning parameter. Our proposed debiased Lasso VAR estimates mitigate both issues
by allowing us to formally test for Granger causality, and form a network with statis-
tically significant relationships as edges. The problem of selecting the critical tuning
parameter then reduces to the familiar specification of significance level in hypothesis
testing. By varying the level of significance (e.g., 1%, 5%, 10%), we can change the
levels of sparsity in our estimated networks. Given that we carry out simultaneously
p2 tests (one for each debiased edge in the network), we need to correct for the well
known multiple comparisons problem. After doing so, the resulting significant edges
are used to construct the Granger causal network of interest, which is summarized by
using various standard network measures such as degree and closeness to detect highly
connected and thus systemically important institutions.
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2.3.1 VAR models and network Granger causality
We model the process of stock returns of p firms X t = (X t1, . . . , X
t
p)
′ using a p-
dimensional Gaussian VAR(1) model.45
X t = AX t−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σε), Σε = diag
(





In this model, the p× p transition matrix A can be viewed as a weighted, directed net-
work G = (V,E) amongst financial institutions, with the set of nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , p}
and the set of edges E = {(i, j) : Aij 6= 0}. The weight of an edge (i, j), denoted by
|Aij| measures the strength of connections. For ease of presentation, we work with the
undirected, unweighted skeleton of the network G, denoted by S(G), where there is an
edge i− j between institutions i and j if max{|Aij|, |Aji|} 6= 0.
The VAR model allows one to generalize pairwise Granger causality towards Granger’s
original definition of causality (Granger , 1969, 1980). A series X1 Granger-causes an-
other series X2 if
σ2(X t+12 |I(t)) < σ2(X t2|I(t)− IX1(t)),
where σ2(A|B) denotes the variance of the prediction error, when predicting A using
the best linear predictor constructed from information set B, and I(t) captures all
available information in the universe up to time t. For pairwise Granger causality
analysis, the information set I(t) is restricted to the information in the two series
X1 and X2 up to time t. A joint VAR model allows one to expand the set I(t) to
4We chose the VAR order to be 1 for ease of exposition. Networks can be estimated by combining
information of transition matrices from different lags in a VAR(d) models (Basu et al., 2015).
5In the data analysis, we use residuals of a GARCH model fitted to the univariate series of returns.
Other suitable transformations can be applied to adjust for non-Gaussian heteroskedasticity in data.
Our statistical methodology is general and can be applied on other characteristics of the institutions;
e.g., volatilities (after log transformation), leverage ratios etc.
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include information contained in all p series X1, X2, . . . , Xp. Conditioning on this
larger information set is the central theme of our system-wide approach, as we also
emphasize in section 2.4 in the context of contemporaneous dependence. To emphasize
its importance in constructing the network representation of the system, we refer to
this notion as network Granger causality (Basu et al., 2015). The entries of the VAR
transition matrix A capture the network of Granger causal relationships with respect
to this larger information set.
The choice of the information set I(t) is an important consideration in multivariate
Granger causality analysis, well-known in the time series and econometrics literature.
Failure to include relevant information outside the two series under investigation of-
ten results in a spurious Granger causal relationship among the observed series, which
essentially captures indirect effects coming via the unobserved omitted variables. An-
other view of using VAR models to estimate network connectivity among stock returns
of p financial institutions is also related to the general theory of graphical models
popular in statistics and machine learning (Wainwright and Jordan, 2008), since the
transition matrix A of a Gaussian VAR(1) model with diagonal Σε determines the
adjacency matrix of the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) which characterizes the condi-
tional independence relationships among firm characteristics in their joint distribution
(Eichler , 2012).
Sparsity of Financial Networks. We assume the network is sparse, i.e., the
number of edges present in the network (s := ||A||0 =
∑p
i,j=1 1[Aij 6= 0]) is very small
compared to the total number of possible edges p2. For example, in a network with 100
institutions, we have 10,000 parameters in a first-order VAR model. We require the
true number of interconnections in a 100 institution network to be much smaller than
10,000. This is a reasonable assumption for our application. First, each financial insti-
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tution is unlikely to form strong relationships with all others in the sample simply due
to the costs involved in starting and maintaining such relationships. This is especially
true in information-sensitive markets involving non-trivial search costs (e.g., see dis-
cussion in Gofman (2016)), where institutions often rely on repeat transactions with a
relatively smaller set of institutions. Empirical evidence from inter-bank relationships
provide strong support for this assertion. For example, Soramäki et al. (2007) analyze
daily networks in the first quarter of 2004 using interbank payments transferred be-
tween commercial banks over the Fedwire. Based on actual data they find few highly
connected banks and the great majority of banks having few counterparties. That the
degree distribution (number of counterparties for each bank) roughly follows the power
law distribution with few core banks and several small banks is reported for several
interbank market across the world (e.g Bech and Atalay (2010), Boss et al. (2004), Iori
et al. (2008), Craig and Von Peter (2014), Blasques et al. (2015)). If the underlying
network structure is not very sparse but has a few strong and many weak relationships,
our model will be able to detect strong relationships forcing the weaker ones to zero
(Bühlmann and van de Geer , 2015; van de Geer and Stucky , 2016). Again, from an
economic viewpoint this is a reasonable property of our model since we are mainly
interested in strong connectivity relationships to begin with.
In the next section, we provide a short overview of the existing machinery for
estimating large VAR models and describe our method, which builds upon a bias-
corrected Lasso procedure originally proposed in Javanmard and Montanari (2014)
and extended in this paper for time dependent data.
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2.3.2 Estimating large VAR models
Historically, the most common method for estimating the transition matrix A is
on an equation-by-equation basis, by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of X ti
on X t−11 , X
t−1
2 , . . ., X
t−1
p , for i = 1, . . . , p. However, the OLS estimate is ill-defined
when the number of predictors is larger than the number of observations i.e, p > n.
A VAR(1) model with p variables requires estimation of p2 free parameters, which in
turn requires at least O(p2) samples for meaningful estimation. Therefore, without
imposing any additional restrictions on the parameters, it is not possible to estimate
such a VAR model.
Penalized VAR estimation with Lasso. Recent advances in high-dimensional
statistics have established that it is possible to estimate a VAR model with relatively
few samples, if the underlying transition matrix is appropriately sparse. In the con-
text of regression problems, several sparsity-inducing methods have been introduced,
arguably the most popular among them being the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selec-
tion Operator (Lasso) (Tibshirani , 1996). Recently Basu and Michailidis (2015) have
established that the Lasso VAR estimates are consistent in high-dimensional settings,
i.e., assuming p grows with n, possibly at a faster rate. More precisely, if the number
of non-zero elements of the transition matrix s  p2, then much fewer sample (than
what is required for OLS estimation) is sufficient for consistent estimation of A. An
element of the estimated sparse transition matrix, Âi,j, can then be used to denote
the edge strength between nodes i and j. Barigozzi and Brownlees (2013) proposed a
similar Lasso based VAR estimation procedure for network estimation.
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‖Y:i −Xβ‖2 + λi‖β‖1, i = 1, . . . , p
Here ‖β‖1 :=
∑p
j=1 |βj| is the `1-norm penalty, which encourages sparsity in the solution
by shrinking smaller coordinates to zero. Using Â to construct a sparse estimate of
network faces the following two issues. The first is the choice of tuning parameters.
Lasso VAR minimizes, for every i = 1, . . . , p, a residual sum of squared errors (RSS)
plus λi times the sum of
∑p
j=1 |Aij|, where λi is a tuning parameter controlling the
degree of sparsity in Âi:. Essentially, Lasso augments an OLS minimization with a
penalty term that penalizes non-zero coefficients, and higher values of λi encourage
sparser estimates. Similar to OLS estimates, Lasso penalized least squares estimates
of VAR can be obtained by p separate Lasso regressions and it entails selection of p
tuning parameters λi’s. With limited sample sizes, cross-validation and other data-
driven strategies of selecting λi’s fail to provide robust guidelines for such choices.
The second issue is that Lasso estimates, unlike OLS, do not come with an associated
measure of uncertainty. The main reason is that the use of penalty introduces bias in the
estimate, which is not easy to quantify in closed form. As a result, developing central
limit theorems and associated inference machinery (p-values, confidence intervals) has
been a challenge in the practice of Lasso.
Statistical Inference with debiased Lasso VAR. To address these two tech-
nical issues, we build upon a recently proposed method of debiasing Lasso estimates
(Javanmard and Montanari , 2014). It provides a substantial correction to the bias of
Lasso and in turn allows assessing uncertainty of the estimated network edges. Also, in
order to reduce the degree of subjectivity in tuning parameter selection, this method
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uses a theory-driven choice of λi’s obtained using the strategy of scaled Lasso (Sun and
Zhang , 2012). In this work, we extend this method to time dependent data settings.
We start by elaborating on the second point. The theoretical literature of Lasso
suggests that Lasso estimates are consistent for a choice of λi which scales with the
noise standard deviation σi, which is unknown in reality (Bühlmann and Van De Geer ,
2011). The scaled Lasso procedure (Sun and Zhang , 2012) suggests a work-around
by minimizing a squared error loss function penalized for both large |Aij| and σi,
and provides an estimate σ̂i. Debiased Lasso VAR starts by obtaining equation-by-
equation Lasso estimates Âi:, obtained by plugging-in σ̂i in the theory-driven choice of




MX′(Y:i −XÂi:), where the matrix M (see Supplementary Discussion 2.7.1 for
complete description) is a pseudo-inverse of the sample covariance matrix 6. We show
that the bias corrected estimates Ãi: have asymptotically zero mean, finite variance




)] (Javanmard and Montanari , 2014) to
calculate p-values for the hypothesis tests of itnerest H0 : Aij = 0 vs. HA : Aij 6= 0.
An estimate Â of the VAR transition matrix can be used to construct a weighted,
directed network. An edge is present from node j to node i if Aij is significant at a
pre-specified threshold α > 0.
The choice of the significance threshold α is important, since constructing the di-
rected network amounts to performing p(p − 1) hypothesis tests. For large p, this
requires a correction for multiple testing to avoid the problem of high false positives.
The standard Bonferroni criterion for controlling the family-wise error rate (FWER)
is the most conservative one, but it suffers from low power. We use a less stringent
6Such a bias correction is in the spirit of a single step of Newton-Raphson or Fisher scoring
algorithms in classical statistics, with suitable modifications to allow for lack of regularity in high-
dimension
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criterion of muliple testing, proposed in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), to control
the False Discovery Rate (FDR). FDR is the expected proportion of falsely rejected
hypotheses over the total number of rejected hypotheses. Thus, a 20% false discovery
rate would imply that, on average, 1 out of 5 selected edges is falsely detected. The
procedure was originally proposed for independent test statistics, and its validity for
test statistics with positive regression dependency was established in Benjamini and
Yekutieli (2001).
Network construction and Centrality with VAR estimates. The topology
of a weighted, directed network with edges significant at a level α (after correcting for
multiple testing), or its undirected, unweighted skeleton S(G), can be explored by stan-
dard visualization software or by calculating network centrality measures. In Section
2.5, we have used two centrality measures, degree and closeness, of S(G) to identify
central institutions and monitor the degree of connectedness in different components
of the US financial sector (e.g. banks, insurance companies and broker dealers). We
provide more details on the centrality measures in Section 2.5. However, before ap-
plying our model to the data, in the next section we estimate our model on simulated
data and contrast it with other measures of systemic risk. This is an important exer-
cise to gain insights on the performance of these measures in stylized settings. Due to
the limited number of systemic events, it is almost impossible to empirically validate
these measures. The next best alternative is to study the efficacy of these measures on
simulated data, which is presented next.
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2.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we conduct some simulation experiments to highlight the benefit of
our approach over existing measures. In Section 2.4.1, we focus on differences between
pairwise VAR and Lasso-VAR in estimating the network structure. In Section 2.4.2,
we undertake more extensive simulations to show that the limitations of pairwise ap-
proach apply more broadly to other extant measures of systemic risk as well, including
MES and CoVaR. The key intuition is similar: these measures estimate the associa-
tion between the system and a firm, one firm at a time, which stops short of a true
system-wide approach. Finally, in Section 2.4.3, we change our data generating pro-
cess from VAR to allow for contemporaneous correlation structure, and argue that an
appropriate statistical method for measuring partial correlation is more suitable than
extant pairwise approaches like MES and CoVaR. Thus, our results are not specific to
a given set of economic assumptions that result in a lead-lag relationship in the returns
of financial institutions. Rather, our model can be used to refine a whole range of
statistical estimation in this area.
2.4.1 Granger causality and Network Granger causality
In this section, we conduct a small numerical experiment to demonstrate the ad-
vantage of network Granger causal estimates using debiased Lasso VAR (referred to
as “LVAR”) over pairwise Granger causal estimates with standard pairwise VAR mod-
els. We simulate 100 datasets, each of size n = 500, from a 15-dimensional Gaussian
VAR(1) model (2.1) (i.e., p = 15). The transition matrix A has the following structure:
Aj−1,j = Aj+1,j = 0.6, for j = 2, 5, 8, 11, 14; Aii = 0.8 for i = 1, . . . , 5; and Aij = 0
otherwise. The noise variance is set to σ2 = 1. This model captures a directed network
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with five hubs of size 3 each, with 1 central node affecting 2 neighbors. Thus, in this
hypothetical network, only 5 of the 15 firms are systemically important.
The average performances of LVAR and pairwise VAR estimates in recovering the
true network skeleton are displayed in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The left Panel of Figure
2.3, shows the skeleton of the true network, with 5 non-overlapping hubs. In the right
panel, we plot the “average” network estimated by Lasso VAR (BH correction used
with a threshold 20%), where the grayscale of each edge represents the proportion of
times (out of 100 datasets) that edge was significant. Similarly, the middle panel shows
that “average” network estimated by pairwise VAR (significance threshold set at 5%).
The results in the midle panel clearly show that the pairwise VAR model detects too-
many connections compared to the true network. In this model, the edges are significant
either through direct connectivity or through indirect effects of connectivity emanating
from a common neighbor. For instance, the estimated pairwise VAR networks select
edges between firms 1 and 3, which share a common neighbor 2. Networks estimated
using LVAR do not show any such patterns, and thus they are closer to the true
network.
Figure 2.4 illustrates that this pattern of selecting high false positive is stable across
datasets, and is not an artifact of a few simulated runs. The number of edges selected
by pairwise VAR (blue) and debiased Lasso VAR (red) on each of the 100 estimated
networks are plotted. The figure clearly shows that pairwise VAR method selects at
least 15 edges in all the datasets, while LVAR selects only 10 − 15 edges. This is
expected since LVAR takes into consideration the partial dependence between firms
while pairwise VAR captures the marginal dependence.
The above results demonstrate the potential limitation of pairwise approach in
identifying systemically important institutions. As shown in Figure 2.3, the pairwise
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VAR approach identifies all three firms 1, 2 and 3 as central, while in truth only firm 2
is central to the economy. Such misclassification of systemically important institutions
can have crucial implications for the detection of risk and a range of policies that
depend on systemic risk.
2.4.2 Comparison with MES and CoVaR
In the next simulation experiment, we simulate firm returns from a Gaussian
VAR(1) model, where the transition matrix corresponds to the adjacency matrix of
a network described in Figure 2.5. To enrich our experiment we now add five firms in
the network that are isolated: i.e., not at all connected to the system. The network has
p = 20 firms, of which {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are isolated, i.e., they are not affected by shocks
on the other firms. There are 3 central/risky firms in this universe {8, 13, 18}, each of
which transmits shock to four other firms. Based on n = 500 returns simulated from
this model, we calculate MES, CoVaR and degrees of different firms in pairwise and
Lasso VAR networks. The results are reported in Figure 2.6. The top panel shows
that except the five isolated firms, all the firms are deemed as risky in MES, CoVaR
and pairwise VAR. Moreover, with a slight exception to MES, the true central firms
{8, 13, 18} are hard to detect among the 15 connected firms in this universe. In con-
trast, Lasso VAR captures the true network structure and ranks the three central firms
as highly risky compared to the other 15 firms.
2.4.3 Contemporaneous Correlation Structure
In this section, we show that the importance of delineating direct vs. indirect asso-
ciations amongst firms is prominent even when the connection among firm returns is
contemporaneous instead of intertemporal (i.e., the lead-lag relationship). This exer-
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cise is also useful in stressing the point that our approach does not depend on whether
one takes a strong view on the informational efficiency of the markets or not. To
demonstrate this, we generate firm returns from a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
where the partial correlation among firms encode the conditional relationship described
in the network 2.5. We simulate T = 500 returns from this distribution, and report the
estimated MES, CoVaR and firm degrees in pairwise VAR in Figure 2.7. We simulate
data from a p = 20-dimensional Gaussian distribution with correlated components,
where the conditional independence among the nodes follows the network structure in
Figure 2.5. In particular, we construct a matrix Θ as follows: for each j ∈ {8, 13, 18},
we set Θij = Θji = 0.5, where j ∈ {i−2, i−1, i+ 1, i+ 2}. For every other pairs {i, j},
Θij = 0. To ensure the positive definiteness preserving the network structure, the in-
verse covariance matrix is generated as Θ + (|λmin|+ 0.2)I, where λmin is the minimum
eigenvalue of Θ. The inverse covariance matrix is contain information on the partial
correlations and is routinely used in Gaussian graphical modeling (see Supplementary
Discussion 2.7.2 for more details).
Since MES and ∆CoVaR measure contemporaneous association between each firm
and the system, these measures are highest for the central firms {8, 13, 18}, however the
firms affected by these three central firms are also close. Since there is no intertemporal
dependence, pairwise VAR does not detect any Granger causal relationship as expected.
The same holds for LVAR. However, we show that a bias corrected version of Graphical
Lasso (Friedman et al. (2008); Jankova et al. (2015)), a method for calculating partial
correlation in high-dimension, correctly detects the central firms as more risky than the
other 15 firms. Similar to the network Granger causality, partial correlation measures
the correlation between each pair of firm returns, conditioning on the returns of all the
other firms under consideration. The firm pairs (i, j) with strong partial correlation
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relationships can be recovered using nodewise regression, i.e., regressing Ri on the
returns of all the other firms, and looking at the coefficient of Rj (Meinshausen and
Buhlmann, 2006). An alternative approach utilizes the fact that the partial correlation
structures among the components of a multivariate Gaussian random variable X ∼
N(0,Σ) can be obtained from the inverse covariance matrix Θ = Σ−1. Based on these
connections, the graphical Lasso (Glasso) estimates Θ use a Lasso penalized maximum
likelihood method to estimate Θ:
Θ̂ := argmax
Θ0




where S is the sample covariance matrix, λ is a tuning parameter controlling the degree
of sparsity and  0 denotes that the function is maximized over non-negative definite
matrices. Both of these approaches are commonly used in the statistics literature to
build partial correlation networks from high-dimensional data sets. In recent work,
Brownlees et al. (2015) used Glasso based estimates to construct a network amongst
firms based on their realized volatilities. We use a bias corrected version of Graphical
Lasso, recently proposed in Jankova et al. (2015), which provides a measure of uncer-
tainty of the edge weights. We provide further details on the estimation exercise in
Supplementary Discussion 2.7.2.
Overall, these simulation results establish the usefulness of our approach in esti-
mating the true network structure. We now proceed with the estimation exercise with
actual data on stock returns of large financial firms in the U.S.
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2.5 Empirical Application
We estimate the LVAR model to detect the Network Ganger Causality structure
on a subset of the data set used by Billio et al. (2012b).
2.5.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics
We use monthly returns data from January, 1990 to December, 2012 for three finan-
cial sectors, namely banks (BA), primary broker/dealers (PB) and insurance companies
(INS) available at the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and retrieved from Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). We denote firms
with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) from 6000 to 6199 as banks, from 6200
to 6299 as broker/dealers and from 6300 to 6499 as insurance companies. We divide
the data into 3-year rolling windows, retaining only the institutions that have complete
data in that window. To create our final data set, we keep the top 25 institutions in
terms of market capitalization in each sector in every time window.
Our final sample covers 225 different institutions spanned over 23 years period.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the mean and standard deviation (in %) of monthly stock
returns across different sectors in each 3-year rolling window. As expected, the average
returns are significantly lower and the standard deviations significantly higher during
the 2007-2009 period, compared to any other period in our sample. Another period of
significant volatility in the sample is the Russian financial crisis in 1998. Also, looking
across sectors, all three experienced stress during the 2007-2009 crisis, whereas around
1998 it was predominantly the broker-dealers (PB) who exhibit high volatility.
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2.5.2 Network estimation and Measures of connectedness
In order to estimate our network, we consider the Generalized AutoRegressive Con-
ditional Heteroscedaticity (GARCH(1,1)) as our baseline model for returns of individ-
ual firms. This allows us to remove any effect of heteroskedasticity from contaminating
our LVAR measure. Since accurate estimation of Granger causal relationships relies
crucially on the stationarity of the underlying data generating process (Lütkepohl ,
2005), raw returns with high heteroskedasticity are not appropriate for constructing
Granger causal networks. The approach of using GARCH fitted residuals was also
adopted in Billio et al. (2012b). Multivariate GARCH models like Dynamic condi-
tional correlation (DCC) (Engle, 2002) were not applicable due to high-dimensionality
in our data set with (n = 36 time points, p = 75 firms), but are potential alternatives
to univariate GARCH ones, if the sample size is sufficiently large. We note that by
denoting an institution’s return at time t as Ri,t, a GARCH(1,1) specification implies
the following.
Ri,t = µi + σi,tεi,t, εi,t ∼ N(0, 1)





We estimate the GARCH(1,1) parameters µi, σi,t, α0, α1 and β1 for each of the
75 institutions in every time window. Then we fit our debiased Lasso VAR (LVAR)
model to the estimated Garch fitted returns, namely ε̂i,t =
Ri,t−µ̂i
σ̂i,t
in every window. Our
LVAR network thus defined has 75 nodes, each corresponding to a financial institution
and unweighted non-directional edges such that an edge between institution i and j
denotes either that i Granger-causes j, or j Granger-causes i or both, after a BH
p-value correction at a 20% threshold level of FDR in the estimated LVAR model.
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2.5.3 Comparison of Pairwise and Lasso Penalized VARs
We estimate the model on a rolling basis every month with data from the previ-
ous 36-months. Thus we obtain a network structure for every month in the sample.
Similarly, following Billio et al. (2012b), we estimate pairwise VARs for the 75 largest
firms in every time window as before and define unweighted non-directional edges such
that an edge between institution i and j denotes either that i Granger-causes j, or j
Granger-causes i or both at the 5% level of significance.
In Figure 2.10 we plot the graphs of networks estimated using the pairwaise VAR
and the LVAR models for two periods overlapping financial crises. The upper and
lower panel depict the networks estimated for windows October 1995 - September 1998
and August 2006 - July 2009, respectively. Both types of network plots show high
connectivity during crises. However, as expected, the pairwise VAR model estimates
a far denser network. In comparison, the LVAR network is sparse and identifies AIG
and Goldman Sachs as key central nodes during the 2007-09 period. The benefit of
the LVAR model over traditional techniques can be easily seen from these figures.
First, it allows us to pin down highly interconnected periods in a cleaner manner and
second, it provides a stronger separation between important institutions such as AIG
and Goldman Sachs and the rest, compared to the pair-wise model.
Consistent with our simulation results, the pairwise network captures both direct
and indirect linkages between the two firms in the real data as well. This in turn results
in several false positives. Our refined measure, on the other hand, is able to separate
out weaker connections from stronger ones, and hence it provides a more meaningful
measure. Since there are limited systemic events during the sample period, it is hard to
empirically assess the validity of these models with any reasonable degree of precision.
It is, therefore, even more important to rely on statistically principled techniques for
116
future applications of network models. In the remainder of this section we discuss
our results and findings in more details to establish the usefulness of our measure in
understanding system-wide connectivity.
2.5.4 Time Series of Summary Statistics
In our first test, we study the evolution of system connectivity based on our measure.
In order to do so, we summarize the estimated networks using two primary measures
of centrality well known in the network literature, namely degree and closeness.
Degree of node i = deg(i) = number of edges adjacent to node i




where d(i, j) = shortest path length between node i and j, i.e., number of edges
constituting the shortest path between i and j. If there is no path between nodes
i and j, then the total number of nodes is used as the shortest path length. While
average degree measures the average number of direct neighbors, i.e., connectivity in
the network, average closeness measures the shortest number of steps in which a node
can be accessed from another node.
Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 plot average degree and closeness, respectively of our
estimated network over 3-year rolling windows. These time series plots show that con-
nectivity, measured either by count of neighbors or distance between nodes, increases
before and during systemically important events. In both figures, we mark a few key
events of the last decade at the time window when it is first included in the sample.
In both figures we see two bigger cycles, one starting around 1998 and another around
2008. The former coincides with the Russian default and LTCM bankruptcy in late
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1998 and the latter marks the financial crisis of 2007-2009. In between the two, there is
another prominent cycle of increased connectivity starting around 2002 that coincides
with the growth of mortgage-backed securities (e.g., see the pattern in MBS growth
over this time period in Ashcraft et al. (2010), Figure 3) and the increased connec-
tivity of different sectors of the market through holdings of these securities as well as
increased interlinkages through insurance contracts.
The time-series results show that our network measure is sensible in detecting large
systemic events. To contrast our measure with pairwise network model, in Fig 2.13 we
plot the evolution of connectedness based on the two models. Note that it is not useful
to directly compare the number of connections over time based on the two models,
since the pairwise VAR has always significantly higher number of connections. A
meaningful measure should be based on deviation from historical levels of connections
– disproportionate increase or decrease in connectivity measures compared to historical
numbers provides more meaningful information on the buildup of systemic risk in the
economy. Thus, we scale the degree centrality of both network models in different
rolling windows by the historical average of degree centrality over all rolling windows
spanning 1990-2012. Figure 2.13 provides the results. Both models are able to detect
the 2008-09 financial crisis, however, LVAR model does a much better job around the
Russian/LTCM default. It is comforting to see the sharp spike in LVAR model-based
connectivity in periods leading up to both the important events during our sample
period.
It is clear that the key feature of our model is to separate out relatively stronger
connections from the weaker ones. Hence, a key benefit of our approach is cross-
sectional in nature, namely our model better identifies firms that are systemically
more important than the others in a stressful situation. We had shown this advantage
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with simulated data in Section 2.4. Now, we identify the important institutions in
real data using our model. In Figure 2.14 we show the list of important firms based
on our connectivity measures, and Table 2.1 contains firm names with ticker symbols.
Since the estimated networks exhibit different levels of overall sparsity in different time
periods, raw degree centrality of a firm is not ideal to capture its relative importance
in the system. So in each time period, we take the normalized degree of firms, i.e.,
(degree - average node degree)/(standard deviation of node degrees), as a measure
of systemic importance of the firm in that time period. We list firms with highest
degree in networks estimated using 3 year historical data starting May, 2007 and then
re-estimating the network every two months. We see that AIG emerges as one of the
highest degree nodes as early as July, 2008. We also see the increasing connectivity
of Goldman Sachs from March, 2009 onwards. These estimates line up well with the
anecdotal evidence on the importance of these institutions, especially AIG, during the
financial crisis period. More importantly from a regulatory perspective, the separation
between AIG and the second most important institution in our network is stark. Figure
2.15 reproduces the figure based on pair-wise VAR. In this model too, AIG and GS
come up as important institutions, but the separation between AIG and the next
firm is much smaller than our model. Thus, when we separate out all the indirect
connections in the network, AIG emerges as a significantly more important institution
than what one would conclude based on a model that captures the effect of both direct
and indirect connections. Second, our model continues to identify AIG as a relatively
more important institution even in 2009-2010 period, compared to the corresponding
estimation based on pairwise VAR model. Again, the result shows that there are
non-trivial practical implications emanating from the estimation method employed.
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2.5.5 Results around the Lehman Brothers Failure Event
We exploit the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as a shock to the
system, and use this event to shed light on the usefulness of our network in detecting
interconnected firms. On September 10, 2008 Lehman Brothers puts itself up for sale,
but does not find a buyer. The U.S. government refuses to step in and ultimately the
firm announced its bankruptcy filing on the eve of September 15, 2008. There was
considerable government intervention immediately following its collapse. However, in
the short window of time from September 10 – September 16, there was significant
ambiguity about the bailout possibility. We expect firms connected to Lehman to
experience large negative returns during this period. That is indeed the case based
on our network estimation. Lehman has two direct connections in the network – AIG
and Cigna. As shown in Table 2.2, AIG experienced large negative returns of -60.8%
on September 15. CIGNA had a negative return of -2.9% on the day. Both these
firms continue to experience large negative returns till September 18, 2008, when the
U.S. government announced a rescue package for AIG. Extending the analysis to the
neighbors of Lehman’s neighbors, the Table also produces returns for this event window
for firms connected to AIG and CIGNA. They all experience large negative returns on
September 15, 2008, with AIG’s neighbors experiencing generally more negative returns
than CIGNA’s neighbors. As this analysis illustrate, a useful feature of our model is
that we can trace the effect of a negative shock on a firm on the entire network by
tracing its effects through the direct linkages. Pairwise analysis doesn’t lend itself to
such an experiment due to the confounding indirect effects.
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2.5.6 Inter-sectoral Connectivity
Our model allows us to study both within and across sector connectivity. Even
since great depression, there has been a number of policy interventions in banking
industry that are primarily motivated by concerns about connections across banking,
broker-dealer, and insurance sector. A prominent example is the imposition of the
Glass-Stegall Act in 1933 that prohibited commercial banks from engaging in invest-
ment banking activities, such as underwriting of securities or investment in certain
class of securities with their own money or their client’s money. Some of the key pro-
visions of the Act were repealed during our estimation period through the enactment
of Gramm-Leach-Bliely (GLB) Act of 1999. The GLB Act removed barriers between
the commercial banks, broker-dealers and insurance sector. Thus we expect the inter-
sectoral connectivity to increase around this period. While the Act itself was finally
passed in 1999, the real effect of this act was felt in the market starting from 1998 itself.
In 1998, Citicorp, a commercial bank, merged with the insurance company Travelers
Group to form a conglomerate combining banking, securities and insurance services
under one large group. This merger was in violation of the original Glass-Stegall Act
at the time, but after the enactment of GLB Act a year later, it was given a legal status
on a retrospective basis. For our network, this is an important event: by law bank-
ing, insurance, and broker-dealer sectors are expected to show increased connectivity
during this period.
We plot the evolution of inter-sector linkage between the insurance sector and the
other two sectors in Figure 2.16. The figure demonstrates that insurance sector became
more connected with both the broker-dealer and banking sector in 1998-1999. These
results show that our network topology is consistent with the intended consequence of
the repeal of Glass-Stegall Act that increased the connectivity across sectors. Overall
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our results are consistent with broad changes in the markets and regulations.
2.6 Conclusions
We propose a measure of network connectivity based on a system-wide approach.
Unlike extant measures that rely on pairwise approach, we estimate the connections
across all firms in a system-wide sense. Such an improvement is important for measures
of risk that are designed to detect system-wide effects. While we use measure based on
stock returns to illustrate the usefulness of our approach, our model can also be applied
to other sensible measures of firm characteristics such as volatility and value-at-risk.
Our simulation exercises highlight the usefulness of taking a systemic approach
suggested by our model – it separates out direct linkages from the indirect ones, which
in turn allows us to pin down the source of shock propagation in a system. Several
policy proposals, such as linking capital requirements to measures of systemic risk,
crucially depend on an accurate measure of this risk. Any misclassification, therefore,
is likely to be costly to the economy. Our measure minimizes the possibility of such
misclassifications. Finally, we apply our method to large financial institutions of the
U.S. and show that our model is able to capture both systemic events and systemically
important institutions in a meaningful manner.
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Figure 2.1: A schematic representation of VAR(1) model with p = 3 firms A, B, C.
There are 3 network Granger causal effects in the model: B → C, B → A, C → B.
However, due to indirect effect through B, there is additional pairwise Granger causal




























































True network and the network estimated by pairwise GC
in a simulated universe with 15 firms. In this universe,
there are 5 central firms {2, 5, 8, 11, 14} - each affecting
two different firms and forming a network with 5 hubs.
In addition to the true network edges, the pairwise GC
method picks up additional edges between each pair of
non-central firms in each hub. The shade of the edges
are darker proportional to the number of times they are
estimated.
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Figure 2.3: A simulated network estimation (n = 500, p = 15) with pairwise VAR
and debiased Lasso VAR (LVAR). The true network (left) has 5 hubs, each of size 3.
Pairwise VAR (middle) estimates marginal association and captures indirect effects,
and hence the estimated network (middle panel) has 5 complete cycles. Lasso VAR
(right), on the other hand, estimates conditional dependence and accurately identi-
fies the structure of the 5 hubs, including the central node and the neighbors. The
grayscales of edges represents the proportion of times an edge was detected by Lasso











































































































































































































































Figure 2.4: Edge discovery in the simulated network estimation problem of Figure 2.3.
The total number of significant edges discovered by Lasso VAR and pairwise VAR in
100 simulated datasets from the true network are plotted. Pairwise VAR (blue) selects
at least 15 edges in all instances, while debiased Lasso VAR (red) selects much fewer
edges, between 10 and 15, consistently across different datasets. The number of edges
in the true network is 10, as shown in the left panel of Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.5: True Network with 5 isolated firms {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, three central firms
{8, 13, 18} each with 4 neighbors. The returns were simulated based on a Gaussian
VAR(1) model with a transition matrix A with the above network structure. In
particular, we set Aii = 0.7 for i = 1, . . . , 20. Also, for every j ∈ {8, 13, 18} and
i ∈ {j − 2, j − 1, j + 1, j + 2}, we set Aij = 0.6 + ηij, where ηij
i.i.d.∼ uniform(0, 0.05).




















Figure 2.6: Boxplots of systemic risk measures based on 100 simulated datasets of size
n = 500 generated from a VAR(1) model described in Figure 2.5. For the pairwise
measures MES, ∆CoVaR and pairwise VAR, the first 5 isolated firms have the low-
est systemic risk measure. However, the systemic risk measures of the central nodes
{8, 13, 18} are not significantly different from the peripheral nodes. In LVAR, the
degrees of the central nodes are significantly different from the rest, and hence identi-



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7: Boxplots of systemic risk measures based on 100 simulated datasets of
size T = 500 with only contemporaneous dependence among nodes. The data are
generated from a Gaussian graphical model with a true network structure of Figure
2.5, see Section 2.4.3 for more details. We report the performance of three pairwise
measures: MES, ∆CoVaR, pairwise VAR, and a system-wide measure, viz., debiased
graphical lasso. For the pairwise measures MES, ∆CoVaR and pairwise VAR, the
first 5 isolated firms have the lowest systemic risk measure. However, the systemic
risk measures of the central nodes {8, 13, 18} are not significantly different from the
peripheral nodes. In networks estimated by debiased graphical lasso, the degrees of
the central nodes are significantly different from the rest, and hence identification of
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Figure 2.8: Average monthly return of firms used in the empirical analysis of Section
2.5 over 3-year rolling windows spanning 1990 − 2012. In each window, 25 largest
firms (in terms of market capitalization) from three sectors - Banks (BA), primary










































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.9: Standard deviation of monthly returns of firms used in the empirical anal-
ysis of Section 2.5 over 3-year rolling windows spanning 1990− 2012. In each window,
25 largest firms (in terms of market capitalization) from three sectors - Banks (BA),












































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.10: Networks estimated by pairwise VAR and lasso VAR on the time horizons
(a) Oct 1995 - September 1998, and (b) August 2006 - July 2009. During both crisis
periods, networks estimated by Lasso VAR have substantially fewer connections than
the networks estimated by pairwise VAR. During the 2007-2009 crisis, AIG, Bank of
America and Goldman Sachs emerge as the three highly connected firms in the three





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.11: Average degree of LVAR networks based on monthly returns of 75 largest
firms, estimated separately for 3-year rolling windows spanning 1990 − 2012. Verti-
cal dotted lines indicate important systemic events. Average degree increases around



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.12: Average closeness of LVAR networks based on monthly returns of 75
largest firms, estimated separately for 3-year rolling windows spanning 1990 − 2012.
Vertical dotted lines indicate important systemic events. Average closeness increases




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.13: Evolution of average degree of return networks, scaled by their historical
average (over 1990 − 2012), for LVAR and pairwise VAR. Around LTCM crisis and
Russian effective default, connectivity of LVAR networks increased sharply compared





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.14: Firms with highest number of connections in LVAR networks, estimated
using 3 years of monthly returns. The horizontal axis plots the last month of each
window, and the vertical axis displays the degree of a firm, standardized by the mean




































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.15: Firms with highest number of connections in pairwise VAR networks,
estimated using 3 years of monthly returns. The horizontal axis plots the last month
of each window, and the vertical axis displays the degree of a firm, standardized by the

































































































































































































Figure 2.16: Comparison of within- and between- sectoral connectivities for the Insur-
ance sector in estimated LVAR networks. The lines plot, for each of the three sectors,
the total number of connections (edges) with firms in other sectors, as a ratio of the



































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.1: Firm Names, Sectors and Ticker Symbols
Ticker Sector Firm Name
AB PB ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN HOLDING L P
AIG INS AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
AMTD PB T D AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP
AOC INS AON CORP
AXP BA AMERICAN EXPRESS CO
BAC BA BANK OF AMERICA CORP
BEN PB FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC
BK BA BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP
BMO BA BANK MONTREAL QUE
BNS BA BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA
BX PB BLACKSTONE GROUP L P
CB INS CHUBB CORP
CFC BA COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP
CI INS C I G N A CORP
CME PB C M E GROUP INC
COF BA CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP
FII PB FEDERATED INVESTORS INC PA
FRE BA FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP
GNW INS GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC
GS PB GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC
HIG INS HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GRP INC
HUM INS HUMANA INC
IVZ PB INVESCO LTD
JNS PB JANUS CAP GROUP INC
LEH PB LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC
LM PB LEGG MASON INC
MBI INS M B I A INC
MS PB MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO
NCC BA NATIONAL CITY CORP
NDAQ PB NASDAQ O M X GROUP INC
STI BA SUNTRUST BANKS INC
TD BA TORONTO DOMINION BANK ONT
TROW PB T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC
UNH INS UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC
WB BA WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW
WDR PB WADDELL & REED FINANCIAL INC
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Table 2.2: Lehman Brothers Failure Event
Lehman Brothers Neighbors
AIG CIGNA S&P500 Return
9/10/2008 -4.7% 1.4% 0.6%
9/11/2008 0.3% 1.9% 1.4%
9/12/2008 -30.8% 0.0% 0.2%
9/15/2008 -60.8% -2.9% -4.6%
9/16/2008 -21.2% -3.9% 1.7%
9/17/2008 -45.3% -6.2% -4.7%










9/10/2008 1.7% -4.9% -3.7% 1.5% -1.1%
9/11/2008 1.9% 1.5% -0.5% 3.4% -0.4%
9/12/2008 1.0% 3.0% -3.8% 0.4% -3.5%
9/15/2008 -6.6% -3.0% -13.5% -8.5% -15.1%
9/16/2008 4.4% 6.7% -10.8% 3.2% 3.3%
9/17/2008 -5.9% -2.7% -24.2% -12.3% -10.9%









9/10/2008 1.5% -2.7% 2.0% -0.5%
9/11/2008 3.4% -1.1% 0.3% 0.3%
9/12/2008 0.4% 5.1% 0.4% 0.8%
9/15/2008 -8.5% -4.0% -2.1% 1.2%
9/16/2008 3.2% 5.6% 13.5% 8.5%
9/17/2008 -12.3% -7.4% -5.0% -3.0%
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2.7 Supplementary Discussion
2.7.1 Estimation of large VAR models
We discuss statistical issues for estimating VAR models using ordinary least squares
(OLS) when the sample size (n) is small compared to the number of time series (p),
and describe how Lasso based penalized estimation methods can be used to overcome
them. We conclude with a description of our multiple testing correction methods to
construct networks based on fitted VAR models.
In low-dimensional problems (n > p), the most common method for estimating VAR
models is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of X t on X t−1 (Lütkepohl (2005)).
Formally, given n+ 1 observations {X0, X1, . . . , Xn} from the stationary VAR process

























The OLS estimate of the VAR transition matrix A is then obtained by conducting p





‖Y:i −Xβ‖2, for i = 1, . . . , p. (2.4)
In classical, low-dimensional asymptotics (p fixed, n→∞), ÂOLS is a consistent esti-
mate of A and
√
n(ÂOLS −A) is asymptotically normal with finite variance-covariance
matrix. This allows conducting formal hypothesis tests of Granger causality H0 : Aij =
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0 vs. H1 : Aij 6= 0, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ p, and construct a network of significant Granger
causal estimates in a system-wide fashion 7.
In a high-dimensional setting with n < p, equation-by-equation estimation (2.4)
with OLS is no longer possible. Even for p < n, the overall estimation error ‖ÂOLS −
A‖2F is of the order of O(p2/n), which means one needs at least O(p2) samples for
meaningful estimation. Unfortunately, without further assumptions on the network
structure, this is the minimal requirement since we are indeed estimating p2 free pa-
rameters.
Under assumption of sparsity of the true network A (‖A‖0 :=
∑p
i,j=1 1[Aij 6= 0] = s,
s  n), classical subset selection procedures like best subset, forward, backward and
step-wise regression can potentially be used to replace OLS in (2.4). However, their
statistical properties in the n < p setting are unknown, and they are found to be
unstable in empirical applications (Breiman (1995)). Another alternative to OLS in
such situations is shrinkage methods like ridge regression which also appears in the
literature of Bayesian VAR. Ridge regression shrinks weak coefficients towards zero
to reduce the variance of Â and produce meaningful estimates, but introduces bias in
them. More importantly, interpretation of ridge estimates is not obvious since it does
not perform explicit variable selection. Also, due to the added bias of ridge regression,
inference machinery in high-dimension has not been developed.
Our choice of Lasso (Least Absolute Selection and Shrinkage Operator) is motivated
by its ability to provide an attractive middle ground - it shrinks regression coefficients to
reduce variance and make consistent estimation possible in high-dimension, and at the
same time performs automatic variable selection by setting weaker coefficients exactly
to zero. The resulting estimates are sparse and easier to interpret. Similar to ridge,
7Note that this is different from the approach of Billio et al. (2012b), who fit separate bivariate
VAR models for different pairs of firms (i, j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ p.
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lasso estimates are biased and statistical inference with them remained a challenging
problem for a long time. However, recent developments in high-dimensional statistics
have provided means to correct the bias and carry out formal tests of significance of
Lasso coefficients in a regression problem. We use Lasso, followed by a bias correction,
to estimate our VAR model.
Penalized VAR estimation with Lasso: The equation-by-equation estimate





‖Y:i −Xβ‖2 + λi‖β‖1, i = 1, . . . , p (2.5)
Here ‖β‖1 :=
∑p
j=1 |βj| is the `1-norm penalty, which encourages sparsity in the solu-
tion, by shrinking smaller coordinates to zero. The tuning parameter λi controls the
degree of sparsity in the estimate, larger values of λi result in sparser Âi:.
Note that under the model (2.1) with diagonal Σε, equation-by-equation estimate of









Since the equation-by-equation estimate is equivalent to p separate Lasso estimates,
in our discussion we focus on the generic Lasso estimation of a linear model Yn×1 =





‖Y −Xβ‖2 + λ‖β‖1. (2.7)
For estimating the ith row of A using Lasso, the errors in the above regression take
the form ε = [εni : . . . : ε
1
i ]
′, the true coefficients β0 = A′i:, and the penalty λi is chosen
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based on σi = sd(ε
1
i ) (see next section). The design matrix X = [X
n : . . . : X0]′ is
the same across all p regressions. The facts that the rows of the design matrix are not
i.i.d. and the error vector ε is correlated with the design matrix X are specific to VAR
estimation problems, and violate the assumptions under which statistical properties
of Lasso and debiased Lasso have been studied in literature. We provide some new
theoretical analysis to justify their validity in the context of VAR estimation.
Choice of tuning parameters: In practice, choosing the “best” tuning parameter
λ is cumbersome and depends on the context of the problem. AIC, BIC or Cross-
validation (CV) guided choice of λ are commonly used, although they are known
to perform poorly in high-dimensional problems, where n  p. Since our sample
size is small, we use a theory-driven, plug-in estimate rather than cross-validation or
data-driven strategies. The theoretical choice of λ ∝ σ
√
log p/n (Bühlmann and Van
De Geer (2011)) requires knowledge of the error standard deviation σ =
√
Var(ε1),
which is seldom available in practice. To mitigate these problems, we use the scaled
lasso algorithm in (Sun and Zhang (2012)) to obtain an estimate of σ̂, and choose
λ = Cσ̂
√
log p/n. Scaled Lasso solves the following convex optimization problem










with λ̃ = C
√
log p/n, for some constant C that does not depend on model parameters.
Scaled Lasso enjoys similar theoretical properties as Lasso in high-dimensional prob-
lems, but does not require knowledge of error standard deviation σ in the choice of
tuning parameter. Rather, it provides as a by-product an estimate of σ which can be
used for follow-up analyses as in hypothesis testing and confidence interval construction
for the regression coefficients β̂j.
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Consistency of Lasso VAR in high-dimension. Basu and Michailidis (2015) have
established that the Lasso VAR estimates are consistent in high-dimensional settings,
i.e., assuming p grows with n, possibly at a faster rate. In particular, under a double
asymptotic framework where both p, n → ∞, p = O(nα) for any α > 0, and the true
sparsity s = o(n), it follows from the results of Section 4 in Basu and Michailidis
(2015) that ‖β̂ − β0‖2 = OP (s log p/n) with a choice of λ ∝
√
log p/n and the un-
derlying Gaussian VAR process is stable (Lütkepohl (2005)). This rate of convergence
demonstrates the remarkable advantage of Lasso (also reported in several other works
involving i.i.d. data): modulo a cost of log(p2) = 2 log(p) for searching the locations of
non-zero coordinates in A, one needs merely O(s) samples to estimate the VAR coeffi-
cients, which is the same as if one a priori knew the positions of the s non-zero edges
and were only estimating the s free parameters of edge strengths. So, for problems
where s log p p2, Lasso VAR achieves comparable estimation accuracy as OLS with
much smaller sample size.
Bias Correction of Lasso VAR estimates:
Despite the nice estimation accuracy of Lasso VARs as above, there are two limita-
tions of using it directly for network construction. First, the shrinkage effect of Lasso
introduces a bias in estimating the edge strength, which can be potentially large in
a finite-sample setting. Second, the Lasso VAR estimates Âij do not come with any
measure of uncertainty.
Javanmard and Montanari (2014) proposes a methodology to bias-correct the VAR
estimates so as to draw statistical inference. Bias correction of nonlinear estimates is
a common technique in classical statistics (Cordeiro and McCullagh (1991), Cordeiro
and Vasconcellos (1997)). For high-dimensional regression problems, Zhang and Zhang
(2014) first proposed a bias correction method for constructing confidence intervals of
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the individual regression coefficients. In parallel lines of work, van de Geer et al. (2014);
Javanmard and Montanari (2014) also proposed bias corrected versions of Lasso for
linear regression. For a more detailed discussion of the intuition behind bias correction,
we refer the readers to the excellent review article Dezeure et al. (2015).
In order to correct the bias of Lasso VAR estimates, we first construct a matrix
M , which can be viewed as an approximate inverse of the sample covariance matrix
Σ̂X = X
′X/n. Given a tuning parameter µ > 0 (chosen in the order of
√
log p/n),







where ej ∈ Rp is the vector with 1 at the jth position and zero at all the other coor-
dinates. If any one of the p convex programs is not feasible, the matrix M is set to
identity 8.
With the new matrix M , for any given j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, the debiased Lasso estimate
is given by




where β̂ is a solution of (2.7).
The intuition of debiasing is simple and can be explained in a low-dimensional
context assuming M is exactly Σ̂−1. Let δ = β̂ − β denote the bias of lasso estimate
8Using arguments of Lemma 23 in Javanmard and Montanari (2014) together with Proposition
2.4 in Basu and Michailidis (2015), we can show that Σ−1 = (V ar(X1)−1) is a solution to 2.9 (hence
the constrained optimization problem is feasible) with high probability.
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β̂. Then (2.10) can be expressed as
β̃ = β0 + δ + (X′X)−1X′(−Xδ + ε)
= β0 + (X′X)−1X′ε,
which is identical to the ordinary least squares estimate. Since ε is zero mean Gaussian,
under suitable regularity assumption on X which ensures that the variance does not
blow up, the second term is asymptotically negligible, making the bias of β̃ orders of
magnitude smaller than the bias of β̂. Another way to motivate the debiasing procedure
is to view the bias correction step as an approximate Newton-Raphson iterate, since
(1/n)X′(Y − Xβ̂) and Σ̂ can be viewed as approximate gradient and Hessian of the
least-squares loss function evaluated at the current iterate β̂. The classic method of
Fisher’s scoring uses a similar one-step update to a consistent estimate to reduce its
variance and make it efficient (Le Cam (1956)).
















(β̂ − β0). (2.11)
Suppose the tuning parameters λ and µ are chosen to be of the order
√
log p/n. In
a double asymptotic regime p, n → ∞ mentioned above, Proposition 4.1 in Basu and
Michailidis (2015) established that ‖β̂ − β0‖1 is OP (s
√
log p/n). This, together with
(2.9), implies that ‖∆‖∞ is of the order OP (s log p/
√
n). Hence, the bias term ∆ is
asymptotically negligible when s log p = o(
√
n), and it is possible to conduct inference
using only the asymptotic distribution of the first term.
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Inference with debiased Lasso. We discuss construction of p-values for the hypoth-
esis H0 : βj = 0 vs. HA : βj 6= 0, for a fixed j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, under the double asymptotic
regime n, p→∞ where s
√
log p/n→ 0. Leveraging the asymptotic negligibility of the
bias term in (2.11), we use the method proposed in Javanmard and Montanari (2014)
to construct p-values for testing significance of the individual edges Aij. Formally, for
every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, the p-value for testing
H0 : β
0












where Φ(.) is the standard normal cdf, and σ̂ is a consistent estimate of error standard
deviation σ obtained using scaled Lasso (2.8) with λ̃ := 10
√
2 log p/n, as suggested in
the theoretical analysis of Javanmard and Montanari (2014).
Network construction with VAR estimates: Using the estimates of p lasso prob-
lems as row vectors, we construct our debiased Lasso VAR estimate Ã. This matrix
can be used to estimate the weighted, directed network described in section 2.3. An
edge is present from node j to node i if Aij is significant at a pre-specified threshold
α > 0.
Choice of the significance threshold α is important, since constructing the directed
network amounts to performing p(p − 1) hypothesis tests. For large p, this requires
a correction for multiple testing to avoid the problem of high false positives. The
standard Bonferroni criterion for controlling the family-wise error rate (FWER) is
the most conservative one, but it suffers from low power. We use a less stringent
criterion of multiple testing, proposed in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), to control
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the False Discovery Rate (FDR). False Discovery Rate is the expected proportion of
falsely rejected hypotheses over the total number of rejected hypotheses. Thus, a 20%
false discovery rate would imply that, on average, 1 out of 5 selected edges is falsely
detected. The procedure was originally proposed for independent test statistics, and
its validity for test statistics with positive regression dependency was established in
Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001).
The Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure works as follows. Suppose we are testing
m null hypotheses H1, H2, . . . , Hm with p-values P1, . . . , pm. Given the sequence of
ordered p-values P(1) ≤ . . . ≤ P(m), the following twp-step procedure controls the FDR
at a level α > 0:
1. find the largest integer k ≥ 1 such that P(k) ≤ kmα;
2. reject all null hypotheses H(i), for i = 1, . . . , k.
The topology of a weighted, directed network with edges significant at a level α
(after correcting for multiple testing), or its undirected, unweighted skeleton S(G),
can be explored by standard visualization software or by calculating network centrality
measures described in section 2.5.
The complete algorithm for calculating weighted adjacency matrix Ã based on
debiased Lasso VAR is described in Algorithm 1.
2.7.2 Estimating Contemporaneous Dependence with debiased graphical
Lasso
We assume the stock returns of p firms across n time points, after appropriate
transformations (log, GARCH filter etc.) to reduce nonstationarity, are stored in a
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Algorithm 1: Network GC using Debiased Lasso VAR
Input: Data: {X0, . . . , Xn}, Xt ∈ Rp, upper bound on false discovery rates (FDR): α
X← [Xn−1 : . . . : X0]′
for i← 1 to p do
Y ← [Xni : . . . : X1i ]
Estimate noise standard deviation σ̂i using scaled Lasso (2.8)
Set tuning parameter of Lasso λ← σ̂i
√
log p/n
Calculate Lasso VAR estimate Âi: using (2.7)
Calculate debiased Lasso VAR estimate Ãi: using (2.10)
for j ← 1 to p do
Calculate p-value Pij for testing H0 : Aij = 0 vs. HA : Aij 6= 0 using (2.12)
end
end
Adjust p-values Pij , for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ p, for multiple testing using Benjamini-Hochberg
procedure, controlling for FDR at α
Set Ãij ← 0, for all i, j with Pij ≥ α
Output: Estimated weighted adjacency matrix Ã
n× p matrix X, where Xij denotes the return of firm j at time point i. We center the
columns of X to have zero mean and unit variance.
Assuming the returns are independent across time, and the p-dimensional vector
of returns follow a N(0,Σ) distribution, returns of firms i and j are conditionally
independent given the rest of the firms if and only if their partial correlation is zero.
Since Θ = Σ−1 contains partial covariances between firm returns, returns of firms i and
j are partially uncorrelated if and only if Θij = 0. Hence, the set E = {(i, j)|Θij 6= 0}
can be used as the set of edges of a graph among the p firms. This procedure is also
known as Gaussian graphical modeling.
In classical low-dimensional setting (p fixed, n → ∞), the maximum likelihood
estimate of Θ is given by S−1, where S := X ′X/n is the sample covariance matrix.
In high-dimensional setting (n  p), S is not invertible and the MLE is not uniquely
defined. In such cases, under sparsity assumption on Θ, the graphical Lasso (Glasso)









where λ is a tuning parameter controlling the level of sparsity in Θ̂, and Θ  0 indicates
that we minimize over the set of nonnegative definite matrices.
The Glasso estimate is known to be consistent for Θ in high-dimensional settings, as
long as Θ is sufficiently sparse (Ravikumar et al. (2011)). However, just like Lasso, the
Glasso estimate is also known to be biased, and formal statistical inference (confidence
intervals, hypothesis testing) with Θ̂ij is not possible without correcting the bias.
The debiased graphical Lasso (DGlasso), proposed recently in Jankova et al. (2015),
corrects the bias of Glasso and provides a method for formally testing presence or
absence of an edge between firms i and j (H0: Θij = 0 vs. HA: Θij 6= 0 ). Below we
provide a brief description of DGlasso and refer the readers to Jankova et al. (2015)
for more details.
Since columns of X are scaled to have zero mean and unit variance, we set λ =√
log p/n, as suggested in Jankova et al. (2015). Starting with the Glasso estimate Θ̂
and the sample covariance S, the debiased Glasso estimate is defined as
T̂ = vec(Θ̂)− Θ̂⊗ Θ̂vec(S − Θ̂),
where vec(A) = [A11, . . . , Ap1, . . . , A1p, . . . , App]
′ is a vector formed by stacking the
columns of a p × p matrix A, and A ⊗ B = ((AijB))1≤i,j≤p is the p2 × p2 Kronecker
product of matrices A and B. Similar to the bias correction of Lasso described in
Supplementary Discussion 2.7.1, the above bias correction can also be viewed as an
approximate Newton-Raphson step.
Under some regularity conditions on Θ, Jankova et al. (2015) established that the
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d→ N(0, 1), σ̂2n := Θ̂2ij + Θ̂iiΘ̂jj.
Leveraging this asymptotic distribution, we can formally test presence or absence of
individual edges in the Gaussian graphical model
H0 : Θij = 0 vs. HA : Θij 6= 0




, where Φ(.) is the cumu-
lative distribution function of standard normal density.
The network of partial correlations among the returns of p firms can be constructed
using only statistically significant edges after correcting for multiple comparisons using
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure described in Supplementary Discussion 2.7.1. Unlike
the directed network constructed using thetransition matrix of a VAR model, the net-
work of contemporaneous relationships is undirected since Θ is already a symmetric
matrix. So we can work with the estimated network directly and calculate centrality
measures.
2.7.3 Computing debiased Lasso and Glasso
The simulation and real data analyses in this paper using the statistical software R.
We calculated debiased Lasso using the R codes available on the webpage of the authors
of Javanmard and Montanari (2014) at http://web.stanford.edu/ montanar/sslasso/
with the default choices of tuning parameters, and implemented the algorithm of
Jankova et al. (2015) for debiased graphical Lasso ourselves. We used the R func-
tion p.adjust() to implement the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure for multiple testing
148




Socioeconomic Status and Macroeconomic
Expectations
3.1 Introduction
Individuals’ choices of consumption, saving, and investment depend on expectations
about future macroeconomic conditions. As Mankiw et al. (2003), Souleles (2004), Puri
and Robinson (2007), Dominitz and Manski (2007) and others have shown, there is
substantial disagreement between individuals in their forecasts. Such heterogeneity can
have important effects on asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics (e.g., Sims (2008),
Geanakoplos (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2012), Guzman and Stiglitz (2015)). Con-
sumption and investment choices induced by differences in beliefs further may have wel-
fare consequences (Brunnermeier et al. (2014)). Yet the origins of this disagreement
are still not well understood.
In this paper, we show that heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations is associ-
ated with individuals’ socioeconomic status (SES), measured by income and education.
Experimental evidence suggests that the degree of economic adversity that people have
faced influences their beliefs about the opportunity set available to them. Specifically,
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Kuhnen and Miu (2017) find that experimental subjects coming from high SES back-
grounds form more optimistic beliefs about risky assets’ outcome distributions, relative
to low SES subjects, particularly when those assets are likely to have high future pay-
offs, and are more likely to invest in those assets. We build on this experimental
work by analyzing the relationship between SES and people’s level of optimism about
macroeconomic conditions in a large sample of U.S. adults, recruited monthly over the
past three decades to participate in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC).
We find that expectations regarding future stock market returns, the national un-
employment rate, and general business conditions are all more optimistic for individuals
with higher socioeconomic standing, as measured by their relative income rank within
their age group in a given year, and by their level of education. These differences in
beliefs are substantial, even after controlling for other demographic characteristics, age
cohort effects, and survey time fixed effects. For example, people in the highest income
quintile have macroeconomic expectations that are more optimistic by a third of a
standard deviation relative to the expectations of people in the lowest income quin-
tile. Having a college degree corresponds to an increase in macroeconomic optimism
of roughly one tenth of a standard deviation. In the assessment of the probability
that the stock market will experience a gain over the next 12 months, which is one of
the dimensions of the optimism index we examine here, there is a spread of 15 per-
centage points between the probability assessed by people in the bottom quintile of
income and those in the top quintile, and a spread of 7 percentage points between the
expectations of those without and those with a college education. We further show
that the heterogeneity in macroeconomic beliefs across SES categories is pro-cyclical.
During recessions the gap in beliefs expressed by people from different SES categories
diminishes considerably, by as much as two thirds, as higher SES individuals exhibit a
151
sharper decline in optimism about economic conditions.
We then investigate why these SES-related differences in expectations exist, and
provide evidence that extrapolation from personal circumstances, in a manner similar
to the ”local thinking” framework proposed by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), is a
mechanism that is in part responsible for these effects. We show that higher SES indi-
viduals become relatively more likely to experience declines in their personal economic
situation when recessions arrive, as measured by their reports regarding their personal
finances, the business-related news that they find salient, and the objective economic
changes in their county of residence. Accounting for these recent developments in peo-
ple’s economic circumstances leads to a significant reduction in the observed wedge
in the macroeconomic expectations of individuals with different levels of income or
education, across good and bad economic times.
Moreover, we document that differences in beliefs associated with people’s socioe-
conomic standing help explain their economic behavior. Since the MSC offers data on
beliefs about macroeconomic conditions, as well as information about people’s choices,
such as stock market investment decisions and attitudes towards purchasing homes,
durables or cars, we can quantify the effect of SES through the beliefs channel on
these choices. We find that, while SES measures like income or education on their own
directly predict the interest in investing in stocks, or buying homes, durables or cars,
there exist indirect effects of income and education through the belief channel that ac-
count for a significant fraction of the total effect of the SES variables on these decisions
– for example, about 14% in the case of home buying attitudes. We also specifically
analyze stock market investment decisions and beliefs regarding stock returns in partic-
ular, and show that SES-induced beliefs account for a significant fraction, up to 17%,
of the total effect of the SES variables, namely, income and education, on the decision
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to invest, and on the share of income invested in equities.
The results in this paper can help shed light on the empirical pattern documented
by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), Campbell (2006) and Calvet et al. (2007), namely, that
U.S. and European households with lower education, income or wealth are less likely
to participate in the stock market. For example, as of 2013, 51% of U.S. households
had no stock market investments. For households in the bottom quintile of the in-
come distribution, 89% had no stock holdings, while for those in the upper quintile,
more than 82% had such holdings.1 The causes of these substantial differences in the
investment choices of households across the socioeconomic spectrum are still unclear.
Standard explanations involve participation costs (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), but they
still appear to leave a substantial part of the non-participation unexplained (Andersen
and Nielsen (2011)). Beliefs could be part of the explanation for why some individuals
do not participate: whatever the actual cost or perceived cost of participation, low
expectations lead to low perceived benefits from participation and hence to low rates
of participation. Our findings suggest that lower SES households have less optimistic
beliefs about the possible outcomes of risky investments, making it less likely for these
households to invest in equities.
Stock market non-participation can imply welfare losses for households, as dis-
cussed in Calvet et al. (2007). Thus, low macroeconomic expectations can have welfare
consequence for low SES individuals. Moreover, non-participation of low SES house-
holds may contribute to increasing wealth inequality. By limiting their investment
opportunity set, the non-participating low SES households may perpetuate their dis-
advantaged financial position. Favilukis (2013) presents a general equilibrium model
1Survey of Consumer Finances Chartbook, p. 507-510, is-
sued by the Federal Reserve Board in September 2014, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/BulletinCharts.pdf.
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in which higher rates of stock market participation of less wealthy households would
shrink wealth inequality.
Low expectations about future business conditions or unemployment can induce
individuals from low SES backgrounds to have low levels of investments along other
dimensions also, such as in terms of pursuing higher education, better health, or start-
ing a new business. While there is no direct evidence for this implication of our work,
existing relevant findings seem to support it. For example, Kearney and Levine (2016)
document that children from lower SES families are more likely to drop out of high
school, relative to their better-off peers, and attribute this to more pessimistic subjec-
tive estimates of the likelihood of economic success among lower SES individuals.
Our work is related to an emerging literature showing that individuals’ macroeco-
nomic expectations are “local” in the sense that they are driven by personal circum-
stances that are specific to an individual or a group of people. While our focus is on an
individuals’ current economic situation, which is strongly influenced by a person’s his-
tory of idiosyncratic shocks and initial conditions, earlier work has found links between
the macroeconomic history that individuals of a given cohort have experienced, and
their expectations and investment decisions. Individuals in cohorts that experienced
bad macroeconomic conditions subsequently avoid risky financial choices, either as in-
vestors (Malmendier and Nagel (2011)) or as managers (Malmendier and Tate (2005),
Malmendier et al. (2011)). Evidence in support of this belief channel is provided by
Malmendier and Nagel (2015), who find that differences in inflation experiences across
cohorts strongly predict differences in the expectations of these cohorts regarding fu-
ture inflation levels. Experimental evidence in Kuhnen (2015) shows that individuals
faced with sequences of negative payoffs form overly pessimistic beliefs about the qual-
ity of the available investments. Kuchler and Zafar (2016) show that individuals’
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expectations about national U.S. house prices depend on their personally experienced
house price history in their local geographic area, and expectations about the national
unemployment rate are influenced by personal experiences of unemployment.2
A common thread in these studies is that expectations about a macroeconomic
variable (say, house prices) are related to personal experiences of the realized “local”
(cohort-specific or geographically local) history of the same variable. In contrast, the
effect that we study is one where a person’s own economic situation is correlated
with a broad range of macroeconomic expectations. In other words, we find that a
person’s own economic situation appears to be associated with a general macroeconomic
optimism or pessimism that is not specific to a particular macroeconomic variable.
Our paper is also related to the recent work on extrapolative beliefs in financial
markets. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) document that investor expectations about
stock market returns tend to be extrapolative, as they are positively correlated with
past stock market returns, and with the level of the stock market. Barberis et al. (2015)
propose a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs
about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes,
and show that this model yields predictions that match data well, for example, that
high price-to-dividends ratios predict poor subsequent stock market performance, or
that stock prices are more volatile than would be justified based on rational forecasts
of future cash flows. Gennaioli et al. (2015) develop a model of beliefs in financial
markets in which investors attach excessive probabilities to states of the world that are
representative for the news they observe. This model generates purely belief-driven
boom-bust cycles. Our contribution to this literature is to highlight that there may
2Amonlirdviman (2007) documents that people with low income or education are more pessimistic
about their own personal situation, and presents a model where these individuals suffer from low
self-control, and the optimal response to self-control problems is to become defensively pessimistic
about one’s future prospects.
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be differences in the cross-section of investors with respect to the information set they
extrapolate from, and thus, in the volatility of their expectations.
3.2 Data
Our data span the period 1980-2014, at a monthly frequency. Each month, ap-
proximately 400 individuals are recruited for the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and
are asked to express their beliefs about future values of several macroeconomic vari-
ables. The survey is based on a nationally representative group of respondents, sam-
pled using landline and cellular phone numbers (Curtin and Dechaux (2015)). In our
analysis, we weight observations with the household sample weights provided by the
MSC. These sample weights adjust, among other things, for differential non-response
by demographic characteristics.3
In total, there are 171,911 person-month observations in our sample. The macro
belief variables we study are PSTK, BUS12, BUS5, BEXP and UNEMP . Table 3.1
presents the survey questions used to measure the belief variables, and the respondents’
possible answers. PSTK is the respondent’s subjective probability that the US stock
market will have a positive return over the next 12 months. BUS12, BUS5 and BEXP
measure expectations about the evolution of the overall business environment over the
following 12 months or 5 years, and UNEMP measures expectations about the evolution
of the national unemployment rate over the following 12 months. We rescale the belief
variables except PSTK to vary between -1 to 1, such that higher values mean optimism.
To calculate an aggregate measure of macroeconomic optimism, we standardize each of
3Curtin et al. (2002) investigate the role of survey non-response on expectations collected by the
MSC, and find that demographic characteristics, including income and education, do not have sizeable
effects on the probability of agreeing to be part of the survey. Moreover, the authors find no evidence
that the likelihood of participating in the survey is a function of the respondents’ macroeconomic
optimism.
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these individual beliefs, and average the standardized values. Because PSTK is only
available starting in June 2002, OPTINDX is the average of four standardised beliefs
(BUS12, BUS5, BEXP and UNEMP ) prior to that time, and it is the average of
five standardised beliefs (BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , UNEMP , and PSTK) after that
month.
We choose income and education as indicators of the socioeconomic status of house-
holds. We restrict our analysis to individuals 24- to 75-years old, because information
on income or college degree completion may not be meaningful SES measures for very
old or very young adults. Next we create quintiles of real income (in 2014 dollars)
within each year and age group (25-29, 30-34, .. 70-74), which we label Income rank.
We use this as one the socioeconomic status variables because relative income com-
pared to peers may matter more than dollar income, but we obtain broadly similar
effects if we use dollar income rather than income rank. College Degree is a binary
variable which takes value 1 if the respondent has at least a college degree.
To measure recent changes in an individual’s personal economic situation, we use
three variables. First, we use the variable 1-yr Change in Personal Situation, provided
in the Michigan survey for each respondent, which takes values -1, 0 or 1 if the individ-
ual reports being worse off, the same, or better-off than a year ago, in terms of their
personal finances. As a simpler version of this variable, we also create an indicator
called Worse off, equal to 1 if the individual reports that their personal finances are
worse than one year before. Second, we use the measure Amount of good news, also
available in the survey, which indicates how many pieces of good business-related news
the respondent was able to recall when interviewed. The possible values are 0, 1 or 2.
Finally, for a more objective measure of changes in the individual’s economic environ-
ment, we use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the unemployment level in
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the county when the respondent resides, in the month preceeding the survey.4
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the variables that capture the personal
economic situation, beliefs, and household economic choices of the individuals in the
sample. In our data, 35.3% of people have completed at least a college degree. The
median real household income (in 2014 dollars) of the participants in the survey is
$57,429, but there are clear outliers in the income distribution, as can be seen in Table
3.2. The average value for the overall amount a person has invested in equities as of
the time of the survey is about 85% of the annual income of that individual.
Given the construction of the aggregate belief measure OPTINDX as a mean of
standardized variables, in our sample spanning 1980-2014 the average OPTINDX is
close to zero. The average estimates for BUS12 and BUS5, which are beliefs regarding
whether there will be good or bad economic times over the next 12 months or 5 year,
are 0.014 and -0.06, respectively. Given that the scale for these two variables spans -1
to 1, these averages indicate that expectations about future economic times have not
been overly pessimistic or overly optimistic during the 34 years studied here. The same
holds true for BEXP , the belief regarding general business conditions over the next
year, whose average in the sample is 0.096. The belief regarding whether unemployment
will be lower or higher over the next year, UNEMP , has the most negative sample
average, -0.183, indicating that survey participants were the most pessimistic about
this particular aspect of future economic conditions. During 2002-2014, the time frame
for which this measure is available, the average estimate of PSTK, the probability that
the U.S. stock market would have a positive return in the next 12 months, is 48.3%,
with a standard deviation of 29.3%.
4Because the county of residence is not publicly available in the Michigan survey, we had the
county-level information merged in by the staff who oversee this survey, but the resulting dataset that
we can use does not have the actual county identifiers. The county level data could only be merged
in for MSC observations during 2000-2014.
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We also use several variables that capture the individuals’ decisions regarding stock
market investments, namely whether they invest in equity (Invest), as well as the
share of income invested in the stock market (Invest Share), and their attitudes at the
time of the survey towards buying a home (HOM), buying durables (DUR) or cars
(CAR). About 62% of individuals in our sample participate in the stock market, and
on average responses regarding whether it is a good time to purchase a home, durables
or cars are positive. For example, the variable HOM , which can take values of -1, 0 or
1, indicating either negative, neutral or positive attitudes towards buying a home, has




Our main findings are that higher SES households have more optimistic expecta-
tions about macroeconomic conditions, but the SES-related gap in expectations nar-
rows significantly during recessions. Both can be gleaned from the patterns in expec-
tations across SES levels, over time, shown in Figure 3.1. The figure documents that
during 1980-2014, higher income and higher education individuals had more optimistic
beliefs about future macroeconomic conditions, relative to lower income and lower ed-
ucation individuals. Moreover, the disagreement between households of different SES
levels changed over time, as the gap in expectations between the high and low SES
individuals diminished during recessions. Thus, the data in Figure 3.1 indicate that
the heterogeneity in this aggregate index of macroeconomic optimism across SES levels
is pro-cyclical.
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Looking specifically at expectations about future stock market returns, the evi-
dence in Figure 3.2 shows that the heterogeneity in beliefs regarding stock market
returns across SES levels is similar to that shown by the general optimism index.
Namely, higher income and higher education individuals have more optimistic expec-
tations about the stock market return being positive over the following year, and the
gap in the expectations of high and low SES individuals is pro-cyclical.
In figures 3.6 through 3.9 in the Supplementary results we document that there
exists an SES-induced wedge in beliefs for each component of the optimism index
OPTINDX (aside from PSTK), namely, BUS5, BUS12, BEXP and UNEMP , and
that recessions lead to a lower SES-related gap for each of these types of macroeconomic
expectations.
We further investigate whether household beliefs about different aspects of the
macro economy are influenced by socioeconomic status measures by estimating the
linear regression models in Table 3.3. Dependent variables in the models in the ta-
ble are measures of macroeconomic expectations: the aggregate optimism measure
OPTINDEX in the first column, and its separate components in the following five
columns. Independent variables include the person’s income rank as a quintile (defined
with respect to the person’s year-age group), an indicator for whether the person has
a college degree or higher education, and interactions of an NBER recession indica-
tor with the two SES measures. All the regressions in the paper also include fixed
effects for the year-month of the survey, as well as indicators for the respondents’ age,
gender, and marital status. The standard errors are clustered by time, specifically by
year-month.
As shown by the results in Table 3.3, people’s SES characteristics are significant
predictors of their beliefs regarding future macroeconomic conditions (PSTK, BUS12,
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BUS5, BEXP , UNEMP ), as well as of their aggregate optimism index OPTINDX.
For each of our five measures of beliefs, we find that having a higher income rank
among people in the same age category and in the same year, and having a college or
higher education are significant predictors of the level of optimism in the respondents’
expectations. When the dependent variable captures expectations about future stock
market returns (PSTK), we find that during non-recession months, for each increase
of one quintile in respondents’ income rank, the probability they estimate for the U.S.
stock market to have a positive return over the next year increases by 3.2%. People
with at least a college degree, on average believe that the probability of positive stock
market return is 7.4% higher than people without a college education.
Similarly, we find that during non-recession months, those with better SES provide
significantly more optimistic expectations for BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , UNEMP and
have higher values for the overall belief measure OPTINDX. For example, an increase
of a person’s income rank by one quintile leads to an average increase of 0.063 in
OPTINDX, which is about a tenth of the standard deviation of this variable. Having
a college degree has a similar effect, as it leads to an increase in OPTINDX of 0.069.
All of these effects are statistically significant at p < 0.05 or better.
A possible concern regarding the finding that lower income individuals have more
pessimistic macroeconomic expectations is that the effect is driven by a lack of financial
literacy, which might induce low income people to be more confused, in a pessimistic
manner, about the macroeconomy. To address this concern, in unreported analyses we
estimate similar models as in Table 3.3, but only for people with a college degree, and
we continue to find a significant and positive effect (0.051, p < 0.01) of IncomeRank
on people’s aggregate expectations as measured by OPTINDX. This effect is similar
in magnitude to that estimated in the specification in the first column in Table 3.3 (i.e.,
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0.063). In other words, even among those with high education, we find that individuals
earning more money are more optimistic about future macroeconomic developments
than their lower-income peers.
While during normal economic times higher-income and higher-education individ-
uals are more optimistic about macroeconomic developments, the coefficient estimates
in Table 3.3 on the interaction terms of the NBER recession indicator and either SES
measure show that, consistent with the patterns in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the SES-related
wedge in expectations is significantly smaller during recessions. In the case of educa-
tion, the effect of a college degree on OPTINDX is two thirds smaller during recessions
(instead of 0.069, it is 0.069-0.047, or 0.022), and the effect of income rank is a third
smaller (instead of 0.063 it is 0.063-0.02, or 0.043). These estimates are significant at
p < 0.01 or better.
Our analysis so far has documented two broad empirical patterns: first, lower SES
people hold more pessimistic macroeconomic beliefs, and second, during recessions
the difference in macroeconomic beliefs of those with high and low SES diminishes
considerably. The fact that the gap in expectations between households from different
SES levels is not constant over time is not surprising. Households from high and low
SES levels may differ in the economic shocks they experience, the information they
receive, and the way they process information. Building on this intuition, in the next
section we investigate a potential mechanism that may be driving our main results.
3.3.2 Mechanism: Extrapolation from personal circumstance
It is possible that individuals form beliefs about aggregate macroeconomic condi-
tions by extrapolating from their own economic situation. This idea is similar to the
”local thinking” concept proposed by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010). In their model, an
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agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from
memory to evaluate a hypothesis, with limited and selected recall of information. In
our context, local thinking would mean that when asked about macroeconomic condi-
tions, people can only envision a limited number of scenarios, and those that do come
to mind are more representative, or stereotypical, for these individuals. Therefore,
people would forecast macroeconomic conditions more similar to their own personal
situation than they ought to be, given objective information about the economy in
general. Moreover, as long as the scenarios that come to mind more likely are more
recent, this would suggest that recent changes in one’s personal economic situation
would be particularly salient in the formation of macroeconomic expectations.
This mechanism can account for the first main fact we document, namely, that
households with better incomes or education have more optimistic beliefs about macroe-
conomic outcomes such as stock market returns or unemployment levels. The second
fact we document, namely the convergence in beliefs across SES levels during recessions,
is also a consequence of this mechanism if during recessions higher SES households suf-
fer, or perceive to suffer, a larger decline in their economic wellbeing in general.
There is suggestive evidence that higher SES people indeed have more cyclical in-
come, consumption growth, or wealth, and thus face more cyclicality in their economic
situation. Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) analyze the sensitivity of household in-
come to aggregate income, where household income includes wages, as well as transfers
(which impact incomes for low SES people) and realized capital gains (which impact
incomes for higher SES people). Their analysis documents that the people with the
least cyclical income are those in the lowest income quintile, and the people with the
most cyclical income are those in the highest income quintile.5 Saez (2015) finds that
5When income is measured solely with W-2 based wages, and does not include tranfers or realized
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the taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribuion experienced much sharper
falls in income during the 2001 recession and the Great Recession than other taxpay-
ers. The sensitivity of consumption growth to aggregate consumption growth is much
greater for people in the top quintile of income, relative to those in the bottom four
quintiles (Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)). Luxury good consumption—which
is, presumably, an indication of the financial well-being of wealthier households—is
more highly correlated with stock market returns than other consumption categories
(Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004)). The fraction of net wealth invested in equity is significantly
greater for people in the top two quintiles of wealth relative to those in lower wealth
quintiles (Gomez (2017)), implying that the wealth of higher SES people is more ex-
posed to market conditions, in line with the finding in Bosworth (2012) that the most
pronounced drop in wealth during the 2007-2009 was among households in the top
third of the distribution in terms of either income or wealth as of 2007.
Below, we provide evidence from the Michigan survey that in terms of subjective
perception but also objective measures, higher income and higher education individuals
experience a more pronounced decline in their economic situation during the recessions
in our sample. Moreover we show that these changes in people’s personal economic
situation are factors that drive expectations about future macroeconomic conditions,
and the SES-wedge in these expectations documented earlier in the analysis.
Our first measure of the recent change in a person’s economic circumstances is given
by the subjective assessment as to whether the individual is worse off, the same, or
better off in terms of their finances, relative to a year before the survey. Figure 3.3
shows that in recessions high SES individuals become more likely to report that their
personal economic situation is worse than a year before, relative to non-recession times,
capital gains, then the sensitivity of wage income to GDP is U-shaped: it is high for low income and
for high income groups. See Guvenen et al. (2014) and Guvenen et al. (2017).
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and the worsening of personal economic circumstance is more pronounced for high SES
relative to low SES individuals.
The regression models in the first two columns in Table 3.4 document similar results
as those in Figure 3.3. In non-recession times, people are 5.7% (p < 0.01) less likely
to report that their personal finances are worse than a year before, if their income
rank increases by one quintile. Similarly, in non-recession times, people with a college
degree are 2.5% (p < 0.01) less likely, relative to those without a college degree to
report that their personal finances have worsened since a year before. During recession
months, however, these gaps in the likelihoods of people of high versus low SES to
report a change for the worse in their economic situation become about a fifth smaller,
as can be seen by adding the non-recession coefficients to those on the NBER recession
interaction terms. A similar effect is observed when instead of using the simple Worse
off indicator, we use the 1-yr Change in Personal Situation measure, which can take
the values -1, 0 or 1 to indicate whether people feel their finances have gotten worse,
stayed the same, or improved in the past year. We find that this variable is more
positive for higher SES individuals during non-recession times, but the gap between
high and low SES people in their reports regarding the change in their finances narrows
by about a fifth during recession months.
Our second measure of the recent change in a person’s economic situation is given
by the individual’s report about the type of business-related news that are salient to
them at the time of the survey. Each person is asked whether they have followed the
news recently, and if so, they are asked to list up to two different pieces of news, which
are later coded by the interviewer as being good news or bad news. Here, for each
respondent we create a variable (Amount of good news) equal to 0, 1, or 2, depending
on how many pieces of positive economic news they mentioned to the interviewer. The
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average of this variable in the sample is 0.34.
We find that during non-recessionary times, higher SES individuals report hearing
more news of a positive nature relative lower SES people, as can be seen in Figure
3.4, but this SES-related gap in good news salience disappears during recessions. The
regression model in column three in Table 3.4 documents similar results as those in
Figure 3.4. During non-recession months, the amount of good news reported is 0.045
(p < 0.01) higher for each increase of a quintile in the income rank of a person, and
0.157 (p < 0.01) higher in the case of college degree holder versus those with a lower
education. These differences across SES levels in the amount of good news salient to
people drops during recession months, by about a half.
In unreported results, we also show that higher SES individuals are more likely
to be aware of economic news than lower SES individuals, especially during normal
economic times. To the extent that people in different SES categories have different
stakes when it comes to following economic developments, this evidence is in line with
rational inattention theory (Sims (2008), Kezdi and Willis (2011)), which states that
individuals with high stakes have strong incentives to pay more attention to macroeco-
nomic signals, and thus they will update their macroeconomic beliefs frequently. The
opposite is true for individuals with low stakes, who will engage in infrequent updating
and thus will exhibit sticky expectations. Examining whether people report hearing
any business news at all, irrespective of their type, we document a pattern very much
in line with the pro-cyclical inattention results in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015),
namely, we see that across all SES levels, people are less aware of business news during
good economic times.
As our final measure of changes in a person’s economic environment, we use county
level information about unemployment rates, provided by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
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tics with a monthly frequency, thus matching the frequency of the expectations data.
In column four in Table 3.4 we examine whether there is a change, driven by the occur-
rence of recessions, in the wedge between economic conditions in the communities where
higher SES individuals live relative to those where lower SES individuals reside. We
were able to have county-level information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics merged
in with the publicly available data from the Michigan Survey, for the 2000-2014 period.6
Specifically, as our measure of economic conditions in the county of the respondent we
use unemployment growth over the three months prior to the month when the individ-
ual is in the survey. We find that during non-recession months, unemployment growth
in respondents’ communities is similar across high and low income or education in-
dividuals. The average during the sample for the three-month growth in the county
unemployment rate is about 1.2%. However, unemployment growth is higher during
recessions in the counties of residence of higher SES individuals. A change from one
quintile to the next higher quintile in terms of a person’s income corresponds to an
increase of 0.2% (p < 0.05) in the three-month growth in unemployment observed in
the person’s community. For an increase in education, from having no college degree
to having one, the corresponding increase in the three-month growth in the unemploy-
ment rate in the person’s county is 0.5% (p = 0.1). These are sizeable effects, given the
mean of this growth, namely, 1.2%. This suggests that higher SES people may observe
a faster decline in the economic situation of their community during recessions, relative
to lower SES individuals.
The two panels in Figure 3.5 present residual plots for the optimism index, split by
SES, during 1980-2014. SES is defined based on income in the top panel, and education
in the bottom panel. The residual optimism shown in the figure is obtained after
6This merge can not be done for times prior to year 2000 due to the lack of county identifiers in
the MSC data up to that year.
167
controlling for measures of personal circumstance, specifically respondents’ assessment
whether their own personal finances have improved in the past year, and the amount
of good business news heard recently. As can be seen by comparing Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.1, the SES-related differences in beliefs diminish significantly, when beliefs are
measured by this residual optimism index.
This result can also be seen in the regressions in Table 3.5. Once we control for
changes in a person’s own economic situation, the amount of good news salient to
them, and for the county economic condition as measured by unemployment (for the
subsample for which we have this data), the coefficients on the SES variables – income
rank and education – and their interactions with the NBER recession indicator drop
in magnitude significantly, by roughly a half. This indicates that indeed the SES-
related wedge in expectations documented in the paper, and its pro-cyclical nature,
can be explained at least in part by people extrapolating from local, personal changes
in economic conditions.
3.3.3 Importance of SES-driven expectations for household choices
The results so far indicate that a person’s socioeconomic situation shapes their
beliefs about future macro-level economic conditions, such that higher SES individuals
hold more optimistic beliefs about future stock returns, unemployment and business
conditions. In the next step of the analysis, our goal is to quantify the impact of SES,
specifically through its influence on beliefs, on households’ economic choices.
It is natural to expect that aspects of a person’s SES will have a direct effect
on that person’s economic choices. For example, higher income individuals or those
who are better educated likely have easier ways to invest in stocks relative to lower
income individuals, perhaps because of access to retirement accounts at work, or simply
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because they have money left to save after paying their bills each months. Similarly,
higher SES individuals are less likely to face financial constrains and thus more likely
to consider purchasing homes, cars or durable goods.
Therefore, the total effect of SES on household choices comes from two sources: (1)
the direct effect of SES on these choices – for example, because higher income leads
to easier access to retirement accounts, and (2) the indirect effect of SES on these
choices through the belief channel – for example, because higher SES indviduals hold
more optimistic beliefs about the distribution of stock returns, or other macroeconomic
developments.
We can measure the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects of SES
on people’s economic choices using the analysis in Table 3.6. The dependent variables
in the models estimated in the table capture the respondent’s investments in stocks
(Invest and InvestShare) and their propensity to assess when completing the survey
that it was a good time to purchase homes, durables or cars (HOM , DUR, CAR).
The independent variables include our two SES dimensions (income rank and educa-
tion), as well as the person’s aggregate belief about future macroeconomic conditions
(OPTINDX).
The direct effects of the two SES measures on household choices are given by the
estimated regression coefficients in the models in Table 3.6 for each of the two measures.
As expected, we find that higher SES people are more likely to participate in the stock
market, invest more money relative to their income in equities, and are more likely to
believe that it is a good time to purchase homes, cars or durable goods. For example,
the regression in the second column in Table 3.6 shows that an income rank higher
by one quintile corresponds to 14.2% (p < 0.01) increase in the probability that the
person invests in stocks. This is a large effect, considering that in our data, as shown
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in the summary statistics in Table 3.2, 65% of respondents invest in the stock market.
Individuals with a college or higher education have a 12% (p < 0.01) higher probability
of investing in stocks, compared to those less educated. Similarly, the results in the
third column in Table 3.6 show that people with higher incomes and a college or
higher education, conditional on investing in equities, have a higher amount of money,
expressed as a fraction of their annual income, invested in stocks.
The regression models in the last three columns in Table 3.6 show that, in general,
both dimensions of SES are significant and positive predictors of people’s assessment
that it is a good time to purchase a home, or a car or durable goods. For example,
having a college or higher education translates into an improvement of 0.08 (p < 0.01)
in the person’s attitude towards buying a home, which is sizeable, given that the
mean of this variable is 0.44 in our sample. The effect of increasing one’s income
rank by one quintile on the attitude towards buying a home is similar in magnitude
(0.071, p < 0.01) to that of having a college education. When the dependent variable
captures the attitude towards buying durables, or cars, the estimated direct effects of
the SES dimensions are in line with those observed when the dependent variable refers
to people’s home buying attitude. The only exception is that college educated peope
are not significantly different than those without a college degree to indicate that it is
a good time to purchase durables.
Since in the regression models in Table 3.6 we control for the person’s beliefs about
future macroeconomic conditions, as measured by their overall optimism, OPTINDX,
the above effects of SES on the person’s decisions regarding investments and purchases
represent the direct effects of SES on these decisions, aside from any indirect effects of
SES through the belief channel.
To measure the indirect effects of SES, and the relative importance of the direct
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versus the indirect effects, we follow standard methodology used in mediation analysis.
The results are presented in presented in Table 3.7, and show that SES changes house-
hold choices through both the direct channel and the indirect, belief-related, channel.
For example, looking at the decision to invest or not in stocks (first row in Table 3.7),
the direct effect of an increase of one quintile in a person’s income rank is an increase
of 14.2% in the probability of investing, as shown earlier in the regression analysis in
Table 3.6. The indirect effect of the same increase in the income rank, through the
belief channel, is equal to the product of two quantities: the coefficient estimate on
Income Rank in the regression model predicting the belief OPTINDX in the first
column of Table 3.6, and the coefficient estimate on OPTINDX in the regression
model from Table 3.6 that predicts the Invest variable. Thus, the indirect effect is
0.06 × 0.035 = 0.2%. The total effect of an increase of one quintile in income rank
on the probability of investing in stocks is the sum of the direct (14.2%) and indirect
(0.2%) effects, namely 14.4%. The importance of the indirect, belief-related channel, is
given by the ratio of the indirect to total effect, which is equal to 1.5%. In other words,
a person’s income rank is a positive predictor of the decision to invest in stocks, and
about 1.5% of the positive effect of income on the probability to invest is attributable
to the beliefs that the person holds about future macroeconomic conditions. The rest of
the effect is attributable to other income-related factors that are not about differences
in beliefs.
The importance of the indirect, belief-channel is higher for other SES measures
and household decisions. For example, analyzing the decision to invest in stocks, the
indirect channel accounts for 1.8% of the positive effect of a college education. When
analyzing the share of income invested in stocks, the indirect, belief-related channel,
accounts for 8.83% of the positive effect of higher income rank, and 2.45% of the
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positive effect of a college education. When analyzing people’s home buying attitude,
the indirect, belief-related channel, accounts for 14.57% of the positive effect of higher
income rank, and 13.58% of the positive effect of a college education. The indirect,
belief-related channel accounts for 24.67% of the positive effect of higher income rank
on attitudes towards durables purchases, and for 18.7% of the positive effects of either
higher income rank, or higher education, on attitudes towards car purchases. Thus, the
effects of SES on household choices and attitudes are in part driven by the differences
in macroeconomic expectations of people with different SES.7
So far in the analysis we have related several decisions of individuals to their aggre-
gate belief about future economic conditions, OPTINDX. We will now turn towards
analyzing a specific aspect of these beliefs, namely, the subjective probability that the
U.S. stock market return will be positive over the next year (PSTK), to understand
how it relates to the respondents’ decision regarding making investments in stocks.
While SES-related variables such as income and participation costs impact whether
a household invests in the stock market (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), our results so
far suggest that SES-driven variation in beliefs about stock returns may also explain
the variation across SES levels in terms of the decision to invest, and the fraction of
income invested in stocks. We thus investigate the relative importance of the SES-
related stock market belief channel, relative to that of other SES-related factors, on
stock investment decisions.
The results in Table 3.8 indicate that SES measures, as well as PSTK, are positive
predictors of a person’s decision to invest in equities, and conditional on investing, of
the share of income invested in stocks. The relative importance of the direct effect
7An additional way to quantify the role of the SES-induced beliefs on household economic choices
is to examine the contribution of these beliefs to the standard deviation of households’ choices. In
unreported analyses, we find that this alternate approach leads to similar results as documented here.
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of SES measures, and their indirect effect through expectations, is illustrated in the
results in Table 3.9.
As expected, the results in Table 3.8 show that, controlling for the belief about
stock market returns, our SES measures are positive and significant predictors of both
the invest decision, as well as of the share of income invested in stocks. In other words,
income rank, and education directly influence a household’s stock market investment
decisions. However, as our analysis in Table 3.3, and in the first column in Table 3.8
shows, these SES measures also impact PSTK, the belief about whether the stock
market return will be positive over the next year, which by itself, as seen in Table 3.8,
influences the households’ decision whether, and how much, to invest in stocks.8
The coefficient estimates in Table 3.8 allow us to estimate the direct and indirect
(via the belief channel) effects of each of the SES measures on stock market investment
decisions. Specifically, increasing a person’s income rank by one quintile increases the
probability of stock market participation by 13.4%, and the share of income invested
by 7.3%. The indirect effects of income rank on these two outcomes, through the belief
channel, are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimates on PSTK in the first
column in Table 3.8 and those in the second, and third column, respectively. Namely,
the indirect effects of increasing the income rank by one quintile on the probability of
participation and on the share of income invested in stocks are increases of 0.5% (i.e.,
0.031 × 0.176) and 1.5% (i.e., 0.031 × 0.491), respectively. Thus the total effects of
increasing one’s income rank by one quintile are an increase of 13.9% (i.e., 13.4% +
8A possible concern is that there is a mechanical correlation between the expectations expressed
by survey respondents and their declared choices, stemming from people’s desire to look ”consistent”
in their survey answers. Specifically, an individual who declared that he does not invest in the stock
market may later express pessimistic expectations about future stock market returns, to justify to
himself and the experimenter why he holds no equities. Fortunately, the survey design used by the
MSC staff alleviates this concern, because people are first asked to estimate the probability that the
stock market will have a positive return, and only later are asked to calculate how much money, if
any, they invest in stocks.
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0.5%) in the probability of participation in the stock market, and an increase of 8.9%
(i.e., 7.3% + 1.5%) in the share of income invested. The indirect effect of higher income,
though inducing more optimistic beliefs about the stock market, represents 3.93% of
the total effect of income on the participation decision (i.e., 0.5%/13.9% ), and 17.21%
of its total effect on the share of income invested in stocks (i.e., 1.5%/8.9%).
When examining the effects of education on the decision to invest in stocks and on
the share of income invested, we also find sizeable indirect effects of this SES measure
on the two decisions. Specifically, following the same procedure described earlier for
quantifying the direct and indirect effects of income rank on stock investment decisions,
we find that having a college degree increases the probability of investing in stocks by
11.7% and 10.84% of this total effect of education on participation is coming from the
indirect, belief-related channel. Also, having a college or better education increases the
share of income invested in stocks by 32.4% and the fraction of this total effect that is
driven by the belief channel is 10.92%. These results are summarized in Table 3.9.
Thus, we find that people who have higher incomes and are more educated are more
likely to invest in stocks, and are willing to invest more of their income in these assets,
and this is in part because they hold more optimistic beliefs about the stock market
return distribution.
When studying the effect of one dimension of expectations, namely, PSTK, on in-
vestment decisions, rather than using an aggregate measure based on several macroeco-
nomic beliefs, such as OPTINDX, it is important to alleviate the concern that there
may be substantial measurement error in the PSTK variable. To do so, in additional
analyses presented in the Supplementary results, we have used an instrumental vari-
ables estimation strategy, based on the idea that the several other reported macro belief
variables in the Michigan Survey (i.e., BUS12, BUS5, BEXP and UNEMP ) can be
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used as instruments for PSTK, assuming their measurement errors are uncorrelated
with the measurement error in PSTK. We find similar effects either using the OLS or
the IV approach, and thus in the paper we focus on the OLS results.
3.4 Caveats and limitations
Our interpretation of the results presented here is in line with the assertion in Man-
ski (2004) and a large body of research using survey expectations that the subjective
beliefs reported by respondents in the survey are independent of the respondents’ pref-
erences over outcomes. It is possible, though, that preferences lead survey respondents
to tilt their expectations in a particular direction. For example, ambiguity aversion
can be represented as a pessimistic tilt in subjective probabilities (Hansen and Sargent
(2016)). If respondents perceive ambiguity about probability distributions, it is possible
(although not necessarily true) that they report their pessimistically tilted probabili-
ties in the survey. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that macroeconomic
expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers are systematically too pessimistic
relative to professional forecast or econometric model-based forecasts (Bhandari et al.
(2016)). Viewed through the lens of these models, our findings indicate that individuals
with lower SES have subjective beliefs that have a greater tilt towards pessimism and
that that their tilt is less cyclical than the tilt of high-SES individuals.9
We also interpret the respondents’ answers regarding household decisions – such as
choices concerning investing in the stock market, or attitudes towards buying homes,
cars and durable goods – as good proxies for these individuals’ actual economic be-
havior. That being said, we do not have administrative data to verify these survey
9Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) provide an alternative model of optimistically-titled probabili-
ties. A tilt towards optimism is, however, in conflict with the fact that expectations seem to be too
pessimistic on average.
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answers. However, there are two reasons to believe that people’s survey responses are
truthful.
First, as shown earlier in our analysis, there is a clear relationship between a respon-
dents’ expectations and their own household decisions as reported during the survey,
which implies that the data on decisions can not be simply noise. This correlation
between expectations and behavior is also found at the aggregate level, as shown for
example in Carroll et al. (1994), who document that the degree of optimism in MSC
expectations is a strong positive predictor of the change over the following year in the
aggregate level of personal consumption, including purchases of cars, other goods, and
services.
Second, the survey measures of household behavior are strong predictors of ag-
gregate macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Cai et al. (2015) find that the MSC
aggregate response regarding whether it is a good time to buy a home is a strong and
positive predictor of the volume of transactions in the housing market measured over
the following year. In additional analyses of our own we find that the MSC respondents’
monthly aggregate attitude DUR regarding purchasing durables is highly correlated
(ρ=0.5, p < 0.01) with the aggregate contemporaneous monthly demand for durable
goods, obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Similarly, we find there there is a high correlation (ρ=0.6, p < 0.01) between the MSC
aggregate monthly attitude CAR towards buying cars, and the contemporaneous total
car sales reported in the FRED database.10
Therefore, while we can not verify for each respondent whether their household
decisions are truthfully reported, at least we observe that in the aggregate, the reports
10The durable goods demand data and the total car sales data are available on the website
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGORDER, and
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA, respectively. For our analysis we detrend these monthly
time series to account for population growth.
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of individuals in the MSC correspond to actual macroeconomic outcomes.
3.5 Conclusion
Using a sample of more than 170,000 responses from individuals recruited to par-
ticipate in the Michigan Survey of Consumers each month from 1980 to 2014, we
document that people’s socioeconomic status is a significant driver of the beliefs they
hold about future macroeconomic conditions such as the performance of the stock mar-
ket and changes in unemployment or business conditions in general, and this in turn
has significant effects on people’s economic choices. Specifically, we find that higher
SES individuals – namely, those with higher income and higher education – are more
optimistic about future macroeconomic conditions during non-recessionary times, and
these optimistic beliefs are in part responsible for these households’ higher propensity
to invest in stocks or to be inclined to purchase homes, cars or durable goods. Impor-
tantly, the SES effect on beliefs is pro-cyclical, as we find that during recessions, the
wedge in expectations across SES levels diminishes significantly. We provide evidence
that suggests that extrapolation from personal experience is a likely mechanism for the
observed differences in expectations of people with different socioeconomic standing,
as well as for the convergence of these expectations during recessions.
Our findings suggest that differences in macroeconomic expectations across people
with different socioeconomic standing may lead to an increase in wealth inequality
in the population over time, since these expectations influence household decisions
such as investing in stocks or in real estate. However, our results also point to the
possibility that due to the convergence in expectations that occurs during recessions,
wealth inequality may diminish during those times. An interesting avenue for future
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work is to quantify the importance of divergence in expectations across SES strata for
the dynamics of the wealth distribution in the population.
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Figure 3.1: Macroeconomic optimism during 1980-2014, by SES level. Monthly level
data. Income quintiles are created within year-age groups. Shaded areas represent
NBER recession periods.
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Figure 3.2: Stock market expectations during 2002-2014, by SES level. Expectations
refer to individuals’ stated probability that the US stock market would have a positive
return over the following 12 months. Monthly level data. Income quintiles are created
within year-age groups. Shaded areas represent NBER recession periods.
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Figure 3.3: Fraction of population reporting that their own personal economic situation
is worse relative to one year before, by SES level.
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Figure 3.4: Amount of good news heard, by SES level. Possible values for each indi-
vidual are 0, 1, or 2, depending on how many pieces of good economic news they said
they heard recently.
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Figure 3.5: Residual of the optimism index obtained after controlling for the respon-
dents’ perceived change in their own economic situation over the past year, and the
amount of good news heard, shown by income levels (top panel) and education levels
(bottom panel).
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Table 3.1: Data Definition




% Chance of investment in-
crease in 1 year: What do
you think is the percent
chance that a one thousand
dollar investment in a diver-
sified stock mutual fund will
increase in value in the year
ahead, so that it is worth
more than one thousand dol-
lars one year from now?






And how about a year from
now, do you expect that in
the country as a whole busi-
ness conditions will be bet-
ter, or worse than they are










Now turning to business
conditions in the country as
a whole–do you think that
during the next 12 months
we’ll have good times finan-











Looking ahead, which would
you say is more likely –
that in the country as a
whole we’ll have continuous
good times during the next
5 years or so, or that we will










Continued on next page...
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... table 3.1 continued




How about people out of
work during the coming 12
months –do you think that
there will be more unem-
ployment than now, about











to A Year Ago
Would you say that you are
better off or worse off finan-































Generally speaking, do you
think now is a good time or






Generally speaking, do you
think now is a good or a bad





CAR Car Buying Atti-
tude
Speaking now of the auto-
mobile market –do you think
the next 12 months or so will
be a good time or a bad time
to buy a vehicle, such as a






Table 3.2: Summary Statistics. Expectations data are collected monthly during 1980-
2014, with the exception of PSTK (stock market expectations), which is available only
during 2002-2014.
N Mean Median StdDev Min Max
OPTINDX 171911 0.034 0.045 0.733 -1.540 1.771
PSTK 56821 0.483 0.500 0.293 0.000 1.000
BUS12 157332 0.014 0.000 0.965 -1.000 1.000
BUS5 162786 -0.060 -0.500 0.868 -1.000 1.000
BEXP 168954 0.096 0.000 0.691 -1.000 1.000
UNEMP 170579 -0.183 0.000 0.694 -1.000 1.000
Income Rank 171911 2.898 3.000 1.410 1.000 5.000
College Degree 171911 0.353 0.000 0.478 0.000 1.000
Worse off 171618 0.327 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000
1-Yr Change in Personal Finances 171618 0.068 0.000 0.847 -1.000 1.000
Amount of good news 171014 0.339 0.000 0.619 0.000 2.000
County Unemployment Rate 68548 6.419 5.800 2.616 1.100 31.200
Invest 78825 0.622 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000
Annual income (Real $) 171911 71393 57429 63236 2 1041090
Amt Inv(Real $) 43168 232604 80654 605282 985 14612452
Log(Amt Inv(Real $)) 43168 11.207 11.298 1.591 6.893 16.497
Log(Inv share) 43168 -0.157 -0.077 1.402 -5.565 5.085
HOM 169143 0.415 1.000 0.900 -1.000 1.000
DUR 163451 0.473 1.000 0.856 -1.000 1.000
CAR 163592 0.333 1.000 0.929 -1.000 1.000
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Table 3.3: Macroeconomic expectations, socioeconomic status, and recessions. Linear
regression models. Controls include dummies for year-month, age, gender, marital
status. Higher beliefs indicate optimism. All Beliefs except PSTK and OPTINDX are
categorical. OPTINDX : Overall macroeconomic optimism index; PSTK: Probability
of stock market gain in next 1 year; BUS12: Financially good times in next 12 months;
BUS5: Financially good times in next 5 years; BEXP: Overall business environment
in next 1 year; UNEMP: Unemployment increase/decrease in next 1 year. Standard
errors are clustered by year-month, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. T-statistics
are shown in parentheses.
OPTINDX PSTK BUS12 BUS5 BEXP UNEMP
Income Rank 0.063 0.032 0.063 0.079 0.028 0.032
(31.41) (27.67) (22.55) (33.28) (14.54) (16.45)
College Degree 0.069 0.074 0.035 0.088 0.027 0.035
(12.24) (24.35) (5.54) (15.11) (5.25) (6.60)
Recession × Income Rank -0.020 -0.011 -0.049 -0.016 0.015 -0.027
(-3.40) (-2.92) (-7.24) (-2.71) (2.46) (-4.45)
Recession × College Degree -0.047 -0.016 -0.082 -0.025 0.007 -0.060
(-3.85) (-2.35) (-5.47) (-1.72) (0.52) (-5.19)
Observations 171549 56747 157013 162448 168607 170230
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.113 0.132 0.075 0.043 0.069
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Table 3.4: Changes to personal economic circumstances, SES and recessions. Linear
regression models. Controls include dummies for year-month, age, gender, marital sta-
tus. Standard errors are clustered by year-month, and are robust to heteroskedasticity.











Income Rank -0.057 0.112 0.045 -0.000
(-50.96) (53.56) (24.75) (-1.18)
College Degree -0.025 0.063 0.157 -0.001
(-7.97) (11.55) (29.65) (-0.68)
Recession × Income Rank 0.010 -0.024 -0.022 0.002
(2.82) (-3.99) (-5.79) (2.14)
Recession × College Degree 0.005 -0.010 -0.095 0.005
(0.53) (-0.61) (-6.61) (1.66)
Observations 171371 171371 170772 68458
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.113 0.091 0.258
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Table 3.5: SES and expectations, controlling for changes to individuals’ personal cir-
cumstances. Linear regression models. Controls include dummies for year-month, age,
gender, marital status. OPTINDX : Overall macroeconomic optimism index. Standard
errors are clustered by year-month, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. T-statistics






Income Rank 0.063 0.034 0.070 0.035
(31.41) (18.75) (22.74) (12.40)
College Degree 0.069 0.015 0.115 0.049
(12.24) (2.95) (14.15) (6.62)
Recession × Income Rank -0.020 -0.010 -0.046 -0.029
(-3.40) (-1.86) (-5.69) (-4.07)
Recession × College Degree -0.047 -0.019 -0.071 -0.023
(-3.85) (-1.58) (-3.78) (-1.32)
1-yr Change in Personal Situation 0.146 0.157
(50.21) (32.89)




Observations 171549 170370 68450 68122
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.191 0.101 0.225
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Table 3.6: OLS Regressions of Choices and Attitudes on Beliefs and SES Variables.
Controls include dummies for year-month, age, gender, marital status. Invest: In-
dicator for investment in equities; Invest Share: Log(Amt Invested/Income); HOM:
Home buying Attitude; DUR: Durables Buying Attitude; CAR: Car Buying Attitude.
Standard errors are clustered by year-month, and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
OPTINDX Invest Invest Share HOM DUR CAR
Income Rank 0.060 0.142 0.075 0.071 0.037 0.061
(31.20) (104.69) (11.51) (29.31) (18.09) (27.24)
College Degree 0.063 0.120 0.301 0.080 -0.007 0.063
(12.22) (35.20) (23.47) (15.15) (-1.32) (11.09)
OPTINDX 0.035 0.121 0.201 0.203 0.232
(15.08) (12.68) (47.40) (45.64) (51.47)
Observations 171549 78706 43139 168796 163120 163267
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.284 0.238 0.196 0.102 0.093
Table 3.7: SES effects on choices and attitudes, direct and indirect through macroe-
conomic expectations.
Model Direct Indirect Total Indirect/Total (%)
Invest: Income 0.142 0.002 0.144 1.5%
Invest: Education 0.120 0.002 0.122 1.8%
Invest Share: Income 0.075 0.007 0.082 8.83%
Invest Share: Education 0.301 0.008 0.309 2.45%
Home: Income 0.071 0.012 0.083 14.57%
Home: Education 0.080 0.013 0.093 13.58%
Durables: Income 0.037 0.012 0.049 24.67%
Durables: Education 0 0.013 0.006 100%
Car: Income 0.061 0.014 0.075 18.66%
Car: Education 0.063 0.015 0.078 18.68%
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Table 3.8: OLS Regressions of Investment Decisions on Stock Market Beliefs and SES
Variables. Controls include dummies for year-month, age, gender, marital status. In-
vest: Indicator for investment in equities; Invest Share: Log(Amt Invested/Income).
Standard errors are clustered by year-month, and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
PSTK Invest Invest Share
Income Rank 0.031 0.134 0.073
(26.20) (82.56) (10.09)




Observations 56747 56361 33762
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.277 0.247
Table 3.9: SES effects on investment decisions, direct and indirect through expecta-
tions about future returns in the US stock market.
Model Direct Indirect Total Indirect/Total
Invest: Income 0.134 0.005 0.139 3.93%
Invest: Education 0.104 0.013 0.117 10.84%
Invest Share: Income 0.073 0.015 0.089 17.21%
Invest Share: Education 0.289 0.035 0.324 10.92%
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3.6 Supplementary Results
3.6.1 Time variation in other macroeconomic beliefs by SES
Figure 3.6: UNEMP by SES, over time
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Figure 3.7: BUS12 by SES, over time
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Figure 3.8: BUS5 by SES, over time
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Figure 3.9: BEXP by SES, over time
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3.6.2 Instrumental variable estimation of the effect of PSTK on investment
choices
In the main body of the paper we study the effect of stock market-related expec-
tations (PSTK) on investment decisions (see Table 3.8). Since there we focus on one
dimension of beliefs rather than on an aggregate measure based on several macroeco-
nomic beliefs (i.e., OPTINDX), an important issue is that there may be substantial
measurement error in the PSTK variable. We used an instrumental variables estima-
tion strategy to address this concern. Consider the following model for the decision to
invest in stocks:
invest = f(SES, PSTK∗, η) (3.1)
PSTK∗ = g′SES + u (3.2)
where invest equals 1 if the household participates in the stock market, PSTK∗ is the
true belief about positive stock returns and η and u are random noise. Assume the
observed stock market belief PSTK has measurement error e1.
PSTK = g′SES + u+ e1 (3.3)
The measurement error in observed stock belief induces endogeneity as the error term
in Eq (3.1) becomes a function of η and e1. We can instrument the noisy observed belief
with other observed beliefs in the data but the instrument should be such that there
is no correlation between the measurement errors. Consider another belief variable, x,
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with measurement error e2.
x = w′SES + v + e2 (3.4)
To use x as an instrument, we assume Corr(e1, e2)=0 and Corr(η,v)=0. Other reported
macro belief variables in the Michigan Survey like BUS12, BUS5, BEXP and UNEMP
could be used as an instrument for PSTK assuming their measurement errors are
uncorrelated. We use the same IV strategy for analyzing both the decision to invest in
stocks, as well as the share of income invested by the household.
In the first stage of the IV regression, for both decisions – whether to invest, and
what fraction of income to invest in stocks, we find as expected, that our belief instru-
ments, BUS12, BUS5, BEXP and UNEMP are strongly and positively related to
the stock market related belief PSTK. The IV estimate of the coefficient on PSTK is
positive and significant and implies that a 1% increase in this belief is associated with
a 0.2% increase in the stock market participation rate. The IV coefficient estimate is
somewhat larger than the OLS estimate (0.22 vs. 0.17, see Table 3.8) but the direction
and magnitude of these effects is similar. We also estimate a linear regression of log
amount invested scaled by income on the SES variables and PSTK, instrumented as
before. The coefficient on PSTK indicates that 1% increase in PSTK is associated
with a 0.90% increase in the fraction of income invested, broadly similar to the OLS
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